





Understanding the United Nations Security Council’s Decisions to 









Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 
 
 



































All rights reserved 
 
Abstract 




Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) has taken 
a leading role in investigating atrocities. Yet, the UNSC has only investigated atrocities 
committed in eleven out of the ninety-two states that have experienced atrocities during 
this period. This dissertation examines the reasons behind this disparity. To do so, this 
dissertation examines how past studies on atrocities investigations do not account for the 
work of the UNSC in this field, and how past studies on the UNSC cannot explain its 
actions on atrocities investigations. Instead, by relying on historical records and 
interviews with decision-makers, this dissertation argues that the UNSC’s decisions on 
which atrocities to investigate are committee projects, which can only be understood 
through the prism of the UNSC’s decision-making process. Because of the constraints 
imposed by the UNSC process, an atrocities investigation will take place only after (i) a 
diplomat brings specific atrocities to the attention of the UNSC, (ii) an independent 
commission of inquiry supports the creation of an atrocities investigation, and (iii) the 
UNSC members become comfortable with the text of the authorizing resolution. This 
dissertation examines the political decisions behind each of these three steps and 
highlights how the decision-making process guides and influences the UNSC’s actions. 
By doing so, it provides an explanation on the aforementioned double standard in the 
UNSC’s work vis-à-vis atrocities. 
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The fundamental problem of modern man, not yet adequately appreciated, 
is to learn how to build his international organizations on the basis of a 
wise understanding of the lessons of history and a perceptive estimate of 
the issues and forces which will challenge his survival and welfare in the 
future.  




Over a month ago the United States proposed to the United 
Kingdom, Soviet Russia and France a specific plan, in 
writing, that these four powers join in a protocol 
establishing an International Military Tribunal, defining 
the jurisdiction and powers of the tribunal, naming the 
categories of acts declared to be crimes, and describing 
those individuals and organizations to be placed on trial. 
Negotiation of such an agreement between the four powers 
is not yet completed. 
Justice Robert Jackson, Report to the President on 
Atrocities and War Crimes, June 7, 1945.1 
On July 14, 2008, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, requested from the judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chamber that the President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, be indicted for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Moreno-Ocampo explained that “there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir…bears criminal responsibility under the 
Rome Statute for the crime of genocide…for crimes against humanity…and for war 
crimes.”2 From a legal perspective, Moreno-Ocampo’s presentation of evidence and law 
convinced the judges. Bashir was indicted. But, since Sudan is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, how did Moreno-Ocampo have the power to prosecute Bashir? How could the 
ICC pierce Sudan’s sovereignty by authorizing an investigation into the actions of its 
government and targeting its head of state? The answer to these questions lies in United 
Nations Security Council (‘UNSC’) Resolution 1593,3 whereby the members of the 
                                                        
1 Jackson (1945).  
2 Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, ICC-02/05 (July 14, 2008).  
3 S/RES/1593 (2005). 
 
 2
UNSC created this investigation. The goal of this dissertation is to clarify the political 
dynamics in international affairs behind such UNSC decisions.   
Judicial investigations take place for only a small number of atrocities, 
creating a peculiar situation for international politics.4 Victims of overlooked atrocities 
justifiably complain that their perpetrators should also face justice. Those alleged 
perpetrators under investigation, perhaps also justifiably, complain that they should not 
be tried and punished for acts that routinely go unpunished. The world is rife with such 
double standards. The RUF atrocities in Sierra Leone became the focus of an 
international criminal tribunal, while nothing happened for the RUF atrocities in 
neighboring Liberia and Guinea. The ICC is investigating the atrocities committed by the 
Qaddafi regime in Libya, but it is not doing so for the objectively worse atrocities 
committed by the Assad regime in Syria. The politics of international justice for atrocities 
are such that these paradoxes often appear within the same country and at the same time. 
In Rwanda, for example, the ICTR has not investigated crimes committed by Tutsis 
against Hutus, but has focused on those committed by Hutus against Tutsis. In Cambodia, 
while Khmer Rouge leaders are on trial for crimes they committed between 1975 and 
1979, the temporal span of the international investigation has been restricted to exclude 
crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge before their rise to power in 1975 and after their 
fall in 1979.  
While such double standards relating to issues of international criminal 
justice abound, this dissertation focuses on the actions of the UNSC and its decisions to 
                                                        
4 This double standard also hampers the greater goal of the human rights movement for accountability. 
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initiate international criminal investigations in the post-Cold War period. As illustrated in 
Map 1 below, out of the ninety-two states that have experienced atrocities since the end 
of the Cold War, the UNSC has authorized the creation of international atrocities 
investigations in only five instances, which cover only eleven states. The limited number 
of atrocities that the UNSC has investigated is even more puzzling as some of the five 
investigations authorized by the UNSC target atrocities that are very similar to other 
atrocities that have not received an investigation. For example, the UNSC created an 
atrocities investigation for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities committed in Rwanda in 1994, but 
not for the Hutu-Tutsi atrocities committed in neighboring Burundi from 1993 until 2005. 
Similarly, the UNSC created an investigation into the suppression of the Arab Spring in 
Libya by Colonel Qaddafi, but not for similar or worse atrocities arising out of the 
suppression of the Arab Spring in other countries (e.g. Syria, Egypt, Bahrain).  So, why 
do the fifteen members of the UNSC decide to investigate specific atrocities, but fail to do 
so for others? This is the question this dissertation will answer.  
Ultimately, when trying to understand these apparent double standards, all 
participants in international justice, whether perpetrators, victims, defendants, 
prosecutors, or even presidents who have been indicted by the ICC realize that, behind 
the UNSC’s decision to create an international atrocities investigation, ‘it’s all politics.’  
Academics agree. As a review of past studies demonstrates, there are two 
broad categories of answers that may explain the UNSC’s actions in creating atrocity 
investigations. On the one hand, studies on atrocity investigations provide four models 
for why a decision is made to investigate atrocities. On the other hand, studies on 
decision-making at the UNSC, which focus on issues such as sanctions, peacekeeping 
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and military intervention, provide legal and political explanations into why the UNSC so 
rarely decides to investigate the commission of atrocities. Yet, none of these studies 
captures the essence of decision-making at the UNSC, where the UNSC members have to 
overcome coordination and cooperation problems to reach a group decision. As such, the 
past analyses fall short of providing a satisfactory explanation on why the UNSC 
members decide to create international atrocities investigations.   
Contrary to the prior analyses, this dissertation asserts that the UNSC’s 
decisions to authorize atrocity investigations are best explained by examining decision-
making within the UNSC. More specifically, this dissertation locates the answer to the 
question of this dissertation (i.e. why the fifteen UNSC members decide to investigate 
specific atrocities) in the UNSC’s procedures of operation, which allow the UNSC 
members to coordinate and/or cooperate within the UNSC. The UNSC decision-making 
procedure involves three steps, as the UNSC (i) comes to hear about certain events, (ii) 
evaluates its responses to these events and (iii) formulates its decisions. This dissertation 
argues that each of these three steps is necessary, and together they are sufficient, for a 
UNSC decision to authorize an atrocities investigation. As a result, this dissertation 
examines each of these three steps. 
The interviews shed considerable light on the nuances of the behind-the-
scenes negotiations at the UNSC. Beyond this, however, the interviews also challenged 
some assumptions of the literature on the UNSC. The participants in the interviews found 
it impossible to identify a few factors that trigger the UNSC’s decision to create 
international atrocities investigations. To the contrary, across all interviews, the constant 
theme was that all factors matter and no two situations with atrocities are ever similar. In 
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the eyes of the participants, therefore, it was hard, if not impossible, to identify a clear 
causal mechanism for the UNSC’s work and to answer the question of this dissertation in 
a few words.  




Additionally, the participants at these interviews were quick to highlight 
that the decision-making procedures at the UNSC are of central importance in 
understanding the UNSC’s decisions. The majority view among those interviewed was 
that, while procedural steps are not sufficient to lead to the final outcome, they are 
necessary. Both of the above observations clash with long-held assumptions of the 
academic literature on the work of the UNSC, which has emphasized the existence of 
identifiable causal pathways and the role of power politics, not procedure, in the work of 
the UNSC. The clash becomes particularly noteworthy as, apart from the active role that 
the participants of the interviews had in the decisions of the UNSC, most participants also 
had (perhaps surprisingly) a good understanding of the academic writings on the work of 
the UNSC.  
Even though this dissertation as a whole relies of the historical records and 
the interviews, the various chapters use these sources in different ways. 
Methodologically, the use of the historical case studies is a contested point in the political 
science literature,5 with those in one extreme arguing for detailed case studies exceeding 
in number the tested explanations,6 while those on the other extreme relying on one 
detailed case study for all explanations.7 Because of the thorough data collected through 
the historical records and the interviews, the Chapters of this dissertation use, in turn, all 
possible approaches. Chapter Four examines how diplomats are central to bringing up 
atrocities at the UNSC through three case studies. Chapter Five presents one case study                                                         
5 For an overview, see McKeown (1999). 
6 E.g. King, Keohane and Verba (1994). 
7 E.g. Eckstein (1975) (the ‘crucial case-study’). 
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for all the arguments on why the UNSC members use third-parties before deciding. 
Finally, Chapter Six presents a series of five short case studies to examine why diplomats 
rely on precedent at the UNSC. 
The argument and findings of this dissertation present significant lessons 
for the study of international affairs. To start, this dissertation presents a few lessons for 
the greater field of international relations. In line with the institutionalist literature, this 
dissertation confirms that a state’s power within an institution is an important explanatory 
variable in international relations. While more traditional writings assert that states 
prioritize power in the absolute or vis-à-vis other states, this dissertation argues that states 
are also concerned about their power within an international organization. New Zealand, 
not a very powerful state by any measure, was able to convince the members of the 
UNSC to create the ICTR. And, while the veto at the UNSC preserves a central role for 
the more traditional notion of power, its use does not reflect a policy of constant 
emphasis on absolute or relative power. The United States, for example, chose not to veto 
the referral of the Darfur investigation to the ICC,8 because a veto would have 
undermined its position, and made it more difficult to accomplish other goals, within the 
UNSC. 
Additionally, this dissertation underscores why studies of international 
organizations should consider the procedural elements of these international 
organizations. In the past, a few significant studies have examined various characteristics 
                                                        8 Darfur is a region in the western part of Sudan. 
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of international organizations, such as their precision, delegation and organization.9 
However, these studies overlook the fact that the procedure of international organizations 
with similar levels of such characteristics may affect their operations in significantly 
different manners. For example, the European Union (‘EU’) and the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) both increasingly delegate tasks to judicial bodies. In both cases, a 
judicial body can determine if a member state of that international organization has 
violated the policies and rules of the organization. Yet, the procedure for bringing a case 
to these judicial bodies is significantly different and each procedure leads to substantially 
divergent results. In the EU, for example, any individual citizen of an EU member state 
can file a complaint against a member state and can claim retroactive damages. At the 
WTO, only a member state can file a complaint and such complaint can only seek 
prospective compensation. These two procedural differences between potential plaintiffs 
and type of compensation, are sufficient to substantially differentiate the role of the EU 
court from that of the WTO and to render the common category of ‘high delegation to 
judicial body’ practically meaningless.  
Finally, the present dissertation emphasizes the role of evolution in 
international relations. Many past studies present discrete historical facts. Yet, 
international affairs are constantly in flux. Moreover, the UNSC’s decisions on atrocities 
investigations in 2005 were certainly influenced by its decisions in 1994. A few 
participants in the interviews for this dissertation, for example, emphasized that their 
actions on a certain topic were influenced by their past policy on the topic, their past 
                                                        
9 Abbott and Snidal (2000). 
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decisions on a similar topic, their future goals, or ongoing events. An analysis that 
focuses on a narrow set of historic events is thus likely to miss this larger context. 
Through the prism of the UNSC’s decision making procedures, this dissertation allows 
for the observation of these moving pieces in a coherent framework, with the goal of 
capturing the greater evolution of international affairs with regards to atrocities 
investigations rather than making an argument that only applies to a few specific case 
studies. 
The rest of this dissertation is organized in seven chapters. Chapter One 
presents the facts. It identifies the atrocities committed in the post-Cold War era and the 
role of the UNSC in international affairs. Chapter Two presents the answers of previous 
analyses to the question of this dissertation, and explains how these answers do not 
adequately explain the UNSC’s decisions on atrocities. Then, Chapter Three develops the 
argument of this dissertation. The subsequent three chapters examine in turn the three 
necessary steps for the creation of an atrocities investigation by the UNSC. Chapter Four 
thus considers the role of a patron diplomat at the UNSC in initiating the debate on the 
role of an atrocities investigation. Chapter Five turns to the role that an independent third-
party has in the deliberations of the UNSC members over the creation of an atrocities 
investigation. Chapter Six presents the UNSC’s decisions relating to the drafting of the 
final resolutions. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the argument and presents some 
general observations on the UNSC. 
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to define the term 
‘international atrocities investigation,’ which is used throughout this dissertation. The 
term atrocity, despite its clarity in colloquial use, is “unclarified and infuriatingly 
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obscure” for use in political science or the law.10  Past attempts to arrive at a precise 
definition have been largely unsuccessful. In the Justinian code, for example, an atrocity 
included all acts that were legally inexcusable even when carried out under formal 
orders.11 At the Nuremberg tribunal, after the end of World War II, an atrocity was 
described as an act “in evident contradiction to all human morality and every 
international usage of warfare.”12 Grappling with the vagueness of this term, the United 
Nations International Law Commission later adopted an expansive definition.13 
Nevertheless, as the term remains unwieldy for any precise application, it has never been 
used by the various international criminal tribunals. The latter, rather than going after 
atrocities, have targeted the precisely defined crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. For the purposes, therefore, of this analysis, an atrocity is a 
reference to any act that could amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes. In line with previous such uses of this term,14 the term aims to capture all of the 
acts that could qualify as violations of domestic law, international humanitarian law, 
international criminal law, and laws and customs of war. 
                                                        
10 Osiel (1998). 
11 Digest of Justinian, Law 157, tit. XVII, Lib. L. 
12 War Crimes Reports 7 (1947) 27, 41-42. 
13 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th 
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 198, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991) (defining atrocities “as acts of inhumanity, cruelty 
or barbarity directed against the life, dignity or physical or mental integrity of persons [in particular wilful 
killing, torture, mutilation, biological experiments, taking of hostages, compelling a protected person to 
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war after the 
cessation of active hostilities, deportation or transfer of the civilian population and collective 
punishment];”). 
14 E.g. Scheffer (2013). 
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The second term used throughout this dissertation is ‘investigation.’ As 
defined by the jurisprudence of the ICC, an investigation “signif[ies] the taking of steps 
directed at ascertaining whether [individuals] are responsible for that conduct, for 
instance by interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or 
carrying out forensic analyses.15 While the concept of an investigation of a crime is 
closely related to that of a criminal trial, there is an important conceptual distinction 
between the two processes. Once an investigation into an atrocity crime has taken 
place—a purely political decision—there are many non-political considerations that can 
prevent or compel the creation and/or success of the subsequent trial. For example, when 
the prosecutor of the ICTY investigated the practice of extrajudicial killings in Bosnia, 
the prosecutor examined hundreds of mass graves throughout the countryside. Yet, 
ultimately, she decided to indict only certain individuals and presented only a small 
subset of the evidence from the mass graves at these trials. A prosecutor’s rationales for 
his or her primary initial decisions (namely, who to accuse and with what evidence) can 
vary and often are not political (e.g. lack of proper evidence or trial time management).16 
But, the decision of the UNSC to investigate the atrocity crimes committed in Bosnia 
was, at its core, a political decision, which the rest of this dissertation will focus on 
explaining. 
                                                        
15 ICC, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali, 30 August 2011, ICC-01/09-02/11-274, paras. 1 and 40; ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I, The Prosecutor v. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, 11 October 2013, ICC-01/11-01/11, 
para. 66. 
16 For the same reasons, this dissertation does not examine the proprio motu investigations commenced by 
the ICC’s Prosecutor. See more below. 
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Chapter One. The Facts: Atrocities Investigations and the UN Security Council 
3 November 2013 
Nairobi, Kenya 
Dear Mr. President, 
I attach a letter expressing the opposition of the victims in 
the Kenyatta case at the International Criminal Court to 
any resolution by the Security Council to suspend the 
prosecution of that case. 
On behalf of those victims, I would be grateful if you could 
bring this letter urgently to the attention of the members of 
the Security Council.  
Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
Fergal Gaynor 
Legal Representative of Victims 
The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, International 
Criminal Court.17 
 
In the post-Cold War era, conflicts—both international and civil—
continue to plague the world. Similarly, repressive states and dictatorial regimes continue 
to suppress, often violently, their own populations. As a result, even though the Cold War 
ended, atrocities continue to take place.  
At the same time, and continuing since the end of World War II, the 
UNSC has been the primary institution for maintaining peace and stability in the 
international system. Since 1993, unshackled from the East-West divide of the Cold War, 
the UNSC has responded to several atrocities through the creation of international 
investigations, leading to the question behind this dissertation. 
                                                        
17 Gaynor (2013).  
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This Chapter provides an introduction to the subsequent analysis of the 
UNSC’s decisions on atrocities. Its goal is to present the existing facts relating to both 
atrocities investigations and the UNSC, in an effort to create the setting for the 
subsequent analysis. To do so, it presents, in Part I, where atrocities have taken place in 
the post-Cold War era. Parts II and III evaluate how other domestic and international 
atrocities investigations have been created in response to these atrocities, indicating that 
the UNSC is one of many actors in this field. In Part IV, the Chapter turns its attention to 
the role of the UNSC in international affairs. Finally, Part V concludes the contextual 
presentation of this Chapter by explaining how the UNSC operates, specifying the 
extensive role of its procedural rules. 
Part I. The Location of Atrocities 
It is hard to know where, when and which atrocities have taken place. 
Many atrocities remain unreported. Perpetrators seldom talk about their acts. Victims of 
violence often prefer not to report the events, causing bias in any count of atrocities.18 In 
Darfur, for example, after conducting interviews and surveys of Darfuri refugees, the 
Atrocities Documentation Team of the U.S. Department of State, which was organized by 
the U.S. government to catalogue the crimes committed in Darfur,19 was able to get some 
sense of the scale of the atrocities that had been committed in the region. It concluded 
that 67% of refugees had witnessed a killing and 16% had witnessed or experienced rape. 
It clarified its findings, however, by noting that “it is very likely that rapes are 
                                                        
18 Such bias is the result of Type II errors (i.e. false negatives). 
19 For an overview of the work of the Atrocities Documentation Team, see Documenting Atrocities in 
Darfur (2004); Totten and Markusen (2013). 
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underreported because of the social stigma attached to acknowledging such violations of 
female members of one’s family.”20  
Additionally, it is hard to document even those atrocities that get reported, 
i.e. those for which someone is willing to speak out. For example, how can a research 
team away from the conflict zone know, with reasonable certainty, that a death, rape or 
kidnapping occurred in a remote village? In the case of Darfur again, the Atrocities 
Documentation Team noted how “the data may actually undercount the extent of 
atrocities because mass attacks often leave few survivors.”21 This uncertainty introduces 
additional bias in the count of atrocities. 
Such difficulties are hard to overcome even with an abundance of 
resources. In Cambodia, for example, the Documentation Center for Cambodia, with a 
significant budget, permanent staff and the cooperation of Yale University’s Cambodian 
Genocide Project and—at least sometimes—of the Cambodian government, spent ten 
years to identify 19,733 mass burial pits and 196 prisons that operated during the Khmer 
Rouge regime (1975-1979). Even though it has created a map of the killing fields,22 the 
Documentation Center has yet to complete its task of reconstructing the historical 
records. 
In addition to these practical difficulties, any attempt to quantify atrocities 
overlooks their qualitative nature. In other words, not all atrocities should be counted as 
equals. The murder of ten random local civilians is unlikely to have the same effect on a                                                         
20  Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (2004). 
21  Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (2004). 




conflict with, for example, the killing of ten local leaders. One could even argue that the 
mere kidnapping of the ten local leaders can have a greater impact on a local community 
and a conflict than the murder of ten random civilians. In reality, countless suicide 
bombings in Pakistan over recent years have resulted in hundreds of casualties in the 
aggregate, yet have not had the same effect on the peace and security of Pakistan as the 
2007 killing of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto or the 2014 massacre of 132 
schoolchildren in Peshawar. A quantification measure, however, would treat all these 
atrocities equally and would omit important qualities of the underlying facts.  
Creating a dataset of atrocities appears to be an impossible task. Yet, some 
past studies have tried to identify the commission of atrocities by relying on proxy 
measures.  A few datasets that count the number of deaths in conflict are often used as 
proxies for the presence of atrocities. Jo and Simmons, for example, in their attempt to 
determine the deterring effect of the ICC on atrocities, rely on the dataset of one-sided 
violence by Eck and Hultman.23 Similarly, Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay, in their 
effort to examine why guerillas resort to violence against noncombatants, rely on the 
Correlates of War Project and construct a count of mass killings.24 
A few other studies have constructed more complicated proxies for 
atrocities, by moving beyond the measure of deaths in conflict. Mullins, for example, 
examines all civil and international conflicts from 1945 until 2008 and, borrowing 
techniques from domestic criminology, estimates the number of atrocity victims.25 In                                                         
23 Jo and Simmons (forthcoming). 
24 Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004). 
25 Mullins (2010). 
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Mullins’ count, for example, the atrocities committed in Angola’s civil war, which 
ranged from 1974 until 2002, led to approximately 1,500,000 victims. In a similarly 
nuanced count of atrocities,26 Harff created a dataset that categorizes atrocities committed 
from 1955 until 2012 by magnitude of death (on a 0 to 5 scale) and the type of violence 
(ethnical, revolutionary, regime change and general).27 According to this scale, Angola’s 
civil war was a regime change war that averaged at 2.96 on the magnitude of death 
scale.28  
A different route in documenting atrocities is to avoid numerical 
references. Stanton, for example, constructed an eight-step model to describe the 
escalation of mass killings. The steps are, in progressive order: classification, 
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination 
and denial.29 Stanton applied this eight-step model to all conflicts since 1945 and created 
a list of countries that have erupted or are likely to erupt into genocidal violence. 30 In 
Stanton’s model, Angola’s civil war was a, step five, polarized conflict.  
 
 
                                                         
26 Harff (2003). 
27    Harpff’s 0-5 scale of magnitude of death is (code – number of deaths): 0< 300; 0.5=300 – 1000; 
1.0=1000 – 2000; 1.5=2000 – 4000; 2.0=4000 – 8000; 2.5=8000 - 16,000; 3.0=16,000 - 32,000; 3.5=32,000 
- 64,000; 4.0=64,000 - 128,000; 4.5=128,000 - 256,000;  5.0>256,000. 
28 The dataset can be accessed at http://www.gpanet.org/content/genocides-and-politicides-events-1955-
2002.  
29 The description of each step can be found at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/8stagesofgenocide.html.  




Table 1. Countries with Atrocities since 1990 
1. Afghanistan 32. Gambia 63. Niger 
2. Albania 33. Georgia 64. Nigeria 
3. Algeria 34. Ghana 65. North Korea 
4. Angola 35. Guatemala 66. Pakistan 
5. Armenia 36. Guinea 67. Palestine31 
6. Azerbaijan 37. Guinea-Bissau 68. Papua New Guinea 
7. Bangladesh 38. Haiti 69. Peru 
8. Benin 39. Honduras 70. Philippines 
9. Bhutan 40. India 71. Russia 
10. Bolivia 41. Indonesia 72. Rwanda 
11. Bosnia 42. Iran 73. Saudi Arabia 
12. Burma 43. Iraq 74. Senegal 
13. Burundi 44. Israel 75. Serbia 
14. Cambodia 45. Kenya 76. Sierra Leone 
15. Cameroon 46. Kosovo32 77. Slovenia 
16. Central African Republic 47. Kuwait 78. Somalia 
17. Chad 48. Laos 79. South Sudan 
18. Colombia 49. Lebanon 80. Sri Lanka 
19. Comoros 50. Lesotho 81. Sudan 
20. Congo 51. Liberia 82. Suriname 
21. Cote d'Ivoire 52. Libya 83. Syria 
22. Croatia 53. Mali 84. Tajikistan 
23. Djibouti 54. Mauritania 85. Thailand 
24. Democratic Republic of the Congo 55. Mexico 86. Togo 
25. East Timor 56. Moldova 87. Uganda 
26. Ecuador 57. Montenegro 88. Ukraine 
27. Egypt 58. Morocco 89. Venezuela 
28. El Salvador 59. Mozambique 90. Western Sahara 
29. Eritrea 60. Namibia 91. Yemen 
30. Ethiopia 61. Nepal 92. Zimbabwe                                                         
31 As of the writing of this dissertation, Palestine has been recognized as a state by 136 of the 193 UN 
member states. In 2012, Palestine was granted the status of non-member observer state by the UN General-
Assembly. But, Palestine has not been recognized as a state by the UNSC or the UN. Among the P5, 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States do not recognize Palestine as a state. Yet, several 
initiatives relating to atrocities investigations (such as the ICC’s preliminary examination into the situation 
in Palestine, which started in 2015) have treated Palestine as if it were a state.  
32 As of the writing of this dissertation, Kosovo has been recognized as a state by 111 out of the 193 UN 
member states. But, Kosovo has not been recognized as a state by the UNSC or the UN. Among the P5, 
Russia and China do not recognize Kosovo as a state. Yet, several initiatives relating to atrocities 
investigations (such as the Kosovo War and Ethics Crimes Court established by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo) have treated Kosovo as if it were a state.  
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31. FYROM 62. Nicaragua  
 
By relying on “the best available measure to assess” where atrocities have 
taken place in the post-Cold War era,33 these studies risk presenting biased estimates of 
atrocities. But, even though the magnitude of victimization may be under- or over-
reported, the above studies are helpful in laying out the geographical span of atrocities. 
As portrayed in Map 2 and listed in Table 1, the above datasets, when combined, identify 
that ninety-two states have experienced atrocities in the post-Cold War era. While this list 
may be incomplete, precisely for the reasons mentioned above, historical records, reports 
from human rights NGOs, the U.S. State Department and the EU Commission confirm 
that these ninety-two countries have experienced atrocities since 1990. Since atrocities 
investigations require the prior commission of atrocities, the map below identifies where 
atrocities investigations are likely to arise and provides a useful starting point for the 
subsequent analysis. 
The UNSC is not the only institution to consider an investigation into 
atrocities. To the contrary, both domestic judicial bodies and other international actors are 






                                                         
33 Jo and Simmons (forthcoming). 
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Part II. Domestic Judicial Responses to Atrocities 
By the end of the Cold War, the global human rights movement had 
advanced its determination to instill justice mechanisms in the aftermath of atrocities. In 
what started as reactions to the Greek and Argentine juntas,34 states were gradually using 
domestic judicial tools to examine their pasts. Trials of former strongmen became 
emblematic of a movement for human rights accountability. In 1999, victim groups and 
human rights organizations succeeded in convincing the Spanish and U.K. authorities to 
examine the actions of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet. Similarly, in 2000, the 
authorities in Senegal were persuaded to investigate the brutal crimes committed by 
former Chadian President Hissène Habré. As the movement for accountability grew 
stronger, more states started examining their past. In Central America, Guatemala 
decided to investigate the actions of its military and political leaders during its civil war. 
In Eastern Europe, Romania prosecuted the commander of a communist-era labor 
camp.35 
A few states appeared eager to support the “justice cascade” even for 
atrocities committed outside their borders.36 To do so, these states empowered their 
criminal justice systems with extra-territorial jurisdiction. In these instances, a state may 
prosecute domestically citizens of foreign countries who are accused of perpetrating 
atrocities in foreign countries. While laws granting such extraterritorial jurisdiction have 
                                                        
34 See Sikkink (2011). 
35 Gillet, The Guardian (September 24, 2014). 
36 Sikkink (2011). 
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substantive legal differences,37 they have been responsible for a few notable atrocities 
investigations. Belgian courts, most famously, have investigated, prosecuted and 
convicted Rwandan nuns for helping Hutu genocidaires. A U.S. District Court in Florida 
convicted Chucky Taylor, the son of Liberian dictator Charles Taylor, because of 
Chucky’s actions in the Liberian civil war. Equally well-known, Spain’s prosecutors have 
investigated and attempted to prosecute Pinochet for his actions in Chile, and have 
investigated, prosecuted and convicted Argentine military officers for the disappearance 
of Spanish citizens in Argentina. 
The existence, however, of the “justice cascade” did not proceed 
uninterrupted. Some states that had experienced atrocities chose to prioritize arriving at 
the truth surrounding their atrocities rather than justice. The best-known example of this 
approach to atrocities comes from South Africa, where at the end of apartheid a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was set up “to enable South Africans to come to terms with 
their past on a morally accepted basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation.”38 In 
some form, such commissions were also created in various other countries.39 The work 
and results of many of these commissions is a highly contested topic, as they are often 
created in an effort to stem criticism of inaction rather than to produce any substantive 
results.40 For this dissertation, however, it is important to note that such truth 
commissions are often organized together with criminal investigations. In the most                                                         
37 See e.g. Randall (1987); Macedo (2006). 
38 Omar (1995) (Minister of Justice of South Africa).  
39 This list includes: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Philippines, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Korea, East Timor, Uganda, and Ukraine. 
40 See e.g. Hayner (2001). 
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famous example of such co-existence, in Argentina, the report of the National 
Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desparición 
de Personas) paved the way for the Trial of the Juntas. 
States, furthermore, interested in conducting a legal investigation for 
atrocities committed on their territory may face logistical problems. In such cases, states 
often resort to community-based initiatives for achieving justice and reconciliation. After 
the genocide in Rwanda, for example, it was impossible for the government of Rwanda to 
investigate and prosecute the actions of each genocidaire. Not only did the country not 
have the necessary infrastructure in place for such investigations, but such investigations 
were also believed to be counterproductive for peace as they would alienate Hutus and 
cripple the local economy, since multitudes of genocidaires would probably end up in 
jail. As a result, Rwanda instituted gaçaça proceedings, which are traditional community 
based initiatives, aimed at exposing the truth, empowering victims, achieving closure and 
punishment. Similar proposals for community-based investigations have occurred more 
recently in northern Uganda. There, Acholi leaders, in their effort to deal with the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, insisted on relying on traditional dispute resolution mechanisms rather 
than the Ugandan courts or the ICC.  
Similar to truth commissions, however, such community-based initiatives 
often go hand-in-hand with criminal investigations. In Rwanda, for example, while local 
communities conducted gaçaça procedures, the state of Rwanda organized its own 
domestic investigations and trials in Rwandan courts. Despite the existence of the state 
and local involvement in Rwanda, the international community, through the ICTR 
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conducted another parallel investigation. To understand how this came about, the next 
part presents how international actors become involved in atrocities investigations. 
Part III. The International Judicial Responses to Atrocities 
Apart from domestic atrocities investigations, the international community 
has also developed three tools for the investigation of atrocities, namely the creation of 
international criminal investigations at the request: (a) of the UNSC, (b) of the state that 
had experienced atrocities, or (c) for state-parties to the Rome Statute, of the ICC’s 
prosecutor. 
With the end of the Cold War, the UNSC turned its attention to regional 
conflicts and their attendant consequences. In the mid-1990s, with the P5 cooperating in 
unprecedented ways, the UNSC expanded its activities in an effort to stop conflict. With 
this mindset, the UNSC created international criminal tribunals with the task of 
investigating the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda 
(1994). As Chapter Five describes, the UNSC also seriously debated the creation of a 
similar international criminal tribunal for atrocities committed in Burundi (1993-1996). 
The creation, however, of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) meant that the UNSC had 
to deal with the management of international criminal justice. Among other things, funds 
had to be raised, evidence collected, witnesses protected, and judges selected. As all of 
these decisions fell on the UNSC members, by the late 1990s, the UNSC underwent a 
period of ‘tribunal fatigue.’ As a result, the UNSC was skeptical when faced with 
establishing another complete international criminal tribunal for the atrocities committed 
in Sierra Leone (2000). It instead decided to delegate the daily management of the 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘SCSL’) to the United Nations Secretary-General (the 
‘Secretary-General’) and the government of Sierra Leone, thereby creating the first 
hybrid international criminal tribunal. 
While the UNSC was experiencing ‘tribunal fatigue,’ a different use of 
international atrocities investigations begun in 1997. As part of a coalition government, 
attempting to transition to peace after more than 20 years of civil war, the co-Prime 
Ministers of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, sent a letter to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations asking “the assistance of the United Nations and 
the international community in bringing to justice those persons responsible for the 
genocide and crimes against humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 
1979.”41 The positive response of the UN led to the creation of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), a hybrid domestic and international 
court, which has investigated, prosecuted and convicted some, and is investigating other, 
high-level Khmer Rouge leaders. Since the Cambodian request, several other states have 
also sought international assistance with investigations into crimes committed on their 
territory. Sierra Leone, for example, asked for such assistance in 2000, in the midst of the 
UNSC’s deliberations on the creation of the SCSL. 
By the mid-1990s, supporters of international justice—both states and 
NGOs—had been arguing in favor of the creation of a permanent international criminal 
court. Initially, the idea was proposed by Prime Minister Robinson of Trinidad and 
Tobago, who suggested to the General Assembly in 1989 that the UN create an 
                                                        
41 S/1997/488 (June 24, 1997). 
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international court to counter the illegal drug trade. Soon thereafter, the UN General 
Assembly tasked the United Nations International Law Commission (‘ILC’), a group of 
international legal experts, with the drafting of a statute for a permanent international 
criminal court. Gradually, with the creation of the ICTY in 1993 and the ICTR in 1994, 
the focus of the ILC’s work shifted from drugs to atrocities. Then, from 1996 to 1998, six 
drafting sessions were held in New York on the creation of a statute for an international 
criminal court, with the participation of NGOs and state delegations. These sessions 
paved the way for a full debate on a draft statute in Rome, in July 1998. After a heated 
conference, the Rome Statute for the creation of the ICC was ratified on July 17, 1998. 
The ICC became operational on July 1, 2002, after 60 states ratified the Rome Statute.  
Article 13 of the Rome Statute details how the ICC may investigate 
atrocities. First, following the logic of the request of the Cambodian co-Prime Ministers 
mentioned above, Article 13 allows any state to request the assistance of the ICC in the 
investigation of an atrocity committed on its territory.  Since the ICC became operational 
in 2002, Uganda asked the ICC for such assistance in 2003, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo in 2004, the Central African Republic in 2004, Ivory Coast in 2010, Mali in 
2012, Comoros in 2013, and Ukraine in 2014.  
Second, following in the footsteps of the ICTY and the ICTR, Article 13 
of the Rome Statute invites the UNSC to refer atrocities investigations to the ICC. The 
UNSC has referred two investigations, the Darfur genocide in 2005 and the Qaddafi 
atrocities in Libya in 2011, to that court. In light of the opposition towards the ICC 
expressed by some of the UNSC’s permanent five members (the “P5”), both at the Rome 
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Conference and in subsequent years, the referral of atrocities to the ICC was no easy 
political feat.   
Finally, Article 13 also enables the ICC’s prosecutor to investigate 
atrocities committed in state-parties to the court on the prosecutor’s own volition.42 So 
far, these proprio motu investigations have been initiated for atrocities committed in 
Kenya in 2010 and in the Central African Republic in 2014. Such investigations are 
supposed to be based on the prosecutor’s assessment of specific legal factors,43 even 
though political calculations may also affect them.44 Despite the small sample of such 
investigations, the fear of a full proprio motu investigation has led many state-parties to 
the ICC to reform their domestic criminal law system. The most important such reforms 
are rumored to have occurred in Colombia, where a preliminary investigation by the ICC 
Prosecutor is still on-going, but due to the changes made by the local government appears 
unlikely to result in a full-fledged atrocities investigation.45 
So far, the three uses of international atrocities investigations have led to 





                                                         
42 Article XX of the Rome Statute. 
43 See the factors enumerated at Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (2007).  
44 For a cogent and non-conspiratorial analysis of such factors, see Bosco (2014). 
45 Interview: 17. 
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Table 2. Who Authorizes International Atrocities Investigations 
United Nations Security Council Domestic Requests ICC Prosecutor 
1. the former Yugoslavia, 
2. Rwanda, 
3. Sierra Leone, 




3. Republic of the 
Congo, 
4. Central African 
Republic (2004), 
5. Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, 
6. Ivory Coast, 
7. Mali, 
8. Comoros, and 
9. Ukraine. 
1. Kenya, and 









Part IV: The UNSC within International Affairs 
As mentioned above, the UNSC has been an active participant in the field 
of atrocities investigations since the end of the Cold War. In order, however, to examine 
the role of the UNSC on atrocities investigation, it is first necessary to appreciate the role 
and powers of the UNSC within international affairs at large. Preliminarily, it seems that 
such an analysis would have to start at the end of World War II, when the UNSC was 
created. Yet, historically, the analysis has to go back to 1919, as the outbreak of World 
War II was in part a failure of international institutions created at the end of the Great 
War.  
In 1919, after the end of World War I, the Paris Peace Conference led to 
the creation of the League of Nations. Yet, with limited powers and an intricate system of 
rules, the League of Nations proved to be a house of cards that all too quickly fell. 
The League of Nations was constructed on the idea of collective security, 
according to which all members of the League would respond together to an aggressor 
against any member. The Covenant generalized among all states. If, for example, war 
were to break out, regardless of the circumstances or the participants, the warring states 
would face an embargo.46 The Covenant was also drafted with mathematic logic of ‘if X, 
then Y,’ depriving the member states from having any discretion when determining their 
preferred course of action.47 As a result, if a dispute arose, it would be submitted to a 
third-party, then arbitration or judicial resolution,48 then to the Council of the League.49                                                         
46 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16.1. 
47 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 12. 
48 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 13. 
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(The Council consisted “of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League.”50) And, if 
the Council were to make a decision, all members of the League would automatically 
implement that decision.51 But, in line with its aspiration to universalism, the Covenant of 
the League of Nations provided that all decisions “require the agreement of all the 
Members of the League.”52  
Initially, the Covenant seemed to be working. In 1921, the League helped 
resolve the Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland.53 Then, in 1925, it 
managed to stop a militarized incident at the Greek-Bulgarian border at Petrich from 
erupting into another war between the two neighboring countries, which had already 
fought two bloody wars in the previous 20 years.54  
The initial success, however, of the League was short-lived, as the League 
proved unable to prevent, stop or rectify serious aggressive acts, such as the 1931 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the 1937 
Japanese invasion of China and the subsequent German annexations and expansions 
under the Nazis.  
The 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia is indicative of the League’s 
shortcomings. After Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, the European powers—particularly 
                                                                                                                                                                     
49 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 14. 
50 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 4. 
51 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16. 
52 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 5.1. 
53 Barros (1968). 
54 Hall (2000). 
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France—tried to appease Italy rather than risk pushing Mussolini into Hitler’s camp.55 
When the League’s Council agreed to hold naval demonstrations in the western 
Mediterranean as a warning to Italy, only the United Kingdom sent its fleet.56 Later, 
when the Council imposed an embargo on war equipment, credit lines, imports of Italian 
goods and exports to Italy of specific products,57 the decision was ignored by Albania, 
Austria, Hungary, all of Italy’s neighbors and League members, and the United States 
and Germany, which were not members of the League.58 Having failed to allow for 
discretion in its otherwise automatic and impartial decisions and as it was premised on a 
false sense of universality, the League failed to stop or prevent Mussolini’s army from 
attacking Abyssinia.  
Similar failures took place in response to the aggressions in Manchuria, 
China, and Czechoslovakia, leading an observer to poignantly conclude that “the idea that 
the international community organized through the League was united by a bond of 
common reason and good will conflicted with considerations of a political nature.”59 
Because of these political considerations, collective security gave way to appeasement, 
and then World War II. 
During World War II, the allied powers held a number of conferences to 
shape the international system after the war. Among these, the delegates to the 1944 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, in Washington D.C., were tasked with negotiating the                                                         
55 Zimmerman (1936).  
56 Zimmerman (1936). 
57 Zimmerman (1936). 
58 Feis (1947). 
59 Schiffer (1954). 
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creation of what would become the United Nations, an institution positioned at the 
pinnacle of issues relating to war and peace. Having learned from the failure of the 
League of Nations, delegates at Dumbarton Oaks debated what form the next incarnation 
of an international body to deal with issues of war and peace would take. By then, it was 
well known that the United States looked favorably upon the creation of a body that 
preserved special status for the few most powerful states in the international system. 
President Roosevelt, during World War II, had initially talked about creating a 
“trusteeship of power” among the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union 
and China. While the “trusteeship” later evolved into the “Four Policemen,” the idea 
remained that these four leading states would agree to (i) avoid conflict among them, (ii) 
stay away from each other’s sphere of influence and (iii) have a supervisory role over 
conflicts in their spheres of influence.60 
The Dumbarton Oaks Conference did not provide a final answer to how 
the concept of the “Four Policemen” would be cemented within the United Nations. The 
main sticking point was what power, if any, ‘One Policeman’ would have to stop the 
international institution from taking any action (i.e. the veto). This issue was resolved in 
Yalta, in February 1945. With France now also present, the “Big Five” decided that, 
within the United Nations, they would create a council tasked with maintaining peace and 
security. To preserve their special status, each of these five states would hold the power 
to veto any non-procedural decisions of this council. 
                                                        
60 Bosco (2009). 
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A few months later, in April 1945, at the United Nations Conference on 
International Organization in San Francisco, the role of the Big Five and their veto power 
was raised. Even though everyone understood the special position that these countries 
had in ending World War II and would have in maintaining peace in the future, states felt 
uneasy transitioning from the egalitarian framework of the League of Nations to the 
segregated system of the United Nations. After extensive debate, however, the Yalta 
understanding did not change.61 The UNSC was created as the central body on issues of 
war and peace and the five most powerful states would have veto rights over these issues. 
The drafting of the UN Charter in San Francisco signaled a major break 
from the covenant of the League of Nations. Established “to maintain peace and 
security”62 and based on the “principle of sovereign equality of all its Members,”63 the 
UN would be made out of “a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and 
Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a 
Secretariat.”64 Yet, to counter the difficulties faced by the League of Nations and “[i]n 
order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.”65  
                                                        
61 Hurd (2007). 
62 UN Charter, Article 1. 
63 UN Charter, Article 2(1). 
64 UN Charter, Article 7. 
65 UN Charter, Article 24. 
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The UN Charter lays out the details of the UNSC’s power and operations. 
First, Article 23 clarifies that the UNSC is composed of two-tiers of states.66 In the first 
rank are the five permanent members of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States of America (the “P5”). The second tier is composed of ten non-
permanent members (the “E10”). These latter states hold a UNSC seat for a two-year 
rotation, with half of the seats contested every year. These states are elected to the UNSC 
through the General Assembly. As the UN Charter calls for an “equitable geographical 
distribution”67 for the non-permanent members of the UNSC, each of the five regional 
groups (i.e. Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Caribbean, and 
Western Europe and Others) elects a representative to the UNSC each year. An Arab 
state is also always elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, alternatively from 
the African or Asian-Pacific regional group.  
The voting system of the UNSC is set out in Article 27. To approve any 
substantive (as opposed to procedural) decision, such as the creation of an atrocities 
investigation, the UN Charter requires that two elements be satisfied:68  
1. Nine out of the fifteen members of the UNSC vote in favor of the 
decision; and 
2. “[T]he concurrent votes of the permanent members.”  
There are two sides to the latter requirement. On the one hand, the obvious 
result of the requirement for a “concurrent vote” is the conferral of a veto to the P5.                                                         
66 UN Charter, Article 23. 
67 UN Charter, Article 23(1). 
68 UN Charter, article 27. 
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Through the process of backwards induction, the veto is a central element to the 
operation of the UNSC, one that affects all other elements of its functioning. In practice, 
the reach of the veto is such as to predetermine the agenda and content of the debates at 
the UNSC. It is, for example, unreasonable to expect that the UNSC will debate the 
situation in Tibet or Chechnya, as China or Russia are (reasonably) expected to veto any 
action on these respective issues.   
On the other hand, the text does not clarify how the requirement for a 
“concurrent vote” would deal with the practice of abstentions. This ambiguity seems to 
have triggered more academic commentary69 than concern from the UNSC’s member 
states, which continued to abstain. It was, finally, resolved in 1970, when the 
International Court of Justice in the Namibia case clarified that abstentions should be 
counted as concurrent votes under Article 27.70 As a result, Article 27 now provides that 
the UNSC can decide (i) without counting abstentions, after (ii) nine positive votes and 
(iii) no veto from the P5. 
The UN Charter also establishes the primacy of the UNSC on issues of 
peace and security. The leadership role of the UNSC on such matters is set out in Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter,71 according to which the UNSC “shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”72 and shall decide on 
actions against this threat. Most importantly, the actions of the UNSC may also include 
“such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore                                                         
69 See e.g. Stavropoulos (1967); Liang (1950); Gross (1968); McDougal and Gardner (1951). 
70 ICJ, Namibia Advisory Opinion, (1970). 
71 UN Charter, Articles 39-51. 
72 UN Charter, Article 39. 
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international peace and security.”73 While the UNSC cannot restrict any state from 
exercising its right of self-defense,74 the text of the UN Charter clearly allows the UNSC 
ample flexibility to determine both the existence of a threat to international peace and 
security and the method of dealing with this threat.  
The UN Charter did not only place the UNSC at the leading institutional 
position within the UN on issues of war and peace. It also placed the UNSC in the 
leading position of such issues in international affairs at large. Legally, the position of the 
UNSC in international affairs depends on the supremacy clause of the UN Charter.75 The 
latter mandates that the UN system enjoys primacy over any other regional or 
international system or multilateral or bilateral treaty in international affairs. As a result, 
the UNSC sits at the very top on issues of war and peace in international affairs. 
In this leading role, the UNSC has arguably big shoes to fill. It was given 
unprecedented powers to take any necessary action. Yet, deciding on such actions 
presupposes a common understanding among the members of the UNSC, and particularly 
among the P5, as to what constitutes a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.”76 With no clear criteria on this point, the need to make such determinations 
guaranteed that Roosevelt’s vision of the “Four Policemen” would continue to govern the 
international system, as the P5 would prioritize their own preferences in arriving at 
common decisions at the UNSC. 
                                                        
73 UN Charter, Article 42. 
74 UN Charter, Article 51. 
75 UN Charter, Article 103. 
76 UN Charter, Article 39. 
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The preferences of the P5 thus became a defining characteristic of the 
UNSC’s work. Because of this defining factor, the United States and Soviet vetoes acted 
as gating items to the UNSC’s involvement in the most important security issues during 
the Cold War. The wars in Korea and Vietnam, several civil wars in Africa and Central 
America, the Middle Eastern conflicts, the invasions of Grenada and Afghanistan and the 
division of Europe were among the obvious threats to peace and security that were never 
resolved at the UNSC because the preferences of the two great superpowers clashed. Yet, 
when both superpowers considered a situation as a threat to peace, the UNSC would take 
significant far-reaching actions. For example, it authorized peacekeeping missions in 
Zaire and Cyprus, brokered peace agreements in the Middle East and imposed sanctions 
against South Rhodesia.77 
After the end of the Cold War, without the U.S.-Soviet split, it has been 
easier for the P5 to arrive at a common conclusion over threats to international peace and 
security. As a result, the UNSC has taken actions more frequently than in the past.78 
Peacekeeping missions, diplomatic initiatives, sanctions and criminal tribunals have all 
been agreed upon for situations that would have likely prompted a P5 veto during the 
Cold War (e.g. those imposed on the former Yugoslavia). Additionally, in their analysis 
of peace and security, the focus of the P5 has shifted from international conflict to civil 
wars and failed states. The increased cooperation, however, has not changed the reality 
that the preferences of the P5 remain paramount in defining and targeting threats to                                                         
77 Bosco (2009). 
78  Up to the end of 1990, in its first 46 years, the UNSC passed 683 resolutions, which leads to an average 
of 14.9 resolutions per year. In the following 23 years, the UNSC has passed 1531 resolutions, for an 
average of 66.6 resolutions per year. 
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international peace and security. As witnessed, for example, in the UNSC’s actions on the 
ongoing conflict in Syria, the preferences of the P5 remain crucial. 
Because of the importance that the P5 preferences play in the work of the 
UNSC, a constant debate exists about the success of the UNSC on issues of war and 
peace. On the one hand, since the creation of the UNSC, deaths in conflict have 
decreased, nuclear war has not materialized, superpower conflicts have been neither 
direct nor global and, in some instances, significant threats to peace and security have 
been dealt with through the actions of the UNSC. On the other hand, the UNSC may not 
be responsible for any of the above. State preferences may operate independently of the 
UNSC. But, even those who assert that the UNSC has had a minimal role in maintaining 
international peace and security acknowledge that the UNSC enjoys unparalleled prestige 
and symbolism in international affairs.79 Because of these secondary roles, considering 
the actions of the UNSC is unavoidable when examining issues of peace and security. 
Understanding, however, how the UNSC makes decisions requires more 
than merely looking at its voting rules and acknowledging the role of the P5’s 
preferences. Similar to any institution, the UNSC follows a set of rules that control the 
debate and the outcome of its deliberations. In an effort to better appreciate how the 
UNSC arrives at its decisions, the next Part turns to these rules. 
Part V: How the UNSC Operates 
The UN Charter, apart from endowing the UNSC with the responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and setting its voting rules, also 
                                                        
79 See e.g. Bolton (2007).  
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gave the UNSC the power to “adopt its own rules of procedure….”80 Subsequently, in 
1946, when the UNSC held its initial meetings at Church House in London, it agreed to 
adopt its Provisional Rules of Procedure (the “Rules”). The Rules, which have been 
amended seven times since 1946, determine the method through which the UNSC acts. 
For example, Rule 18 determines that each UNSC member shall hold the Presidency of 
the UNSC for one calendar month, in alphabetical order, according to the member state’s 
English name. While this is a ceremonial position with no substantive benefits, it entails 
significant procedural responsibilities. The coverage of the Rules is broad enough to 
detail the most important elements of the UNSC’s work, such as the types of meetings 
available, the procedure for setting the agenda for each meeting, the procedure for each 
decision, and the role of the UN Secretariat at the UNSC. In brief, the Rules control the 
decision-making procedures of the UNSC.  
Chronologically, the order of the UNSC’s work follows Graph 1. The 
UNSC is first made aware of an event or situation that threatens the international peace 
and security through some form of communication. According to the Rules, such 
communications can come in the form of letters from either state members, other organs 
of the United Nations system (e.g. ECOSOC, IAEA), or the Secretary-General.81 The 
letters from the Secretary-General often consist of reports or statements on specific issues 
that the UNSC, in prior resolutions, had asked the Secretary-General to undertake.82 
                                                        
80 UN Charter, Article 30. 
81 Rules, Chapter II. 
82 See e.g. S/2012/894, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, 29 November 2012. 
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Finally, the UNSC sometimes also sends some of its representatives on missions, the 
results of which are also reported to the UNSC in the form of a letter.83  
Graph 1: UNSC Procedures 
 
All forms of communication that are addressed to the UNSC must be 
placed on the UNSC’s agenda by the Secretary-General. The agenda is public and is 
adopted at the beginning of every UNSC meeting. The President of the UNSC calls the 
UNSC members into a meeting, with each meeting focusing on a distinct topic. 
Sometimes multiple meetings are called in one day. 
Once a meeting has been called and the agenda has been adopted, the 
UNSC members decide what type of meeting will be held according to the topic on the 
agenda. There is a presumption in the Rules that a public hearing will be held on all 
matters,84 but any state can move the President of the UNSC to change the meeting to a 
private meeting.85 During private meetings, notes are taken, but only a single copy is kept 
with the Secretary-General.86 As a result, the public most often cannot find the opinions 
voiced or the reasoning behind the decisions taken during such private meetings.   
The deliberations on a specific topic signal the beginning of the main 
decision-making phase at the UNSC, during which the UNSC members engage in, mostly                                                         
83 See e.g. S/1994/1039, Report of the UNSC Mission to Burundi on 13 and 14 August 1994, 9 September 
1994. 
84 Rules, Chapter IX. 
85 Rules, Chapter I. 
86 Rules, Chapter I. 
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private, conversations to decide on the best response for a specific issue. Procedurally, at 
this stage, and even though it is not required by the Rules, the UNSC members routinely 
seek the recommendation of a third-party (e.g. the Secretary-General, the sanctions 
committee, a fact-finding mission). Such third-parties range from the Secretary-General 
and the subsidiaries bodies created by the UNSC to fact-finding missions and 
commissions of inquiry. In 2013, for example, the UNSC sought the opinion of the 
Secretary-General relating to the conflict in Mali.87 In another example, the UNSC 
mission to Burundi offered suggestions to the UNSC members on the diplomatic and 
peacekeeping roles the UNSC could play vis-à-vis that conflict. The International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur also provided the UNSC with a list of crimes that have 
taken place.  
After the UNSC has received the recommendations of these third-parties, 
it decides what actions it will take on a specific topic. Over the years, the UNSC has 
become very innovative. Despite their diversity, for analytical purposes, the actions of the 
UNSC can be divided into the following categories: 
1. taking no decision; 
2. calling for solution;  
3. proposing diplomacy; 
4. sending humanitarian aid; 
5. creating an investigation; 
                                                        
87 S/Res/2100 (2013). 
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6. imposing sanctions;88  
7. sending peacekeepers; or 
8. authorizing military force. 
The above ranking places the categories of UNSC action in order of 
intrusiveness, with military action as the greatest burden on a targeted state’s 
sovereignty.89 
After they have come to an agreement over the preferred course of action, 
the UNSC members translate their understanding into a document, resulting in two 
subsequent political decisions. First, the UNSC members have to decide which legal tool 
they will use as the conduit for their decision. The UNSC can call for a solution and 
propose a diplomatic plan of action (categories 2 and 3) through a Presidential Statement. 
The UNSC can also take any step (2-8) through a Resolution. However, a Resolution 
specifying that it is drafted under Chapter VII carries more legal power than one that does 
not make any mention of this Chapter. Admittedly, there are many different types of 
threats to international peace and security, some of which cannot be addressed with 
certain categories of actions described above. For example, Iran’s nuclear program 
cannot be solved through an international atrocities investigation, while Somalia’s civil 
                                                        
88 This category is not limited to economic sanctions but any measure against specified individuals. As 
such, it captures the UNSC’s decisions that target terrorism, including the creation of domestic anti-
terrorism legislation. 
89 There is a debate in the literature on the significance of the recent anti-terrorism resolutions, which 
dictate what measures all states must take to internally prevent and suppress terrorism. Some argue that the 
resolutions appear legislative in substance and exceed the legal scope of prior UNSC decisions. See e.g. 
Talmon (2003); Szasz (2002); Alvarez (2003). While recognizing the merit of these arguments, this 
dissertation follows the traditional ranking of UNSC actions, in which military intervention ranks as more 
intrusive than obligations to combat terrorism.  
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war and famine cannot be effectively addressed through sanctions. As a result, not all 
options may be available for all situations.  
Second, the UNSC members have to overcome drafting difficulties. 
Should, for example, a resolution authorize “all necessary means” or should it inform its 
target that it “will face serious consequences?”90 While the second option remains vague, 
some have argued that it includes the use of force as an available option.91 The first one, 
however, specifically allows the use of force. The choice between such formulations is a 
political decision that the UNSC members have to make before issuing their decision. 
Interestingly, even though it is not required by the Charter or the Rules, the UNSC 
routinely, and across all topic areas, resorts to its own precedent during the drafting 
phase. 
For UNSC decisions that have been taken under Resolutions, the public 
record also includes statements that any UNSC member state volunteered at the time a 
Resolution was adopted. While sometimes these statements are elusive, they often help 
explain the reasons behind why the decision was made.  
Apart from examining the Rules that guide the decision-making process, it 
is important to emphasize that the UNSC members have some other unusual ways of 
controlling the content of the agenda and the deliberations. Instead of waiting for a topic 
to appear in the agenda, a member of the UNSC can propose that the UNSC meet in 
informal consultations or that its members engage in an informal dialogue. Some 
members of the UNSC can even organize an “Arria meeting,” in which only other                                                         
90 Compare, for example, Resolution 1973 (2011) with Resolution 1441 (2002). 
91 For a detailed overview of these arguments, see Peter Goldsmith’s memo to Tony Blair (March 7, 2003). 
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interested states will be invited to attend.92 Through these unofficial paths, the members 
of the UNSC can agree off the record to a solution to a certain topic, then place that topic 
on the agenda and deal with it officially, even though the course of action is already 
determined.93 It is for this reason that the public records for some UNSC Resolutions note 
that the topic and the proposed Resolution are placed on the agenda “in light of prior 
consultations.”94 As a result, the member states can determine the content of the 
deliberations.  
Table 3: UNSC Procedure and Options 
A. Preliminary Steps B. Deliberation of Options C. Issuance of Decision 
Information From:  
• States, 
• UN Organs, 
• Secretary-General, or 
• UNSC Missions. 
 
Agenda 
• Organized by SG, and 
• Adopted at start of 
meeting. 
• No decision, 
• Call for solution, 
• Propose diplomacy, 
• Sending of humanitarian aid, 
• Create legal investigations, 
• Impose sanctions, 
• Send peacekeepers, or 
• Authorize military. 
Type of Tool: 
• Presidential Statement, 
• Non-Chapter VII 
Resolution, or 
• Chapter VII Resolution.  
 
Drafting Decisions 
• Reliance on Precedent 
 
 
In practice, the use of the closed consultations has resulted in the lack of 
public deliberation by the UNSC. Most of the time, after the deliberations and the voting 
has already taken place, the UNSC members read prepared statements in public. In very 
few instances will the UNSC hold public debates, in which any UN member state can 
express its views. When these debates lead to a UNSC Resolution, the Resolution deals 
                                                        
92 Rules, Chapter I. 
93 In doing so, the UNSC members are combining Steps A and B, and even Step C. 




with the broadest topics.95 Despite the presumption of a public hearing, through the use of 
non-public consultations, in practice, many important decisions are made behind closed 
doors.  
The steps identified in Table 3 present the decision-making process at the 
UNSC, which is, both by design and in practice, cumbersome. Within each of its three 
steps, there are several political decisions that the UNSC members have to agree on. The 
rest of this dissertation focuses on to these decisions. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has presented the contextual facts for answering the question 
of this dissertation (i.e. why the UNSC members have created certain atrocities 
investigations?). It started by specifying the locus of atrocities since the end of the Cold 
War, and explaining how some of these atrocities have been the targets of investigations 
created by domestic states or by international actors, including the UNSC. It then shifted 
its attention to the UNSC, and described its role within international affairs and its 
decision-making procedures. The following Chapter builds on this context to present the 






                                                         




Chapter Two. The Literature Review: The Existing Explanations 
The case of Darfur highlights a number of UN realities. 
Even Security Council agreements about issues such as the 
need to put an end to atrocities and to hold those 
responsible for them accountable at law translate into 
action only with enormous effort and luck. 
Nicholas Rostow, General Counsel and Senior Policy 
Adviser to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations, 2001-2005.96 
This dissertation aims to explain why the UNSC has authorized atrocities 
investigations in only eleven of the ninety-two states that have experienced atrocities 
since 1990. The previous Chapter presented the facts relating to these atrocities, including 
how both domestic states and international actors have responded to them by creating 
atrocities investigations. It also presented the UNSC, its history, power and decision-
making procedures.  
On the basis of these facts, this Chapter reviews the literature on atrocities 
investigations and the UNSC, with the goal of understanding how past studies respond to 
the question of this dissertation. As explained in detail below, past studies provide a 
number of explanations for the UNSC’s actions in this field. The explanations can be 
grouped into two large families. On the one hand, there are four models of atrocities 
investigations, each of which supports a different reason for the UNSC’s involvement in 
specific atrocities. On the other hand, legal and political science analyses of the general 
work of the UNSC provide disparate reasons for which the UNSC would decide on 
creating an atrocities investigation. After presenting these explanations, this Chapter 
                                                        
96 Rostow (2010). 
 
 47
argues that none of them satisfactorily accounts for the UNSC’s decisions to initiate 
specific atrocities investigations. 
The analysis of this Chapter proceeds in two parts. In Part I, this Chapter 
focuses on the literature on atrocities investigations. It examines how prior studies have 
understood the creation of the various atrocities investigations and identifies four models 
of atrocities investigation. It then illustrates why these four models do not explain the 
work of the UNSC. Then, Part II focuses on the literature on the UNSC’s work, which 
includes both legal and political science writings. It presents both the strengths and 
weaknesses of these analyses, and explains why they do not satisfactorily account for the 
UNSC’s decisions on atrocities investigations.  
Part I. Past Analyses of Atrocities Investigations 
The Four Models 
The creation of an atrocities investigation, whether domestic or 
international, involves a significant political decision. Not only will the investigation 
require material support, but there are reasonable fears that it may upset the political 
balance of power within a state, exacerbate the conflict and prolong, rather than end, the 
atrocities. Despite these fears, however, the previous Chapter documented how 
investigations have been taking place with increasing frequency.  
Several analyses have looked into the reasons why atrocities investigations 
are created. These analyses can be grouped in one of four ideal categories, namely the 
victorious, idealist, identity and liberal models. These four models identify the causes 
and the causal mechanisms behind the creation of international atrocities investigations. 
Accordingly, they answer, among others, the following questions: (i) who creates the 
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investigation, (ii) under what circumstances, (iii) for what goal, and (iv) for which 
atrocities. While the four models present concise and coherent answers to these four 
questions, they are not exclusive explanations for the creation of any single atrocities 
investigation. In reality, factors from each of the four models overlap when it comes to 
creating an investigation. For purposes of intellectual clarity, however, it is important to 
examine each model in turn.  
1. The Victorious Model 
The victorious model for the creation of atrocities investigations is rooted 
in the teachings of the realist school of political science. Under this model, political 
leaders, craving for power, use an atrocities investigation to target the losers of a political 
conflict. Whether following a successful international war or domestic regime change, 
the victorious leaders use atrocities investigations as a method to solidify their grip on 
power and ostracize the losers from the political community. These leaders are thus more 
interested in getting rid of a political opponent than in the details of an investigation. The 
creation of atrocities investigations in these circumstances is more likely to take place 
when the victors are not powerful enough to forgo dealing with the losers, but 
nonetheless confident that the investigation will not decrease their grip on power. In such 
situations, atrocities investigations will be created with the clear mandate of bolstering 
those who are already the most powerful. 
Historically, such use of atrocities investigations has been frequent. At the 
end of World War I, the victorious allies, as part of the Versailles Peace Treaty, aimed to 
put the German Kaiser Wilhelm I on trial for his role in beginning and then continuing 
the Great War. While the victorious allies were able to extract important concessions and 
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payments from the losing Germans, they remained worried that the Kaiser could act as a 
polarizing figure, one who would reignite the feuds leading to World War I. To avoid 
such a scenario, the victorious allies sought to prosecute the Kaiser, which they only gave 
up on when the Kaiser found refuge in the Netherlands, as a guest of the Dutch royal 
family, thereby removing himself from the political life in Germany and the continent. At 
that point, the desire for an investigation into his actions gradually waned. 
Later on, such uses of investigations became abundant in Europe. Hitler, 
for example, following his writings in Mein Kampf, created the Volksgerichtshof 
(People’s Court) that targeted the enemies of the Aryan race.97 Similarly, the Soviets used 
investigations in order to target weaker political opponents. Having perfected this system 
of political targeting in the domestic arena with the Moscow trials of 1936-1938, the 
Soviets supported investigations as a way to consolidate power and to undermine weaker 
opponents in the states of the Eastern bloc.98 Decades later, Huntington and Elster each 
documented how similar goals led the countries of Eastern Europe to hold transitional 
justice trials after the fall of the Soviet Union.99 In all of the above examples, the ruling 
regime targeted its weaker political opponents by instituting criminal investigations, 
which in turn allowed the new regime to consolidate power. 
The most recent clear manifestation of the victorious model comes from 
the creation of an atrocities investigation in the Ivory Coast. Following the civil war and 
                                                        
97 Bass (2000). 
98 E.g. the 1952 trial Rudolph Slansky in Czechoslovakia, who was the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and was purged by Stalin after Joseph Tito broke away from the 
U.S.S.R. After an eight day trial, Slansky was sentenced to death and executed by public hanging.  
99 Huntington (1991); Elster (1998). 
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the ouster of Laurent Gbagbo from the presidency, the government of his successor, 
Alessandre Ouattara, was quick to seek the assistance of the ICC in investigating 
atrocities committed during the Gbagbo era. As the victorious model would predict, the 
creators of the investigation were not entirely in control of the country, as they were 
propped up by UN forces and by France, which had intervened militarily. The Gbagbo 
side, which had lost the civil war, still had some political power, mainly in the 
predominantly Christian south of the country. By asking the ICC to investigate the local 
atrocities, the new Ouattara regime ensured that Gbagbo, his wife Simone Gbagbo, and 
his strongman, Charles Blé Goudé, were imprisoned at The Hague. This both physically 
impeded them and politically discredited them, precluding them from further claims to 
power. Due to these facts, it is no surprise that pro-Gbagbo supporters consider the ICC 
investigations to function as a biased form of “victor’s justice.”100 
2. The Idealist Model 
The idealist model for the creation of international atrocities investigations 
has its roots in the constructivist school of political science.101 Leaders can use atrocities 
investigations to restore the normative framework of a society. In such cases, the targets 
of investigations are not ordinary criminals, but those responsible for breaking the moral 
fabric of society and violating its foundational norms. Leaders are interested in the 
process of the investigation, as it helps with the healing that a post-conflict society has to 
undergo in order to overcome the trauma of the atrocities and deal with its past. In such 
                                                        
100 BBC, November 30, 2011.  
101 For similar beliefs in the power of the norm of justice, see Scheffer (2013); Orentlicher (1991); Meron 
(1998); Sikkink (2011). 
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instances, the creators of the investigation focus on the potential catharsis for the social 
group—both victims and perpetrators—rather than mere punishment or attribution of 
guilt. 
Historically, the most famous case study for this model arose at the end of 
World War II. The allies arrested the remaining leaders of the Nazi party and put them on 
trial. The process for the creation of the Nuremberg tribunals was initiated by the United 
States a few years before the end of World War II. Within the Roosevelt administration, 
there had been two opposing camps. Henry Morgenthau Jr., the Treasury Secretary and a 
close friend to President Roosevelt, tried to convince the Roosevelt administration to 
summarily execute the captured Nazi leadership. On the other side, Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of War, as part of his strategy to avoid reducing Germany to rubble, argued in 
favor of a trial for the Nazi leadership. Stimson, a Republican politician from New York, 
is most remembered for his decision to use two atomic bombs against Japan. For 
Germany, however, Stimson believed that a criminal investigation would help restore the 
normative boundaries that had been shattered by the Nazi ideals. The tribunal was thus 
created by the “massed angered forces of common humanity,”102 not a single state. Its 
goal was not only to punish the Nazis but also to “bring our law in balance within the 
universal moral judgment of mankind.” Its result was to create a standard for judging 
aggressive war, a prerequisite to “mak[ing] onward to a world of law and peace.”103 As a 
result, when commenting on these preferences during his opening statements at the 
Nuremberg trial, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, in his capacity as one of the                                                         
102 Stimson and McBundy (1947) (p. 588). 
103 Stimson and McBundy (1947) (p. 589-591). 
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four prosecutors at Nuremberg, considered the allies’ decision to create the court as “one 
of the most significant tributes that Power ever paid to Reason.” 
After Nuremberg, the idealist model was most recently manifested through 
the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone. While Chapter Four presents the facts 
behind the creation of that court in more detail, at this point it is worth noting that the 
court was partly created because President Kabbah of Sierra Leone asked the United 
Nations for assistance in dealing with the RUF leaders. Kabbah’s decision to seek such a 
court may also fall under the victorious model, as the court offered a means of ridding the 
country of, and diminishing the influence of, RUF leaders. In part, however, Kabbah’s 
decision was based on a need to restore the foundational norms of the Sierra Leonean 
society. Even though the chant “Di Wah Dohn-Dohn” signaled the end of hostilities, the 
fabric of the Sierra Leonean society had been torn apart, with hundreds of thousands of 
atrocities victims, including tens of thousands suffering from amputations of the hands, 
arms, feet or legs, living side by side with thousands of former rebels, many of which had 
been mere children when they committed the atrocities. An atrocities investigation was 
one of the mechanisms that would allow the Sierra Leoneans, in President Kabbah’s 
words, to “deal effectively with the trauma, the emotional pain resulting from that bitter 
conflict.”104 
3. The Identity Model 
The identity model for the creation of international atrocities 
investigations has its roots in the ethnographic studies of political science. Under this 
                                                        
104 Kabbah (2013) (p. 176). 
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model, those who seek to reaffirm their own identity, particularly if they perceive their 
identity to be under threat, initiate atrocities investigations. An investigation is thus a 
means to nourish, strengthen and better define the imaginary community of people who 
initiate the investigation. Similar to the construction of nationalist movements, the target 
of the investigation is the “other,” defined both as the threat to, but also in contrast to, the 
initiators’ own community.  
The most famous manifestation of the identity model is the Eichmann trial 
of 1961. Israel, yearning to find and punish the Nazis who planned and carried out the 
Holocaust, tracked down Adolph Eichmann in Argentina, kidnapped him and brought 
him to Tel Aviv and then put him on trial. Eichmann was unrepentant, the evidence (with 
his own hand-writing) conclusive. A death sentence was handed down, and following his 
execution, Hannah Arendt ignited a debate on criminal responsibility that continues to 
engage the world today.105 For purposes of this dissertation, however, it is important to 
note that Israel, first, decided to find Eichmann and, then, decided to kidnap and 
prosecute him, rather than merely killing him in Argentina. This is somewhat counter-
intuitive. As Bass notes, “if one wants to get rid of undesirables, using the trappings of a 
domestic courtroom is a distinctly awkward way to do so.”106 Grappling with the reasons 
behind the trial, Arendt consistently refers to the larger goals of the Israeli state, which 
under the leadership of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was not as interested in Eichmann as 
it was in highlighting the suffering of the Jewish populations during World War II.107 The                                                         
105 Arendt (1963). 
106 Bass (2000) (p. 6). 
107 Arendt (1963). 
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clearest statements of such goals were offered by Ben-Gurion himself. In reacting to 
Argentina’s protests regarding the kidnapping of Eichmann from its territory, Ben-Gurion 
said “…I am certain that only a very few persons in the world would fail to understand 
the profound motivation and supreme moral justification of the details of his capture.” 
Due to this “profound motivation,” the “trial of Adolf Eichmann illustrates the 
inescapable link between justice and identity politics.”108  
Following the Eichmann case, the identity model for the creation of 
atrocity trials is also manifest in the trials of the juntas in Argentina and in Chile, and in 
the trials of high-level Nazi collaborationists in France. In the 1980s, France prosecuted 
Maurice Papon, Klaus Barbie, and Paul Touvier, as part of a larger attempt to reconcile 
with the role the country played during World War II. These three trials highlighted how 
the actions of these members of the Vichy regime were incompatible with the national 
identity of modern France. Papon’s trial was “a particular vivid example…of 
France’s…passionate involvement with its past.”109 Far from an ordinary criminal trial in 
a domestic court, it was attended over its course by 146 accredited journalists and 1,413 
scholars, and “was attendant with the expectation that [it] would yield lessons of a … 
symbolic nature for French society as a whole.”110 The yearned-for symbolism was aptly 
summarized by Prime Minister Jospin’s statement that “Vichy was the negation of 
France”111 and by President’s Chirac conclusion that “[t]here is also France, one certain 
idea of France, correct, generous, loyal to its traditions, to its ethos. That France was                                                         
108 Sanders (2015). 
109 Bracher (1999).  
110 Wood (1999). 
111 Le Monde, October 23, 1997. 
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never at Vichy.”112 The France that was at Vichy, i.e. Papon, Barbie and Touvier, was 
now in the docket.  
4. The Liberal Model 
The liberal model for the creation of international atrocities investigations 
developed from liberalism, which is one of several second-image theories of political 
science. The model predicts that state governments create atrocities investigations to 
further their own domestic preferences. In creating an atrocities investigation, the 
government is trying to satisfy its supporters, whether the electoral public in a democracy 
or the backers of a dictator, with the ulterior motive of staying in power. In this process, 
the government also takes into consideration pressure from NGOs, activists and civil 
society. Atrocities investigations are thus expected to focus on those atrocities that target, 
or are condemned by, such groups. 
Bass offers the most thorough application of this model to atrocities 
investigations. Bass argues that international atrocities trials are initiated when liberal 
states take up the cause of international justice. Liberal states, imbued with judicial 
frameworks and a preference for the rule of law, are more likely to choose an 
investigation as a response to atrocities than non-liberal states. Yet, Bass argues, because 
they prioritize their own domestic political preferences, liberal states are more likely to 
resort to trials when (i) doing so poses no risk to their own soldiers, (ii) the atrocities 
targeted their own citizens, (iii) public opinion—rather than only political elites—is 
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outraged at the atrocities, and (iv) NGOs shame liberal states into action and provide 
legal expertise.  
Bass documents how the interplay of these factors led to Napoleon’s 
banishment to Saint Helena (rather than his trial by the restored Bourbons), the allies 
support for the trial of Kaiser Wilhelm I at the end of World War I, the creation of the 
Nuremberg trials and the UNSC’s decision to create the ICTY.113 Through his analysis, 
Bass illustrates that the electoral public of western liberal democracies holds important 
power in influencing the creation of atrocities investigations, as the governments of these 
states react to public pressure.  
Bass’ argument, however, also points to an important shortcoming of the 
liberal model, namely that atrocities investigations created for domestic political 
preferences are prone to face significant limitations. After the Armenian genocide, for 
example, the “British public and much of its elite were outraged.”114 Such was the push 
for justice that the United Kingdom arrested some high-ranking members of the Ottoman 
government and put them on trial. Gradually, however, the interest shifted towards 
“punishing crimes against Britons than crimes against Armenians.”115 When Ataturk held 
a small group of Britons as prisoners in 1921, the U.K. government exchanged them with 
the alleged atrocity perpetrators, thereby ending any prospect for an atrocities 
investigation. In the words of the Foreign Office, the need for a trial was “outweighed by 
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and China supported the creation of the ICTY. 
114 Bass (2000) (p. 106). 
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necessity of obtaining release of our prisoners.” 116  The desire for an investigation 
dropped with the shift in the focus of the U.K. public. 
Unsatisfactory Answers from the Four Models 
The four models described above are seldom used exclusively in the 
creation of an atrocities investigation. Collectively, these four models stand for the 
proposition that an atrocities investigation is likely to be created when a state (i) wants to 
target specific opponents, (ii) feels a strong normative demand for justice, (iii) wants to 
strengthen its identity, and (iv) is liberal, gripped by a principled idea, and wants to target 
crimes committed against its soldiers without risking the lives of its troops. Blending 
elements from all four of these models, Rudolph argues that a combination of real-politik 
with domestic interests, bureaucratic prerogatives and idealism play an important role in 
the creation of such investigations.117 He also documents how these various factors have 
influenced the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the ECCC and the ICC. The 
historical literature on the creation of tribunals also highlights the co-existence of these 
factors.118 
Despite the potential overlap in practice, the four existing models clarify 
why a state would decide to prosecute atrocities domestically or would ask the 
international community for help in prosecuting atrocities committed on its territory. 
Perhaps the government in a state wants to target its political opponents (e.g. the 
victorious model in Cambodia in 1997). It is equally likely that the government has a                                                         
116 FO 371/6504/E10662, 27 September 1921, quoted in Bass (2000) (p. 142). 
117 Rudolph (2001). 
118 Scharf (1997); Bassiouni (1996).  
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normative commitment to the idea of justice (e.g. the idealist model in Ukraine in 2014). 
Alternatively, the state may want to reestablish its image domestically and in the 
international community as a law-abiding state (e.g. the identity model in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo in 2003). Finally, liberal governments, not facing any material 
risk, may be seeking justice as a means of satisfying domestic demands for accountability 
(e.g. the liberal model in Kenya in 2011).  
In practice, however, the explanatory power of the four models is 
significant restricted, as variables beyond each of the models interfere with their 
application to a number of atrocities. Historically, there are several instances of atrocities 
that, despite having all the elements necessary for the manifestation of one of the four 
models, never received an atrocities investigation. Haiti, for example, is a good candidate 
for victor’s justice, as a number of times political leaders took power away from atrocity 
perpetrators (e.g. Jean-Bertrand Aristide over Jean-Claude Duvalier (aka Baby Doc) and 
later Jean-Bertrand Aristide over a military dictatorship). Yet, no atrocities investigation 
has taken place. Similarly, the elements of the idealist model were present in both El 
Salvador and Guatemala after the end of their respective civil wars. Still, neither country 
decided to repair its social fabric through the use of investigations. Further, all of the 
elements of the identity model were manifest in Indonesia following the end of the 
Suharto era in 1998, as Indonesia began a democratization effort and an attempt to 
reconcile with its past. But, no atrocities investigation was created. Finally, the liberal 
model should have meant an investigation for Liberia, where a democratically elected 
government with an active civil society has developed after a long brutal civil war. 
Again, despite the model’s predictions, there is no investigation. It thus seems that the 
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four models do not satisfactorily explain the creation of atrocities investigations, as 
factors outside of each model often trump the model’s explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, these explanations focus on the role of state preferences in 
the creation of atrocities investigations. None of these explanations, however, accounts 
for the post-Cold War uses of international atrocities investigations by the UNSC. 
Admittedly, the preferences of some members of the UNSC vis-à-vis certain atrocities 
may fit within one of the four present models. But, the UNSC members have to overcome 
a cooperation problem before authorizing the creation of an international atrocities 
investigation. Yet, these models are state-centric. They do not explain how the motives of 
individual states align at the UNSC. For two reasons, the need for international 
cooperation in creating an atrocities investigation by the UNSC cannot be explained by 
such state-centric models. 
First, the fifteen member states of the UNSC may have independently 
determined that an investigation is necessary for some atrocities. To arrive at a common 
decision on the creation of an atrocities investigation, the members of the UNSC have to 
aggregate their independent determinations into a single decision. This presupposes the 
existence of a method by which the members of the UNSC reveal their true preferences 
to each other. The four state-centric models do not explain how the preferences of the 
UNSC members are revealed and aggregated. In practice, these two steps can have 
significant consequences on the likelihood that an investigation is initiated. In the case of 
Sierra Leone, for example, the United States spent months trying to ascertain if the 
United Kingdom supported an investigation.  
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Additionally, if only a few UNSC members have preferences in favor of 
an international atrocities investigation, the current state-centric models do not explain 
why the other UNSC members go along. In the presence of uncertainty over the actions 
and the preferences of other states, undecided or opposing states have little incentive to 
change their views and support an investigation.  There is a constant concern that the 
benefits of an atrocities investigation will not be uniformly distributed across all UNSC 
members. It was, for example, reasonable for Russia to view the investigation of 
Qadaffi’s action in Libya with suspicion, as the investigation was coupled with an effort 
for regime change, which could be detrimental to its preferences. Yet, Russia somehow 
overcame its hesitations. The state-centric view of the four current models restricts them 
from explaining how that happens.  
Beyond their inability to account for the coordination problems faced by 
the members of the UNSC, the four models do not explain the obvious double standards 
of the UNSC’s decisions on atrocities, i.e. why the UNSC would investigate certain 
atrocities over others. As demonstrated by the double standards shown in Map 1, factors 
that are not accounted for by these four models seem to sway the UNSC towards or away 
from an investigation in otherwise identical atrocities.  
A well-known example helps clarify how the existing four models do not 
account for the actions of the UNSC. In May 1994, following the Rwandan genocide, 
some UNSC member states independently desired to create an international investigation. 
As the liberal model suggests, the public outrage in the United States pushed the Clinton 
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administration to support an investigation.119 In line with the victorious model, the Tutsi 
regime in Rwanda, which had a seat on the UNSC at the time, wanted an investigation 
into the atrocities perpetrated by the losing Hutus.120 Reflecting the idealist model, New 
Zealand, the Czech Republic and Argentina, supported an investigation because of their 
belief in the norm of justice.121 While the existing models explain why each of these 
states had a preference for the creation of an investigation, they do not explain how these 
divergent preferences were revealed and aggregated into the creation of the ICTR. In 
essence, why and how would China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Nigeria, 
Djibouti, Oman, Pakistan, Argentina and Spain also come to support the creation of the 
ICTR? These questions become especially hard to answer in the case of France, for 
example, which had been a supporter of the prior Hutu regime in Rwanda, even 
intervening to stop the advance of the Tutsi RPF with Operation Turquoise in May 1994. 
Furthermore, assuming that the fifteen members of the UNSC considered the atrocities in 
Rwanda as ripe for justice, why did they find the mirror atrocities in Burundi not to be so 
suited?  
In brief, the four current models of atrocities investigations cannot explain 
the UNSC’s decisions to create atrocities investigations, because they do not recognize 
the significance of the cooperation and coordination problems faced by the UNSC 
members. With the goal of finding a suitable answer to the question of this dissertation, 
the next part shifts its attention to past analyses of the UNSC’s work. It concludes,                                                         
119 Scheffer (2013). 
120 Akhavan (1996).  
121 Keating (2004); Kovanda (2010). 
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however, that these analyses provide equally unsatisfactory answers to the present 
question, thereby leaving room for the introduction of an alternative explanation in 
Chapter Three. 
Part II. Past Analyses of the UNSC’s Actions 
The UNSC has attracted much scholarly attention in the past. Writings 
from both legal academics and political scientists have attempted to untangle the UNSC’s 
complicated decision-making procedures. In an effort to ascertain if they provide a 
satisfactory response to the question of this dissertation, this Part presents these analyses 
on the UNSC’s operations and explains their strengths and weaknesses. 
The Legal Literature 
The legal literature on the UNSC is enormous in volume. In the early 
years of the UNSC’s operations, the writings of legal scholars aimed to grapple with the 
nature and scope of the UNSC’s actions. Schachter, for example, investigated the 
UNSC’s power to authorize peacekeeping missions122 and its growth vis-à-vis the power 
of UN General Assembly.123  Jessup examined various proposals through which the 
UNSC could improve its dispute settlement and fact-finding functions.124 Arangio-Ruiz 
looked into the role of the UNSC on the development of the law on peaceful settlement of 
international disputes.125 Cançado Trinidade analyzed the interplay between domestic 
jurisdiction of UN member states and the UNSC.126                                                         
122 Schachter (1968). 
123 Schachter (1964). 
124 Jessup (1947). 
125 Arangio-Ruiz (1979). 
126 Cançado-Trindade (1976). 
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Having attained a valuable understanding of how the UNSC works, the 
focus of legal authors has more recently turned to the UNSC’s powers in dealing with 
current issues of international affairs. Following the Lockerbie case, for example, which 
was brought by Libya against the United States at the International Court of Justice 
challenging the UNSC’s sanctions against Libya, Alvarez investigated if and how the 
actions of the UNSC can be judged, and if the UNSC can serve as both executive and 
judiciary within the UN system.127 Similarly, when faced with regimes that target their 
own citizens, Evans suggested that the UNSC could understand threats to peace and 
security as to include the responsibility to protect.128 On the issue of terrorism, for 
example, Szasz noted that the UNSC has shifted to a legislative approach.129 Franck, 
further, examined the future of the UNSC following its 2003 breakdown over Iraq.130 
On the issue of atrocities investigations, the legal literature again presents 
a detailed explanation on the powers of the UNSC to create such investigations. Schabas, 
for example, documents how the UNSC has the legal power to create independent 
investigations, refer cases to the ICC, and defer ICC prosecutions.131 Werle also presents 
how the UNSC created the ICTY and the ICTR.132 In contrast, Zahar and Sluiter take a 
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critical stance on the power of the UNSC to authorize international atrocities 
investigations.133  
The legal analyses, a small sample of which has been described above, 
provide significant insights into the workings of the UNSC. These writings elaborate on 
the interpretations of the UN Charter and the interplay of the UNSC with other bodies of 
international affairs. Additionally, they explain the UNSC’s power to reinterpret the UN 
Charter in response to new threats to peace and security. The latter is a necessary 
prerequisite in the UNSC’s decision to create international atrocities investigations, since 
these were not expressly mentioned in the UN Charter and were not used in the first forty 
years of the UNSC’s existence. By clarifying the legal basis behind the UNSC’s 
decisions to authorize the creation of international atrocities investigations, the legal 
literature demystifies much of the work of the UNSC.  
Despite its important contributions, the legal literature does not take into 
account the political preferences of the members of the UNSC. In dealing with terrorism, 
for example, the legal literature reveals that the UNSC legislates and focuses on the 
problems behind such legislative acts. Yet, it does not examine why the UNSC members 
decided to start legislating and how the decision to start legislating affects future votes at 
the UNSC on terrorism and other issues. In turning, a blind eye to the divergent 
incentives for cooperation between states, however, the legal literature cannot explain 
how the UNSC members make decisions at the UNSC. The reader is left to believe that 
decisions just happen, without appreciating the complicated machinations through which 
                                                        
133 Zahar and Sluiter (2008). 
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they take place. Additionally, while the legal analyses document the evolution of the 
UNSC’s actions, they cannot explain how the same P5 had, for example, originally 
supported absolute sovereignty and now support the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. 
Evolution depends on changes in political preferences, which are neglected in the legal 
literature on the UNSC.  
More importantly for this dissertation, because of its insistence on 
describing the legal basis behind a decision rather than the reasons behind the 
cooperation leading to such a decision, the legal literature cannot explain any of the 
UNSC decisions on atrocities investigation. For example, while legal analyses debate the 
legality of Resolution 955 that created the ICTR, such analyses do not explain why the 
UNSC members voted in favor of that resolution. Additionally, this literature does not 
have a framework for explaining why the UNSC members refrained from take certain 
action (e.g. no investigation in Burundi). As a result, after having analyzed the legal 
literature on the UNSC, the question of this dissertation still stands. In the hope of finding 
an answer, the next section turns to the political science literature.  
The Political Science Literature 
While the legal literature on the UNSC provides an answer to the question 
of this dissertation, the political science writings on the UNSC are more promising. 
Improving upon the weaknesses of the legal writings, the political science literature 
presents a robust understanding of how state preferences are aggregated to form decisions 
at the UNSC. Overall, it presents four categories of explanations for why the UNSC 
members arrive at common decisions.  
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The first category of explanations falls under the realist school of thought. 
According to these analyses, the strongest UNSC members can coerce other UNSC 
members into specific decisions. Chile, for example, faced significant diplomatic 
pressure from the United States in the debates over Iraq in 2003.134 Kuziemko and 
Werker document how such coercive tactics can even take place through monetary 
transfers akin to bribes. Non-permanent members of the UNSC receive more foreign aid 
than their peers who do not serve on the UNSC.135  
Rational choice scholars have also examined cooperation at the UNSC. 
For these scholars, decisions at the UNSC depend on reaching cooperative equilibriums. 
The earliest such works on the UNSC emphasized the value of the veto, and the effect 
that this voting power has had on all substantive and procedural decisions of the 
UNSC.136 More recently, Voeten argues that a superpower’s threat to take unilateral 
action without UNSC approval makes other P5 states reconsider their veto over actions 
they previously disapproved.137 In a different rational choice analysis, Thompson asserts 
that UNSC members arrive at common decisions in an effort to transmit information. 
Thompson argues that because a UNSC decision provides credible information regarding 
a state’s intentions and the consequences of its policies, it allows a coercing state to 
clearly signal its intentions to the international community, the target state and its own 
public.138                                                          
134 Munoz (2008). 
135 Kuziemko and Werker (2006). 
136 See e.g. Padelford (1948); Rudzinski (1951). 
137 Voeten (2001). 
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A constructivist approach also exists on this issue. Hurd, for example, 
identifies that UNSC members are concerned with the legitimacy of the UNSC because 
its legitimacy is a source of symbolic power. UNSC members who value this symbolism 
thus have a strong incentive to reach agreements over issues such as peacekeeping 
missions and the UNSC’s general agenda. Additionally, weaker states can couch their 
arguments in terms of the UNSC’s symbolic power, and in turn influence the UNSC 
members to backtrack on their original positions in order to protect the UNSC’s long-
term legitimacy. In a similar approach, Johnstone suggests that legal discourse at the 
UNSC, through its discursive properties, has an independent influence over the decisions 
of the UNSC members.139    
Finally, through the writings of Prantl,140 institutionalism is the last school 
of thought that provides an answer to the question of cooperation at the UNSC. Prantl 
argues that informal groups of states within the UNSC have proliferated as a response to 
the post-Cold War systemic change in international affairs. These informal groups 
provide an escape from the stifling structure of the P5 and a platform for those who are 
actually affected by a conflict. In doing so, the informal groups narrow the participatory 
gap at the UNSC, as the E10 states that are more knowledgeable have a say in the 
creation of the UNSC’s response. As a result, these informal groups enable the members 
of the UNSC to reach effective responses to international crises. They also allow for 
diplomatic problem solving, a task that is often difficult for the P5.   
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Admittedly, some political science analyses of cooperation at the UNSC 
cross several of the above schools of thought. Voeten, for example, presents an analysis 
of cooperation at the UNSC that depends both on legitimacy and rational choice. In the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism for the decisions of the UNSC, Voeten argues that 
cooperation at the UNSC for the provision of public goods, such as peace and security, 
requires the existence of a social norm.141 Similar to elite pacts, the non-majoritarian 
nature of the UNSC’s decision-making procedures allows its decisions to signal out those 
specific acts that transgress commonly accepted social norms. In case of a specific war, 
for example, the UNSC members are expected to cooperate when they want to signal that 
the war has transgressed or will transgress a limit that should be defended. Additionally, 
Malone explains why and how the UNSC reacted to the political crises in Haiti from 
1990 to 1997. In his analysis, all the elements identified by the above schools of political 
science come into play. Malone thus comes to see “the Security Council as one 
continuous evolving part of a pattern of global politics in which principles, laws, 
institutions, diplomacy, power politics, and changing perceptions of interest all have 
important roles, with chance and paradox ever waiting in the wings.”142  
The analyses presented by these four schools of political science provide 
critical insight into how the UNSC arrives at its decisions, and build on the writings of 
the legal community in a number of important ways. First, these analyses provide the 
correct orientation for understanding how the UNSC works, where the preferences of the 
various states form the basis of actions, while the law (i.e. the UN Charter and the Rules)                                                         
141 Voeten (2005). 
142 Malone (1998). 
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provides the channel for arriving at the preferred result. Hurd, for example, argues that 
Pakistan has consistently desired to keep the situation in Kashmir on the UNSC’s agenda 
due to the symbolic value of that agenda. Understanding this political desire should come 
before examining the analysis by Baileys and Daws into the various legal tools a state can 
use to set the agenda at the UNSC.143 
Additionally, by emphasizing the variation in bargaining dynamics at the 
UNSC, the political science literature recognizes the circumstances under which 
decision-making gridlock can be overcome. Prantl, for example, demonstrates how, after 
years of impasse, the emergence of an informal group of states interested in the 
independence of Namibia led to a negotiated settlement proposal ultimately ending that 
conflict. In providing such explanations, the political science literature also offers insight 
into important case studies. Voeten’s outside option, for example, provides a good frame 
of reference for understanding the 1998 UNSC debates surrounding the Kosovo war, one 
that cannot be perceived just by looking at the UN Charter’s rules on the use of force.  
Finally, the four explanations suggested by the political science literature 
seem to explain why some atrocities investigations never happened. With its focus on the 
role of power, the realist school explains why an investigation has never looked into 
atrocities committed in Pakistan or Colombia. As both of these states are powerful 
international actors that within the UNSC enjoy the regular support of the United States, 
an attempt to create an investigation would have to overcome significant power-related 
barriers within (and outside of) the UNSC. Similarly, the rationale choice school explains 
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why the UNSC has never considered creating an investigation into atrocities committed 
in Chechnya, Tibet or Iraq. Since these atrocities would likely implicate one of the P5, 
the possible use of a veto prevents any action from ever taking place. Additionally, 
constructivist analyses offer guidance into the lack of an atrocities investigation into 
Burundi. As detailed in Chapter Five, the UNSC’s decision not to create an investigation 
was a result of its preoccupation with its own legitimacy, rather than dealing with the 
local atrocities. Finally, the institutionalist literature sheds some light into the lack of 
investigations into the atrocities of El Salvador. Prantl documents how the Group of 
Friends of the Secretary-General on El Salvador (i.e. Colombia, Mexico, Spain, 
Venezuela and later the United States) provided crucial support to the mediation efforts 
to end the local civil war.144 Because the primary objective of the Group of Friends was 
obtaining peace, they focused their diplomatic efforts on this goal at the exclusion of all 
others, such as financial development and atrocities investigations.   
Despite these advantages, the political science literature has three 
significant shortcomings. First, it is not clear if the explanations provided in these 
writings can be generalized to all situations that occur at the UNSC. To the contrary, it 
often appears as if the analyses apply only to the few case studies presented by their 
authors. Malone’s explanation on the UNSC’s responses to the political crisis in Haiti is 
too case specific to be applicable beyond the case study on Haiti.145 Voeten’s outside 
option clearly occurred during the UNSC deliberations on the use of force in Kosovo 
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(1998) and Iraq (2003).146 It is not clear, however, that it was used in any other instance. 
Thompson’s informational model also suffers from similar drawbacks, as it cannot be 
easily applied beyond the Gulf War (1990-1991) and the invasion of Iraq (2003).147 
Hurd’s analysis on legitimacy at the UNSC—a concept that should always be present at 
the UNSC—is equally difficult to apply.148 Was legitimacy, for example, a factor in the 
UNSC’s decisions on sanctions on Iran? Furthermore, Johnstone’s observations on the 
value of a legal discourse merit attention when the UNSC members actually argue, as 
they did over Kosovo, but appear inapplicable to the majority of issues at the UNSC that 
are barely debated (e.g. Burundi).149 Paradoxically, these explanations appear to be 
applicable to issues that arise in other institutions. The outside option may, for example, 
be useful in a monetary union (e.g. potential exit of Greece from the Eurozone). Yet, they 
seem unable to explain the majority of the UNSC’s work (e.g. renewal of UNFICYP, 
diplomacy in Burundi, negotiations over Syria). 
Additionally, the political science literature seems indifferent towards 
most of the practical steps of the UNSC’s operations, which form the basis of the legal 
literature. As a result, few political scientists venture outside the veto rule in considering 
the effect that the UN Charter and the Rules have on the UNSC’s decisions. Hurd, as a 
lone exception, evaluates only the agenda setting elements of the Rules, but nothing 
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more.150 As a result, the political science literature assumes that the regulations that 
control the work of the UNSC have no effect, neither substantive nor procedural, on the 
decisions of the UNSC. However, this assumption is never examined by the literature, 
even though it has long been recognized that the decision-making regulations affect the 
outcome of other institutions.151  
Finally, the political science literature does not offer a satisfactory 
explanation for the reasons behind the UNSC’s decision to create international criminal 
investigations. To begin with, there is only scant evidence to support the theories of the 
realist and the rational choice schools when applied to the UNSC’s actions on atrocities 
investigations. As the following Chapters will show in more detail, it is not clear that a P5 
state has ever used its power to convince weaker non-permanent members to vote in 
favor or against an atrocities investigation. In the case of Darfur, the United States 
allowed the investigation even though it had argued against the ICC. The explanations of 
the rational choice school are similarly inapplicable. As a state cannot create an 
international investigation alone, there is neither an outside option nor an informational 
advantage in acting through the UNSC on this topic.   
The constructivist and instrumentalist explanations, which may be 
applicable in the UNSC’s decisions to create atrocities investigations, do not resolve the 
double standards of international justice. The explanations that focus on legitimacy may 
be applied for the creation of international investigations. In line with Hurd’s writings, 
for example, it is credible to assert that atrocities investigations are created for their                                                         
150 Hurd (2007). 
151 See e.g. McCubbins, Roger and Weingast (1987); O’Halloran (1994). 
 
 73
symbolic value. The institutionalist writings of Prantl can also explain why informal 
group of states arise to support the creation of some investigations. In the investigation 
into Darfur, for example, the “ICC-9” were of critical importance (see Chapter Six). But, 
these explanations do not resolve the double standards of international justice. How, for 
example, did symbolism lead to action with respect to Rwanda, yet failed to do so for 
Burundi? Why did the ICC-9 not exert pressure for an investigation into Sri Lanka? As a 
result, the question posed in this dissertation remains unanswered. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has examined the existing literature on atrocities 
investigations, as well as the political science and legal literature on the UNSC, with a 
goal of identifying why the UNSC members create investigations for specific atrocities. 
As described above, the four models of atrocities investigations explain the preferences 
individual states may have towards the creation of atrocities investigations. Yet, these 
models cannot be applied to the UNSC in a satisfactory manner, as they do not account 
for the coordination and cooperation dilemmas faced by the UNSC members. Similarly, 
the legal literature offers valuable insight to understand the methods through which the 
UNSC arrives at its decisions. It fails, however, to appreciate the role of political 
preferences in this process. Finally, the political science literature corrects this by 
focusing on how the preferences of fifteen UNSC members align to achieve cooperation. 
In doing so, however, it provides answers that (i) are not generalizable beyond a few case 
studies, (ii) do not appreciate the procedural intricacies of the UNSC’s work, and (iii) fail 




As a result, the questioned posed by this dissertation (i.e. why the UNSC 
members create specific investigations) remains unanswered. The next Chapter suggests 
a new answer to this question, which corrects for the shortcomings of the existing 
analyses and accounts for the facts presented in Chapter One. 
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Chapter Three. The Argument: Three Procedural Steps 
The representative of the USSR agreed that the part of the 
resolution relating to the maintenance on the Council’s 
agenda of the Spanish question was procedural, but other 
parts of the resolution were matters of substance. If the 
resolution was voted upon as a whole, then he would vote 
against its adoption. 
He added that if there was any objection to his 
interpretation of the case, he would ask the Council to 
decide whether the resolution was of a procedural or 
substantive character. 
The Spanish Question, Report of the Security Council to the 
General Assembly covering the period from 17 January to 
15 July 1946.152  
Building on the two previous chapters, the first of which presented the 
facts while the second focused on the literature review, this Chapter presents the 
argument of this dissertation. To understand why the UNSC has created only a few 
atrocities investigations, this Chapter focuses on the role of the UNSC procedure in 
decision-making. It argues that a decision at the UNSC is a committee process, which can 
only be concluded if the UNSC members overcome significant uncertainty and 
apprehension over each other’s preferences, and coordinate or cooperate towards a 
common outcome. The UNSC members are able to overcome these difficulties through 
the UNSC procedural rules, which allow the UNSC members to coordinate and 
cooperate, and thereby create an atrocities investigation.  
To make this argument, this Chapter starts, in Part I, by briefly 
summarizing the existing limitations in answering the present question. Part II then 
documents how the UNSC’s procedure contributes to the creation of atrocities                                                         152 A/93, Official Records of the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, Supplement 
No. 1 (October 3, 1946). 
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investigations. The significance of the procedural argument is developed in Part III, while 
Part IV specifies the boundaries of this argument.  
Part I. Existing Limitations 
While atrocities have occurred in ninety-two states since the end of the 
Cold War, the UNSC has created an investigation into the atrocities committed in only 
eleven of these states. As the previous Chapter documents, the literature on atrocities 
investigations offers four models for the creation of atrocities investigations. Yet, all four 
models are state-centric and do not explain how individual state preferences are 
aggregated when it comes to decision making at the UNSC. Similarly, the legal literature 
on the UNSC explains how the rules governing the UNSC can be used to create 
international atrocities investigations, but does not examine how the members of the 
UNSC arrive at a decision on these investigations. Political science writings explain how 
the UNSC members arrive at a decision, but present answers that are not generalizable to 
the creation of atrocities investigations, do not appreciate the procedural intricacies of the 
UNSC’s work, and fail to resolve the above variation.  
In addition to the shortcomings of the existing literature, there is an 
additional complication in the contextual background of this analysis. Diplomats at the 
UNSC constantly indicate that a single reason or even a consistent set of reasons, for the 
occurrence of atrocities investigations, does not exist. The UNSC, after all, is an evolving 
institution, the decisions of which are affected by numerous evolving political 
calculations. While a causal explanation based on state preferences cannot explain the 
actions of the UNSC, this dissertation does not argue that individual state preferences do 
not matter. They do. Yet, an explanation that focuses on the preferences of the individual 
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UNSC members, would not explain the mechanism by which preferences of fifteen 
UNSC members are aggregated into a single UNSC decision, and the ways in which this 
mechanism can lead UNSC members to modify their preferences over atrocities 
investigations. It would also fail to explain the double-standards of the UNSC’s actions 
on atrocities investigations, where similar atrocities over which all fifteen UNSC 
members have similar preferences have received disparate treatment. 
Part II. Importance of Procedure 
To overcome these limitations, this dissertation looks at the one constant 
feature of the UNSC, its decision-making procedure. This dissertation argues that the 
international cooperation behind the UNSC’s decisions to create international atrocities 
investigations can be examined through the prism of the UNSC decision-making 
procedure. As outlined in Chapter One, there are three phases in the decision-making 
process at the UNSC, namely (i) the setting of the agenda, (ii) the deliberations and (iii) 
the issuance of the decision. This three step decision-making process does not determine 
the outcome of the UNSC actions. But, the political decisions taken at the three steps of 
the decision-making process allow the UNSC members to channel their priorities and 
arrive at acceptable common decisions. In doing so, the three procedural steps allow the 
UNSC members to overcome their coordination and cooperation dilemmas. As a result, 
to understand how UNSC members arrive at an agreement on atrocities investigations, 
the political decisions behind each of these three steps deserve special attention.  
First, not all atrocities are discussed at the UNSC. Because of its limited 
institutional capacity, the UNSC cannot prioritize or even allocate time equally to all 
events in the international system.  Historically, the UNSC has tended to prioritize those 
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events that have a patron; a diplomat that supports their cause within the UNSC. A 
diplomat from one of the UNSC members thus has to insist on bringing up a specific 
topic for consideration by convincing other UNSC members that its worth their time and 
effort to deliberate on a specific topic. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, this support 
came from Ambassador Keating, of New Zealand, and Ambassador Kovanda, of the 
Czech Republic. For the atrocities in Burundi, this support came from the African 
diplomats at the UNSC. Based on a review of the UNSC’s work since the end of the Cold 
War, Map 4 indicates that atrocities committed in only fifty-two states, out of the ninety-
two that experienced atrocities in this period, benefitted from the attention of a UNSC 
diplomat. To understand the scarcity of UNSC international atrocities investigations, it is 
important to examine why certain UNSC diplomats decide to focus on and prioritize 




Once the attention of the UNSC members has been seized on certain 
atrocities, it becomes important to understand how, during their deliberations, the UNSC 
members evaluate their options. On a substantive level, the UNSC does not deliberate 
about its response to atrocities in a vacuum. Quid pro quos, alliances, diplomatic ties, the 
stance of the Secretary-General and a host of other factors become important in forming 
the UNSC’s response. As noted above, however, the UNSC members also seek the 
recommendation of a third-party (e.g. the Secretary-General, the sanctions committee, a 
fact-finding mission) before taking any action. For the authorization of atrocities 
investigations, the UNSC has consistently requested the opinion of a fact-finding 
mission, and has abided by that opinion.153 The support, for example, from the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur put significant pressure on the UNSC for 
the referral of the atrocities in Darfur to the ICC. By contrast, the recommendation of the 
International Commission of Inquiry Concerning Burundi against creating an 
investigation into the atrocities committed in Burundi brought those efforts to a sudden 
halt.  
Out of the fifty-two states with a patron diplomat, Map 5 highlights that 
the UNSC used a third-party for only twenty states. The recommendations of the third-
party are always based on findings of facts and law. Similar to the decisions of a 
prosecutor to investigate a crime (see Introduction), the decisions of the third-party are 
not political. The UNSC decision, however, to use a third-party and follow its 
recommendations is inherently political. To understand the scarcity of UNSC                                                         
153 One exception to this statement is Libya, where the investigation came after Resolution 1970. For more 
on this, see Chapter Five. 
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international atrocities investigations, it is important to examine why the UNSC 
outsources part of its decision-making process to a third-party and follows the decision of 
this third-party. Chapter Five turns to this question. 
 
 
Finally, once the UNSC members have focused on certain atrocities 
through the insistence of a patron diplomat and have received a positive answer from an 
independent third-party, they deliberate as to the proper course of action. At that moment, 
the leading states put forth draft resolutions with their proposals and try to convince other 
UNSC members to support these.  Once again, it is expected that those UNSC members 
with an interest in a specific outcome will use myriads of political tools to convince the 
other UNSC members on a certain course of action. As highlighted above, however, 
significant arguments among UNSC members are also expected to take place on the 
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textual provisions of the draft resolution. With regards to the investigation in Darfur, for 
example, France and the United States jousted for several days over the text of the 
resolution. They only come to a common agreement by relying on prior UNSC precedent. 
Map 6 indicates that the UNSC agreed on a resolution to create an investigation into 
eleven, out of the twenty states with atrocities that had both benefitted from a patron 
diplomat and for which the UNSC relied on a third-party that agreed with an 
investigation. As a result, to understand the scarcity of investigations, it is important to 
examine why the UNSC members rely on precedent in the formulation of their 
Resolutions. Chapter Six examines this question. 
This dissertation argues that the institutional rules at the UNSC guide its 
actions on atrocities investigations. Its main argument is that the UNSC created five 
atrocities investigations for only eleven, of the ninety-two states, that experienced 
atrocities from 1990 to 2014, because only these eleven (i) had a patron diplomat, (ii) 
received a supportive recommendation from a third-party, and (iii) could be based on 
UNSC precedent. Each of these steps is necessary, and together they are sufficient, for 
the creation of an atrocities investigation. The following three Chapters identify the 
















Part III. The Significance of the Argument 
While the three steps leading to the creation of a UNSC atrocities 
investigation are separate and distinct within the UNSC’s decision-making process, they 
highlight how the UNSC members rely on specialized professional expertise in reaching 
a decision. Through such expertise, the UNSC is able to mitigate the difficulties it faces 
in dealing with atrocities.  
The UNSC is in a bind when faced with atrocities. If the UNSC creates an 
investigation into events that were not atrocities (i.e. if it commits a Type I error, or 
reaches a false positive), it will lose some of its credibility in international affairs. It will 
also waste precious financial and political resources. Yet, if the UNSC fails to create an 
investigation for events that were atrocities (i.e. if it commits a Type II error, or reaches a 
false negative), it will again lose some of its credibility in international affairs. It will also 
squander an opportunity to use justice as a peace-building tool. As a result, the UNSC 
faces negative externalities both from (i) creating an investigation when atrocities were 
not perpetrated, and (ii) not creating an investigation where atrocities were perpetrated. 
To avoid the negative externalities of a wrong action, the UNSC has a 
great incentive at resorting to atrocities investigations only for those cases that involve 
confirmed atrocities. But, making this determination is a difficult task for the UNSC 
members. To begin with, there is no exact definition of what constitutes an atrocity. As a 
result, the UNSC members have no precise model to apply or relevant factors to weigh in 
determining if certain facts rise to the level of atrocities. Additionally, the difficulty of 
such a determination is compounded by the absence of credible information on the 
commission of atrocities. As a result, the UNSC often does not know whether certain 
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events were atrocities and also, whether reports on those facts are reliable. Finally, the 
UNSC members have capacity constraints, which restrain them from prolonged focus and 
examination of any particular instance of atrocities. In such a fluid context, it is hard for 
the UNSC members to evaluate and predict the negative externalities of their actions. 
Past studies highlight how decision-makers faced with such uncertainty 
over complex or technical issues often delegate some powers to a common agent (e.g. the 
EU Commission, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the International Court of 
Justice).154 The UN Charter and the Rules, however, restrain the UNSC from delegating 
decisions over atrocities to a common agent. The absence of common state preferences 
among the UNSC members makes such delegation even less likely to happen in practice. 
To the contrary, across all issues, the UNSC consistently acts as executor, legislator and 
adjudicator.155  
In the absence of clear facts and a common agent, past studies argue that 
uncertainty over complex or technical issues provides fertile ground for the rise of 
powerful epistemic communities.156 These are organized groups of professionals, who 
share beliefs and ideas, and who are able to help their states and institutions through their 
expertise and judgment by framing issues, defining interests, overcoming technical 
uncertainties and even suggesting innovative policy options.157 While there is no 
evidence that such epistemic communities exist at the UNSC level, the following three 
Chapters illustrate that, through their expertise and judgment, diplomats, third-party                                                         
154 Mallard (2014); Mavroidis and Wolfe (2015). 
155 Johnstone (2008); Alvarez (1996); Malone (1998). 
156 Haas (1992). 
157 Haas (1992); Adler and Haas (1992). 
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commissions and the resort to precedent take on a similar function within the UNSC’s 
decision-making process. In the Conclusion, this dissertation returns to this point and 
evaluates the role of specialized professional expertise within the actions of the UNSC. 
Part IV. The Boundaries of the Argument 
By focusing on the effect of the UNSC’s procedural rules on its outcomes, 
this dissertation asserts that procedure can control the relationship between cause and 
effect at the UNSC. Yet, this dissertation does not advance a procedural argument by 
comparing it against counterfactual explanations based on the existing literature. Such a 
comparison would be futile, as the existing explanations do not capture the UNSC’s 
activities on atrocities investigations. Additionally, this dissertation does not argue that 
state preferences are subsumed by the powers of institutional procedure. State preferences 
remain the background conditions to the process, as states need to sponsor, support or 
acquiesce with a decision of the UNSC. Yet, interests are expressed, formed and altered 
through the institutional process. If the process was different (e.g. one of a different 
international institution), the same states faced with the same atrocities would likely 
reach different outcomes. As the previous three Maps indicate, the procedural aspects 
shape the expression of state preferences, and thus the work of the UNSC. Because these 
procedural aspects are constant, contrary to state preferences that routinely vary, their 
influence on the UNSC’s decisions deserves separate attention. This focus is the 
distinguishing feature of the present argument. 
Two brief comparisons can provide useful context for the importance of 
focusing on the UNSC’s procedure. The New York County District Attorney, Cyrus 
Vance, Jr., and the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, have (at least) one thing in 
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common. They both have a preference to prosecute crime.158 If a crime takes place in 
New York County, however, District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. has a relatively easy task 
before taking the suspect to trial: all he has to do is to convince a grand jury. In New 
York County, a grand jury is comprised of twenty-three individuals, who only hear the 
evidence presented by assistant district attorneys and decide if the investigation should 
proceed (including, e.g., if a suspect should be arrested).159 District attorneys in the 
United States, such as Cyrus Vance, Jr., are supposed to have an easy task. The grand 
jury process is so undemanding for prosecutors, that it is often said that grand juries will 
even indict a ham sandwich.160 By contrast, Fatou Bensouda has an uphill battle in taking 
someone to court. After she investigates the crime, Fatou Bensouda has to convince the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC of the worthiness of her case. The Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which is comprised of three judges, will evaluate Bensouda’s facts and legal arguments, 
listen to alternative facts and counter-arguments presented by the suspect and the 
suspect’s lawyers and take into accounts greater considerations, such as the interests of 
justice and the interest of the ICC.161 Presenting a case to the Pre-Trial Chamber takes a 
considerable amount of effort and is never a guaranteed success for the ICC’s                                                         
158 See. e.g. Statement by Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus R. Vance, Jr. on Law Enforcement Action 
Against Distributors of Synthetic Cannabinoids (September 16, 2015), available at 
http://manhattanda.org/press-release/statement-manhattan-district-attorney-cyrus-r-vance-jr-law 
enforcement-action-against-; see also Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda, following the transfer of the first suspect in the Mali investigation: “Intentional attacks 
against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion are grave crimes” (September 26, 2015), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en-menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat-
26-09-2015.aspx.    
159 The New York District Attorney’s Office, Criminal Justice System: How it Works, available at 
http://manhattanda.org/criminal-justice-system-how-it-works?s=39.  
160 Reynolds (2013). 
161 See e.g., ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Chapter 5. 
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prosecutor.162 It is far from a ham sandwich. Despite their common preferences to fight 
crime, the different procedures predetermine the scope and number of cases Vance, Jr. 
and Bensouda will bring. The decision-making procedure of the UNSC, which requires a 
patron diplomat, a commission of inquiry and precedent, has the same effect.  
Through its focus on institutional procedure, this argument also avoids the 
shortcomings of the previous analyses. In contrast to the legal literature on the UNSC, 
this argument appreciates the importance of each state’s political preferences and aims to 
indicate how these are expressed and developed through the decision-making process. 
This argument equally bypasses the three shortcomings of the political science literature 
on the UNSC. By focusing on the constant aspects of the UNSC’s decision-making 
process, this argument can be generalized to other UNSC actions, such as sanctions or 
diplomacy, which are outcomes of the same process. As a process-based argument, it 
appreciates the constraints imposed by the rules of the UNSC. And, as the UNSC is a 
living political body, in which calculations and incentives change constantly, this process 
based argument presents reasonable answers to the existing double standards on the 
UNSC’s decisions to create atrocities investigations.  
In addition to these, while a causal explanation based on state preferences 
cannot explain the actions of the UNSC, this dissertation does not argue that individual 
state preferences do not matter. They do. Yet, an explanation that focuses on the 
preferences of the individual UNSC members, would not explain the mechanism by 
which preferences of fifteen UNSC members are aggregated into a single UNSC 
                                                        
162 Courtney and Kaoutzanis (2014). 
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decision, and the ways in which this mechanism can lead UNSC members to modify their 
preferences over atrocities investigations. It would also fail to explain the double 
standards of the UNSC’s actions on atrocities investigations, where similar atrocities over 
which all fifteen UNSC members have similar preferences have received disparate 
treatment. 
But, state preferences, which are ubiquitous, are critical to the UNSC’s 
decision-making procedure. At one extreme, state preferences can prohibit the decision-
making process from taking place. The strong interests, for example, that Russia and the 
United States have over Syria prohibit any conversation on an investigation in the local 
atrocities from taking place at the UNSC. At the other extreme, the complete absence of 
state preferences may de-politicize the decision-making process, making it faster and less 
contentious. When few member states of the UNSC had ex ante preferences on the 
atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, the United States and the United Kingdom were 
able to create an investigation with almost no pushback, or input, from other UNSC 
states.  
In between these two extremes, the UNSC member states routinely have 
some ex ante preferences over atrocities. These state preferences are adequately captured 
by the four models of atrocities investigations presented in Chapter One. The liberal 
model, for example, explains the Clinton administration’s interest in the crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia. The idealist model portrays the preferences many 
UNSC states had towards creating an investigation for the Rwandan genocide. These ex 
ante state preferences undeniably affect all aspects of the UNSC’s procedure. In the first 
procedural step, these preferences influence a diplomat’s knowledge of, and interest in, 
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the atrocities. In the second step, these preferences not only influence the state’s attitude 
towards the creation and work of a commission of inquiry, but also the likelihood that the 
state will read the commission’s report and support its conclusions. Finally, in the third 
step, these ex ante preferences influence the likelihood that a state will search for 
precedent, and support its use, for the creation of an investigation. As a result, while this 
dissertation asserts that state interests cannot explain the double-standards of the UNSC’s 
work on atrocities investigations, it recognizes that the presence of factors outlined by the 
existing literature increases the likelihood that a member state will be supportive of an 
investigation in each of the three decision-making steps.   
In making this argument, this dissertation mirrors the emphasis political 
scientists place on the legislative process in understanding the outcome of political 
bargaining within domestic and international institutions. The preferences of individual 
legislators are always important to the outcome of the deliberations. Yet, it has also been 
recognized that the voting procedures can lead to paradoxical mathematical results.163 
More recent explanations of such counter-intuitive results focus less on the mathematic 
properties of alternative preferences and more on the power of the decision-making 
process. In detail, it is generally accepted that “[t]he rules employed by legislatures 
significantly restrict the potential outcomes of the legislative process,” as they 
“prohibit…[options]…from arising for comparison, thus leaving other points 
invulnerable.”164 Some of the studies that focus on such rules highlight the power of 
committees on the outcome of deliberations. Committee power, for example, is                                                         
163 E.g. the Condorcet method (Marquis de Condorcet, 1785) or the Borda count (de Borda, 1781). 
164 Shepsle and Weingast (1981).  
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contingent on its power to ex ante or ex post terminate (i.e. veto) the decision-making 
process.165 Committee power is also contingent on the committee’s focus on reelection, 
power or policy.166 Other studies of decision-making rules highlight the influence of 
agenda on the outcome of deliberations. The agenda can completely determine the 
outcome of a legislative vote by leading to results that were not ex ante the most 
popular.167 It does so by “limit[ing] the available information that decision makers have 
and determin[ing] the available strategies.”168 Such is the power of the agenda, that the 
agenda-setter has the ability to pre-determine the outcome of the deliberations to his or 
her own preferences.169 
For this dissertation, these studies of legislative bodies shed light on how 
the decision-making process can control the outcome of the deliberations. They 
emphasize that the decision-making sequence, power to set the agenda and the power of a 
committee can have effects that are independent of the decision-makers’ preferences. 
This dissertation makes a similar argument, as the role of diplomats, the use of third-party 
commissions and the resort to precedent are the three procedural features that guide the 
decision-making process at the UNSC. In doing so, these features create, aggregate and 
eliminate competing preferences of the fifteen UNSC member states, thereby 
contributing to the UNSC’s double standards on atrocities. 
Conclusion                                                         
165 Shepsle and Weingast (1987). 
166 Sinclair (1986). 
167 Hammond (1986). 
168 Plott and Levine (1978). 
169 McKelvey (1981).  
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The goal of this dissertation is to explain why the UNSC created only a 
small number of atrocities investigations. To that end, Chapter One of this dissertation 
presented the facts on atrocities, investigations and the UNSC, while Chapter Two 
developed the literature review. Since no past analyses satisfactorily answers the present 
question, this Chapter presented an alternative argument, one that asserts that the UNSC’s 
procedure is central to overcoming cooperation and coordination problems faced by the 
UNSC members when dealing with atrocities. As a result, one can only understand the 
work of the UNSC on atrocities investigations, and hence answer the question posed in 
this dissertation, by focusing on the ways through which the UNSC’s procedure guides 
the UNSC members to a common outcome.  
As outlined above, an examination of the UNSC’s procedures 
demonstrates that three necessary steps must be followed for the UNSC members to 
agree to create an atrocities investigation. First, one or more diplomats from a UNSC 
member state must persistently raise the fact that the atrocities are occurring at the 
UNSC. Second, an independent third-party must recommend to the UNSC that an 
atrocities investigation should take place in a specific case. Finally, the UNSC members 
must arrive at a consensus over the text of the authorizing resolution. The politics behind 





Chapter Four. The First Step: A Patron Diplomat 
I had these instructions which made no sense at all…I felt 
that I would get a better hearing if I called the National 
Security Council [rather than the State Department], which 
I did, and they said, “Well, no, we’re worrying about this, 
and these are your instructions.” I actually screamed into 
the phone. I said, “They are unacceptable. I want them 
changed.” So they told me to chill out and calm down. But 
ultimately, they did send me instructions that allowed us to 
do a reinforcement of UNAMIR. 
Madeleine Albright, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
UN Security Council on the reauthorization of UN 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda, April 1994170 
The UNSC does not investigate most atrocities that take place in the 
world. Due to their limited institutional capacity, the UNSC members cannot allocate 
time to all events in the international system. Additionally, as explained in Chapter One, 
the UNSC has no legal obligation to focus on those events brought to its attention by 
outsiders. In practice, however, because of the institutional procedure at the UNSC, the 
UNSC prioritizes those events that have a patron; a diplomat that advocates for their 
cause within the UNSC. A diplomat from one of the UNSC members thus has to insist on 
bringing up a specific topic for consideration by convincing other UNSC members that it 
is worth their time and effort to deliberate on that specific topic. Out of the ninety-two 
states that have experienced atrocities since 1990, a diplomat at the UNSC has brought to 
the attention of the UNSC atrocities committed in fifty-two of these states (see Map 4 
above and Table 4a below). Accordingly, in order to understand why the UNSC chooses 
to create an investigation for an atrocity, one must first understand why certain UNSC 
diplomats decide to advocate for the investigation of that specific atrocity.                                                         




This Chapter turns to this task. It proceeds in three parts. Part I presents 
three existing explanations of diplomatic engagement, namely that diplomats act (i) at the 
instruction of their government, (ii) within the discretion afforded to them by their 
government, and (iii) against their government’s instructions. It also indicates how these 
explanations capture the work of the UNSC in the field of atrocities investigation. As the 
epigraph illustrates, however, sometimes diplomats act beyond these three methods, as 
they voice their disagreement and convince their own states to change their preferences. 
Part II explores this type of diplomatic action and suggests a framework for 
understanding the success of such disagreements. Nevertheless, the four sources of 
diplomatic activity presented in Parts I and II appear mechanical, devoid of any actual 
political interactions. Part III corrects for this impression by presenting three case studies 
of diplomatic activities from the Sierra Leonean civil war. The goal of these case studies 
is to highlight the intricacies of how diplomats actually act within the larger, and moving, 
constellation of international affairs.  
Part I. Three Existing Explanations 
The UNSC’s actions in the field of international criminal justice are 
replete with stories relating to individuals. Madeleine Albright is remembered as the 
moving force behind the creation of the ICTY and Colin Keating for the creation of the 
ICTR. David Scheffer had a critical role in the operation of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (‘ECCC’), while Jean-Marc de la Sablière played a similar 




scholars of international affairs should not be surprised by the extent of diplomatic 
actions in the field of international criminal justice.  
Table 4a. Atrocities with a Patron Diplomat 
1. Afghanistan 27. Kosovo 
2. Angola 28. Kuwait 
3. Bosnia 29. Lebanon 
4. Burma 30. Liberia 
5. Burundi 31. Libya 
6. Cambodia 32. Mali 
7. Central African Republic 33. Montenegro 
8. Chad 34. Mozambique 
9. Colombia 35. North Korea 
10. Congo 36. Pakistan 
11. Cote d'Ivoire 37. Palestine 
12. Croatia 38. Rwanda 
13. Democratic Republic of the Congo 39. Serbia 
14. East Timor 40. Sierra Leone 
15. El Salvador 41. Slovenia 
16. Eritrea 42. Somalia 
17. Ethiopia 43. South Sudan 
18. FYROM 44. Sri Lanka 
19. Georgia 45. Sudan 
20. Guatemala 46. Syria 
21. Guinea 47. Tajikistan 
22. Haiti 48. Uganda 
23. Honduras 49. Ukraine 
24. Iraq 50. Western Sahara 
25. Israel 51. Yemen 
26. Kenya 52. Zimbabwe 
First, diplomats are empowered to act on behalf of their states. Often 
times, these diplomats will take an important decision for international criminal justice 
acting on behalf of their state, and at the instruction of their states.171 As described in 
Chapter Two, there are numerous reasons for which UNSC member states would 
                                                        




prioritize specific atrocities. Domestic politics in the United States led the George W. 
Bush administration to focus on the genocide in Darfur.172 Colonial ties with Sierra 
Leone made the Blair administration in the United Kingdom more responsive to the 
atrocities of that conflict.173 Commercial ties with a specific state may also play an 
important role. For example, the Chinese government was intent on letting the Darfur 
genocide go unnoticed due to its oil interests in Sudan.174 Power, domestic-politics, 
cultural ties are all valid reasons for which a state will instruct its diplomat at the UNSC 
to focus on specific atrocities.  
Table 4b. Atrocities without Patron Diplomat 
1. Albania 21. Lesotho 
2. Algeria 22. Mauritania 
3. Armenia 23. Mexico 
4. Azerbaijan 24. Moldova 
5. Bangladesh 25. Morocco 
6. Bahrain 26. Namibia 
7. Benin 27. Nepal 
8. Bhutan 28. Nicaragua 
9. Bolivia 29. Niger 
10. Cameroon 30. Nigeria 
11. Comoros 31. Papua New Guinea 
12. Djibouti 32. Peru 
13. Ecuador 33. Philippines 
14. Egypt 34. Russia 
15. Ghana 35. Saudi Arabia 
16. Guinea-Bissau 36. Senegal 
17. India 37. Suriname 
18. Indonesia 38. Thailand 
19. Iran 39. Togo 
20. Laos 40. Venezuela 
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Because of these various reasons, UNSC members instruct their diplomats 
to take specific positions (including voting in a specific manner) when the UNSC is 
considering specific atrocities. In 2005, for example, Anne Patterson, the Deputy U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the UNSC, abstained from Resolution 1593 on the referral 
of the Darfur case to the ICC on instructions from Washington D.C. Similarly, towards 
the end of the negotiations on the same resolution, Mr. Li Baodong, the Chinese diplomat 
at the UNSC, was instructed from his capital to abstain, rather than veto, the resolution.175 
Finally, each of the Russian and Chinese vetoes to draft resolution S/2014/348 on an 
atrocities investigation for Syria also originated in Moscow and Beijing.   
Second, beyond acting at the instruction of their capitals, diplomats take 
important actions on issues of international criminal justice by acting within the margin 
of discretion afforded by their states.176 Most states do not have the capacity to remain 
appraised and interested in all developments of international affairs. In such instances, the 
diplomats at the UNSC often have the flexibility to act as they please, so long as they do 
not offend their state’s interests and partners. As principal-agent theory predicts, in such 
instances, diplomats are not placed on a tight leash.  
In practice, this creates an interesting comparison between the diplomats 
of the P5 and those of the E10, as the P5 have larger and more sophisticated foreign 
policy apparatuses than their counterparts at the E10.177 At first, it may appear that 
diplomats of the E10 are often less constrained in their decision-making that those of the                                                         
175 Interviews: 1, 9, 13. 
176 See e.g. Johnson and Urpelainen (2014); Pickering and Naim (2001). 




P5 because of the limited institutional capacity of the small states at the UNSC. Yet, 
evidence from interviews shows that even the E10 spend important resources on the 
policies that affect their own state, a P5 or a patron-state of their country.178 Diplomats 
from Greece, for example, were given considerable latitude to act on issues relating to 
Africa. But, they were instructed by the Greek foreign ministry to avoid any action on 
issues that might irritate any of the P5.179 As such, while diplomats from the P5 are 
generally expected to be on a tight leash, the discretion afforded to diplomats from the 
E10 may vary considerably from issue to issue. 
There are several examples in which diplomats acted within their 
discretion on issues of atrocities investigation. Most famously, Ambassador Keating of 
New Zealand and Ambassador Kovanda of the Czech Republic were instrumental in the 
creation of the ICTR. As New Zealand and the Czech Republic had no interests in 
Rwanda, their governments did not pay attention to events in that country and gave their 
diplomats at the UNSC, discretion to act as they saw fit. Keating and Kovanda could thus 
make their own decisions with regards to how best to respond to the genocide.180 This 
space to maneuver enabled them to suggest an international atrocities investigation to the 
other UNSC members and to keep working towards its creation. A similar example of 
discretionary action took place in 2000 and involved the French Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the UNSC, Yves Doutriaux. France and the United Kingdom had long 
accorded their diplomats leeway to accommodate each other’s preferences in Africa. As                                                         
178 Interviews: 7, 17, 19, 20. 
179 Interview: 19. 




part of his discretionary actions, Doutriaux thus voted in favor of the creation of the 
SCSL, which was supported by the United Kingdom. 
Third, in very rare cases, diplomats will violate their states’ instructions.  
While such transgressions are not likely to happen often, since a diplomat’s career can be 
terminated for insubordination, they are anticipated under the concept of shirking in 
principal-agent’s theory.181  
Interestingly, shirking has taken place at the UNSC in a few highly 
publicized occasions. For example, in the 2003 debates regarding the invasion of Iraq, 
Mexico’s Ambassador Adolfo Aguilar Zinser opposed a U.S.-sponsored resolution 
despite the instructions of Mexican President Vicente Fox.182 In the area of atrocities, the 
most famous case of shirking took place in 2011 and involved the Libyan diplomat at the 
United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi. Dabasshi in open defiance of the instructions of the 
Libyan government of Colonel Qaddafi defected from the regime and called for an ICC 
investigation into the Libyan atrocities. The impact of his actions was magnified by the 
publicity of his defiance, which took place through a declaration to the media.  
Overall, diplomats are instrumental in bringing atrocities to the attention 
of the UNSC and insisting that such atrocities receive an investigation. As past analyses 
indicate, diplomats take such actions (i) at the instruction of their government, (ii) within 
the discretion afforded to them by their government, and (iii) rarely, against their 
government’s instructions. None of these three categories of diplomatic activities are 
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interesting or surprising. A diplomat’s actual engagement, however, with such issues is 
much more complicated and far less mechanical that than these three descriptive 
categories suggest. The case studies presented in Part III correct for this impression. 
Before turning to those, the next Part presents one more way that diplomats may act in 
favor of international atrocities investigations. 
Part II. Diplomatic Disagreements 
The three aforementioned sources of diplomatic activities are not 
surprising or controversial. To the contrary, the historical records, the epigraph of this 
Chapter and the interviews of this dissertation indicate that diplomats sometimes disagree 
with their own superiors and advocate for a change to the scope of their instructions. In 
turn, the change in state policy caused by the disagreement allows the diplomat to bring 
the atrocities to the attention of the UNSC. 
This fourth source of diplomatic activity is controversial, as it challenges 
common assumptions of foreign policy. A disagreement can be defined as “an argument 
caused by people having different opinions about something.”183 The expression of 
disagreement with one’s instructions inverts a foundation of principal-agent theory, 
according to which the principal decides and the agent—as the name implies—acts. 
Diplomats, apparently, do not always “argue for policies in which they do not personally 
believe.”184 By raising a disagreement and managing to receive new instructions, the 
agent is no longer a recipient and becomes an instigator. It, moreover, appears that 
foreign policy is not formulated by a distinct set of actors and continuously adhered to by                                                         
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others. Instead, the practice of foreign policy may be better depicted as an interactive 
process, one with many participants, that is in constant flux.  
Because this source of diplomatic action has not been recognized in the 
prior literature, this Part will outline a framework for understanding its role as a source of 
diplomatic activities and highlight the consequences of this framework. The goal of this 
Part is to explain a previously unexplored way in which atrocities appear at the UNSC.  
A Framework for Diplomatic Disagreements 
There are at least three reasons for which a diplomat may prevail in a 
disagreement with his or her capital. First, the personality of the diplomat may be 
important in convincing his or her capital.185 Past studies have highlighted how a 
diplomat’s likelihood of prevailing in disagreements with his or her capital depends on 
the character, upbringing, professional background and temperament of each diplomat.186  
Age, experience and education are all conducive to such disagreements.187 Additionally, 
such traits are more successful in heterogeneous teams (i.e. teams whose members have 
varying ages, gender and functional backgrounds).188  
Similar explanations may account for the success of diplomatic 
disagreements at the UNSC. After all, each diplomat carries with him or her experiences 
and personality traits during his or her service at the UNSC. Additionally, the diplomat in 
New York is part of a team, with colleagues of different ages, genders and preferences.                                                         
185 For such approaches to the study of international relations, see Avner (1991); Offer (1995); Byman and 
Pollack (2001). 
186 See Diplomat H. (1937); Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Janis (1972 and 1982); Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and 
Bourgeois (1997). 
187 Bertrand and Schoar (2003). 




These micro-level elements of a diplomat’s life affect the quality of his or her arguments 
and the gravitas of his or her stance vis-à-vis his superiors. As a result, individual-
centered elements can influence the success of a diplomatic disagreement at the UNSC.  
Second, a diplomat may prevail in a disagreement because he or she will 
disagree only when his or her view is likely to succeed. At the UNSC, there are several 
ways in which such internal knowledge may be important. The first way in which a 
diplomat may know when to disagree is through his or her relationship to his or her state. 
As diplomats are agents of the state, various elements of principal-agent theory explain 
how a diplomat’s relationship to his or her state is likely to guide the diplomat in voicing 
his or her disagreements. A series of studies use formal models to argue that a principal 
will grant an agent greater discretion when they share similar preferences.189 According 
to this ally principle, we should expect that diplomats with preference similarity to their 
superiors will voice their disagreements more than those diplomats without preference 
similarity. Apart from the ally principle, several formal models suggest that discretion is 
more likely to be given to an agent when the principal has low search costs and there is 
transparency, which together allow the principal to monitor and ex post facto punish the 
agent’s defections or reward his or her obedience.190 The ability to oversee and punish the 
agent gives the principal comfort that the agent’s actions will not stray from, or in any 
way undermine, the principal’s general aims. A diplomat is more likely to voice 
disagreements when the principal has such comfort. Finally, the conduct of foreign policy 
is a specialized field. A few past studies have highlighted that, in such fields, discretion                                                         
189 On ally principle, see Huber and McCarty (2004); Johns (2007); Bendor, Glazer and Hammond (2001). 




increases with the need for expertise.191 As a result, disagreements are likely to increase 
in tandem with a diplomat’s expertise. 
Anecdotal evidence from the UNSC supports all three of these 
explanations. The former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UNSC, Susan Rice is said 
to have leveraged her relationship with President Obama towards the negotiation of 
Resolution 1970, authorizing the ICC’s intervention in Libya.192 At the same time, the 
Obama administration monitored her performance at the UNSC and, on that basis, 
attempted to ex post facto reward her by elevating her to Secretary of State despite a 
public perception that she was not the best suited for the job.193 Finally, in comparison to 
some of her predecessors in the George W. Bush administration, such as John Bolton and 
Zalmay Khalizad, the Obama administration gave Rice more leeway on issues relating to 
conflict in Africa, a topic that she had worked on for over twenty years.194  Similar 
observations can be made with respect to Russian foreign minister and former permanent 
representative to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov. 
Third, a diplomat’s disagreement may depend on the stage of the decision-
making process.195 A diplomat may provide input in at least two steps of the decision-
making process: (i) the formulation of policy and (ii) the execution of a specific action 
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under this foreign policy. Foreign policy can be defined as “a goal-oriented or problem-
oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward 
entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction.”196 To the contrary, a specific 
action can be defined as one of the steps taken towards executing this “goal-oriented or 
problem-oriented program.”197 
Because of his or her expertise, a diplomat will not only understand the 
problems with a specific foreign policy and the implementing actions, but is also more 
likely to convince his or her superiors of the need to avoid such problems. An erroneous 
foreign policy or course of action is likely to have negative consequences for a diplomat’s 
state, which he or she is supposed to protect as part of his or her employment 
obligations.198 Furthermore, an erroneous foreign policy or course of action will likely 
have negative personal repercussions for the diplomat’s supervisors in the state’s foreign 
ministry. In extreme cases, if the decision proves entirely misguided or results in negative 
consequences, the diplomat’s supervisors may be removed from office.199 For more 
ordinary cases, the government will no longer consider such superiors to be capable 
foreign policy players and will likely doubt their subsequent decisions.200  
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States have an incentive to listen to the opposition voiced by their 
diplomats over taking a specific course of action to implement its foreign policy. In their 
everyday activities, diplomats are instructed by their states to act on specific issues, and 
are routinely given some discretion in order to accomplish their states’ pre-defined goals. 
Diplomats, however, also bring their own experience to the execution of their mission. A 
mainstay of this experience is a diplomat’s awareness of the immediate consequences of 
a particular action. For two reasons, this awareness may not be shared by the state. First, 
by being part of an institution or by living in a host country, a diplomat gains an insider’s 
understanding into the issues and problems of the local environment, one that is not 
shared by his or her state.201 Second, through involvement in the day-to-day practice of 
foreign policy, a diplomat may appreciate the practical differences of each foreign policy 
action much better than his or her more distant colleagues in the capital.202 As a result of 
this expertise, a state is likely to change its policy, if a diplomat voices a disagreement 
that relates to specific foreign policy action. 
States also have great incentives to listen to the opposition voiced by their 
diplomats when it comes to formulating foreign policy. First, diplomats enjoy 
participating in the formulation of foreign policy.203 Moreover, diplomats have valuable 
expertise on the debated issues. The diplomats, for example, who are staffed at the U.S. 
Department of State Office of Global Criminal Justice are hired precisely to help                                                         
201 Talbott (2003) (p. 115); Clark (1973) (p.72). 
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formulate U.S. policy on issues of international criminal justice. Finally, as part of the 
larger bureaucratic machinery, diplomats promote the interests and the agendas of their 
office.204 To guarantee that all relevant views are heard, particularly when many other 
agencies have their own views, each state is likely to actively engage with its relevant 
diplomats in the policy formation process.205  
But, for two reasons, changes in state practice are more likely to be fueled 
by disagreements over concrete particularized steps rather than larger foreign policy. To 
begin with, in formulating their foreign policy, states place an “over-emphasis on 
caution.”206 As a result, because of its risk adverse nature, a state may be less likely to 
revise its position on issues for a disagreeing diplomat, even when this diplomat has an 
informational advantage over his or her superiors. Additionally, a state’s incentive to 
change its foreign policy may be undermined by the uncertain nature and fast-paced 
developments in the context of international conflicts. Conflicts are most often carried 
out in fluid contexts, where events run ahead and guide subsequent diplomatic actions. A 
state dealing with a dissenting diplomat may try first to gauge the future of a conflict, and 
how this future relates to the foreign policy opposed by the diplomat, before changing 
that policy. As presented in the following case studies on the conflict in Sierra Leone, the 
United States and the United Kingdom were given a new opportunity to act due to the 
RUF’s recalcitrant actions. They were able to fulfill the preferences of certain of their 
diplomats (i.e. Scheffer, and Short and Greenstock, respectively), without having to upset                                                         
204 See above note 16. 
205 Clark (1973) (p.49). 




their foreign affairs with a midcourse change in policy. A state, however, dealing with a 
disagreement over a specific step of foreign policy has no such luxury. As illustrated 
again in the following case studies, the United Nations could not prevent or delay the 
signing of the Lomé Peace Accords. A diplomatic ‘fight or flight syndrome’ seems more 
likely to appear in such crammed decision-making grounds.  
Overall, the framework for understanding how diplomats succeed in their 
disagreements with their capitals depends on three factors. First, the diplomat’s 
personality is an important variable. Furthermore, a diplomat’s knowledge of his or her 
capital’s political preferences is an additional important variable. Finally, a diplomat is 
more likely to prevail over disagreements on specific actions rather than foreign policy at 
large.  
Consequences of this Framework 
The framework for understanding the diplomatic disagreements indicates 
that states are likely to heed to disagreements in a few limited circumstances. This 
presents a challenge for optimal decision-making. While disagreements entail an increase 
in transaction costs, namely due to the lack of coordination within a decision-making 
hierarchy, they lead to significant benefits. According to prior studies in political science 
and business administration, conflicts within hierarchies are conducive to positive 
results.207 Disagreements encourage innovation, goal-driven results and facilitate better 
cooperation across decision-makers. To the contrary, groupthink and obedience to 
instructions is a recipe for policy disaster.208 It hinders change, promotes uniformity and                                                         
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restrains creative thinking. In practice, the benefits of disagreements far outweigh the 
transaction costs from the lack of coordination. Yet, fruitless disagreement appears to be 
the norm for diplomats working on conflict resolution. An unobserved side-effect of this 
trend is the likely absence of creative ideas for conflict resolution, including the role of 
justice in this process. 
Moreover, when considered in conjunction with the most recent events in 
the field of international atrocities investigations, this framework should concern both 
scholars and practitioners of international atrocities investigations. Ever since the Libya 
referral to the ICC, in 2011, the field of international atrocities investigations has been in 
retreat. The attempts of the international community to create accountability mechanisms 
have failed in Syria, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan. The ICC’s attempts to prosecute cases 
in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic have 
had, at best, mediocre results. Even civil society has started doubting the role of justice in 
the area of conflict resolution. Conflicts, however, remain ever active. Yet, many UNSC 
members have adopted foreign policies that leave little room for justice initiatives. As a 
result, their diplomats are not instructed or given any discretion to act in favor of 
international criminal justice. And, as they are unlikely to prevail in a diplomatic 
disagreement over the formation of foreign policy, these diplomats have very little 
likelihood of furthering the goals of international justice. Yet, their input is necessary for 
any action towards those goals. 
Recent events in Syria are especially telling. After three years of civil war, 




immediate resort to justice.209 Few other states (e.g. the United States, the United 
Kingdom) have debated the resort to justice as a reconstruction tool, after the conflict 
settles.210 At the same time, several states, such as Russia and China, remain openly 
hostile to the idea of justice ever being used.211 With the exception of the diplomats from 
those very few states that still support an immediate role for justice, all other diplomats 
have very little likelihood of acting in favor of international atrocities investigations. 
Their instructions will not explicitly include this topic, nor will it fall under their 
discretion. If diplomats want to include it, they will have to disagree with their country’s 
foreign policy. As this Part has indicated, such disagreements are not expected to be 
fruitful. Diplomats are thus receding into the background along with the likelihood that 
the perpetrators of current atrocities (like those currently being committed in Syria) will 
face justice. 
Part III. The Case Studies 
The first Part of this Chapter highlighted three traditional sources of 
diplomatic activity, namely that diplomats take action (i) at the instruction of their 
government, (ii) within the discretion afforded to them by their government, and (iii) 
rarely, against their government’s instructions. The second Part presented a framework 
for understanding the more controversial, and previously unrecognized, fact that 
diplomats also act after having convinced their states to change their policies. Yet, the 
above two Parts give the impression that diplomatic activity is mechanical, devoid of any                                                         
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color. To the contrary, the following case studies highlight the intense and passionate 
nature of the work diplomats undertake within the four sources of diplomatic life.    
This Part proceeds in four sections. First, it explains the decision to select 
case studies stemming from the Sierra Leonean civil war. Then, the following three 
sections each present one case study in chronological order. The first case study details 
how Hans Correll disagreed with Kofi Annan and managed to change Annan’s decision 
over the use of amnesty in Sierra Leone. The second case study highlights how David 
Scheffer came about to receiving specific instructions from the U.S. State Department 
over the creation of the SCSL. Finally, the third presents how Sir Jeremy Greenstock 
acted within the discretion afforded by the U.K. government when evaluating the role 
that Foday Sankoh was playing in Sierra Leone. 
Selecting Case Studies 
As this Chapter investigates how diplomats act with respect to specific 
atrocities, it relies on case studies of diplomatic action relating to Sierra Leone’s civil 
war. In order to identify the relevant case studies, a tripartite research strategy was 
implemented. First, those diplomats, who, since the end of the Cold War, have been 
involved on decisions of atrocities investigations at the UNSC were identified. Through 
the use of archival research, historical narratives, diplomatic memoirs and newspaper 
articles, the research was narrowed to those cases in which diplomats had an active role 
over the topic of atrocities investigations at the UNSC.  
The work of a diplomat is rarely publicly aired. Diplomacy is known to be 
a secretive profession, in which plans and actions are not mentioned as they might expose 




research on this topic was supplemented by a series of interviews with the diplomats most 
active in atrocities investigations at the UNSC, their aides, and members of the civil 
society observing these diplomats.  
In conducting the research, it became apparent that a valuable source of 
diplomatic activity on atrocities investigations at the UNSC comes from the diplomats of 
the UN. In a few significant ways, the personnel of the various UN bodies, such as the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Development Program (‘UNDP’), 
and the numerous Special Envoys or Special Representatives do not work according to 
customary diplomatic arrangements. For example, the administrator of UNDP reports to 
the UNDP’s Executive Board and can thus defy the instructions of the Secretary-General. 
Additionally, the heads of departments within the UN are traditionally appointed by state-
members of the UN. While these individuals are responsible to the Secretary-General, 
they often use their contacts with their member state to circumvent the UN’s hierarchical 
process. Despite these differences, it is widely accepted that UN diplomats operate vis-à-
vis the Secretary-General much in the same way that diplomats do vis-à-vis their foreign 
ministries.212 They have the same incentives and concerns, and play the same role in 
making UN policies and implementing UN actions as diplomats do for their countries. 
Their actions were thus included in the research materials.  
Through the focus on disagreements relating to the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, this Chapter controls for a host of external variables, such as the influence of a 
country’s predetermined foreign policy and the greater role of international relations in                                                         
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the present study of diplomatic actions. The civil war in Sierra Leone raged from 1991 to 
2002, with the most violent period occurring after 1997. Throughout its history, the Sierra 
Leonean conflict was never the most prominent issue at the UNSC.213 In the first years of 
this civil war, the UNSC had to deal with more significant crises in the former 
Yugoslavia and in the Great Lakes region of Africa (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo). After 1997, when a series of peace agreements had 
failed and the atrocities in Sierra Leone escalated (e.g. “Operation No Living Thing”), the 
UNSC had to deal with the events in Kosovo, East Timor’s efforts to gain independence, 
wars between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, in the Central African Republic and in Liberia.  
The conflict in Sierra Leone was also not contested among the P5 or the 
various E10 that served on the UNSC during the conflict. Within the UNSC, the United 
Kingdom, as the former colonial power of Sierra Leone, had the lead (i.e. first role) on all 
issues relating to the conflict of Sierra Leone.214 While initially restrained in its 
involvement, the United Kingdom became keenly interested in stopping the conflict after 
1999. The United States also displayed an interest in stopping the conflict, and even 
appointed a special envoy to the region. It never, however, shifted its primary focus to 
West Africa. France, while interested in this conflict—mainly because it affected Cote 
d’Ivoire—maintained a tacit agreement with the United Kingdom not to meddle with its 
initiatives. For the other two P5 members, Russia and China, the conflict was of no 
special interest. The E10 were similarly disinterested. One exception came from Nigeria,                                                         
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who sat on the UNSC in 1994 and 1995 and participated, as a very active peacekeeper, in 
this conflict. The UNSC, however, remained largely passive on this civil war during 
those two years. 
Case Study of Disagreement: The UN and Amnesty (at the Lomé Peace Accords) 
The first case study of diplomatic action relating to international criminal 
justice occurred the few days before the signing of the Lomé Peace Accords and involved 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Francis Okelo, the United Nations 
Office of Legal Affairs (‘OLA’) and the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The staff 
members of the OLA disagreed with Okelo’s and Annan’s intention to sign on to the 
amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Accords. This section first provides the context of 
the events and then explains why Kofi Annan changed policy and agreed with the 
position of the OLA. 
The Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, had long been cognizant of the 
atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone. Initially, the Secretary-General “expressed 
[his] deep regret at the violence, loss of life and property and immense suffering 
undergone by the people of Sierra Leone since the coup d’état…”215 He later informed 
the UNSC that the atrocities committed by the rebel AFRC/RUF alliance216 reached 
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severe proportions.217 The shock and awe value of the Secretary-General’s report is such 
that it is worth quoting in length: 
As ECOMOG troops approached [Koindu and Buedu], 
armed former junta elements attacked the local civilian 
population, killing, raping and mutilating hundreds of them, 
causing tens of thousands of Sierra Leoneans to flee into 
Liberia and Guinea in the last few weeks and tens of 
thousands to flee into the interior of Sierra Leone. 
Hundreds of patients have been admitted to hospitals 
suffering from amputation of limbs and ears and severe 
lacerations. Humanitarian organizations fear that the actual 
number of victims may be much larger….. 
Of those victims who have received treatment, most are 
male, ranging in age from 8 to 60 years. The youngest 
amputee admitted to hospital is, however, a six-year-old 
girl, one of whose arms was completely severed. Victims 
also report that babies have been taken from their mothers’ 
arms and burned alive. There are numerous reports of rape, 
including one of the multiple rape of a 12-year-old girl. 
Doctors at one hospital state that lacerations inflicted on 
one 60-year-old woman are the result of a failed attempt to 
behead her….. 
From all parts of the country there are reports of 
extrajudicial killings, rape, arbitrary detention, including 
for purposes of sexual abuse, torture of children (especially 
child-combatants), forced labour and the looting and 
destruction of residential and commercial premises and 
property. 
As a result of the continued fighting, on July 13, 1998, the UNSC 
established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (“UNOMSIL”) with up 
to seventy military observers and a small medical staff. UNOMSIL was led by the 
Special Representative for Sierra Leone, a position that had been created to subsume that 
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of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy.218 Francis Okelo, a national of Uganda, long-
time UN administrator and, up to then, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, was named the 
Special Representative. 
For the subsequent period of the conflict, the Special Representative for 
Sierra Leone had a central role in negotiating and handling the political aspects of the 
civil war. With the backdrop of the international community condemning the atrocities 
that had been committed and with the UNSC having authorized a peacekeeping force, the 
Special Representative and the Secretary-General attempted to build momentum for a 
peace deal. This process culminated in late May 1999,219 when all warring parties, 
together with the governments of “Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America” as well as the UN, the Organization of African Unity, the 
ECOWAS, and the Commonwealth of Nations, met in Lomé—the capital of Togo—to 
negotiate a peace agreement.220 After more than a month of negotiations, the agreement 
was signed on July 7, 1999. The events of this first case study took place in the days 
before the signing of this agreement. 
As the warring sides were approaching the conclusion of the peace 
agreement, it became apparent that the government of President Kabbah was ready to 
include amnesty provisions to placate demands from the rebels and to entice them to 
participate in the agreement. Kabbah was no stranger to this procedure, which he had first                                                         
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agreed to in the 1996 Abidjan Peace Accords.221 Earlier in 1999, in a private meeting 
with U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes David Scheffer, Kabbah had privately 
conceded that amnesty for all rebels—including the top commanders—could be 
negotiated as part of a peace agreement.222 During the Lomé talks, Kabbah formally 
accepted this rebel demand.223 So did all of the other parties to the Lomé talks. 
As part of his duties, Francis Okelo frequently reported on the progress of 
the peace-talks to the UN headquarters. Following this procedure, after a draft of the 
accords had been finalized, Okelo sent this draft to the UN Headquarters and waited for 
his instructions regarding whether he should sign the accord on behalf of the United 
Nations, as a guarantor. The UN Secretariat was initially positive towards the text of the 
peace accord and was inclined to sign on.224 Okelo, however, had also sent the draft of 
the peace accords to the OLA.225 Once the text of the agreement arrived to the OLA, a 
series of staff members voiced their disagreement with the amnesty provisions of the 
accord internally, within the OLA.226 These UN lawyers, on the basis of their expertise 
and experience with past conflicts, argued forcefully against the amnesty provision, as 
they perceived it to be in violation of international criminal law. It would also counter the 
developing trend towards accountability for those most responsible for committing 
atrocities. 
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Hans Corell, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, shared the 
feelings of his staff members227 and decided to take up the issue with the Secretary-
General.228 Corell and Okelo cooperated very closely with their superior, Kofi Annan. In 
line with the three factors outlined in the framework set forth in the previous Part, they 
used their close relationship as leverage for their argument. Beyond their close 
professional ties, they also knew that Annan was particularly sympathetic to the idea of 
providing accountability for atrocities. 
In his conversation with Annan, Corell acknowledged the positive 
elements of the accord and then voiced his disagreement with the amnesty provision in a 
detailed and forceful manner.229 His arguments focused on the two consequences of the 
amnesty provision. First, an amnesty provision would tarnish the image of the United 
Nations. Corell asserted that the general trend of international law had shifted towards a 
paradigm of accountability and that the United Nations—as a guardian of international 
law—should not agree to a provision that violated established legal practice. How could 
the United Nations sign onto an agreement that would give the murderous Sankoh a blank 
sheet when it was putting pressure on numerous governments to surrender war criminals 
to the ICTY and the ICTR? Second, the amnesty provision would harm peace efforts in 
Sierra Leone and beyond. Judging by the precedent of the Abidjan accords, Corell 
considered that an amnesty provision gave the rebels a perverse incentive to continue 
with their atrocities, since a future amnesty provision would always appear possible.                                                         
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Beyond Sierra Leone, the use of an amnesty clause in Lomé could set a negative 
precedent for other conflicts. 
Throughout their disagreement, both the OLA lawyers and Corell did not 
attack the remaining provisions of the agreement. They agreed with the UN’s policies 
towards the Sierra Leonean conflict, which involved a combination of forceful measures 
(sanctions, peacekeeping) and increased diplomatic efforts.230 All of these policies 
seemed to have been incorporated into the Lomé Peace Accords. Understanding the 
difficulties during negotiations between the various warring parties and cognizant of the 
grim realities of the continued conflict in Sierra Leone, Corell and his staff were as eager 
as all other parties to conclude a peace agreement. But, despite their agreement with the 
larger policy, stemming from their expertise on international criminal justice, they were 
also in the best position to appreciate the shortcomings of the proposed amnesty. Their 
only concern centered on their preference not to preclude a future possibility of justice in 
order to have peace in the short term. Their opposition to an unqualified approval of the 
agreement was the message that Corell conveyed to Kofi Annan. Corell also suggested a 
different step, namely signing the agreement and simultaneously adding a reservation.231  
Annan found Corell’s points compelling. He changed his initially 
unqualified optimism towards the text of the accords. As he writes in his memoirs, he 
“took the very unusual step of instructing his Special Representative to Sierra Leone, 
Francis Okelo, to write into the agreement by hand that for the UN, there could be no 
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amnesty for genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity”232 (emphasis in original).  
Okelo did just that.  
Case Study of Instructions: United States and Atrocities in Sierra Leone (immediately 
after the Lomé Peace Accords) 
The second case study of diplomatic actions took place after the signing of 
the Lomé Peace Accords and involved the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, 
David Scheffer, and the foreign policy apparatus of the U.S. government. As was done 
for the previous case study, this section first provides the context for the events. Then it 
explains the discussions and actions among several high-ranking members of the Clinton 
administration over the amnesty language in the Lomé Peace Accords, and how these 
ended in specific instructions for Scheffer.  
The United States paid close attention to the events in Sierra Leone and to 
the Lomé Peace Accords. After the Clinton administration’s abject failure to act during 
the Rwandan genocide and the administration’s repeated internal and external self-
criticisms over that failure, Africa had become a new priority.233 Yet, events in both the 
international and domestic sphere had rendered the Sierra Leonean conflict of secondary 
significance. Only when circumstances changed, following the RUF’s capture of 150 
peacekeepers in April 2000, did the Clinton administration focus on the conflict. Under 
increased pressure largely due to its prior apathy, the United States decided to support 
forceful measures to stop the conflict, including the creation of an international criminal 
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tribunal. The events examined here took place before that change in policy, during a 
period that the United States was striving for “peace on the cheap.”234  
With the United States focused on events in the former Yugoslavia, 
Saddam Hussein’s intransigence in Iraq, and a multitude of other conflicts, the events in 
Sierra Leone did not draw the full attention of the U.S. government until 1999. After the 
RUF/AFRC attack on Freetown in late December 1998, codenamed “Operation No 
Living Thing,” ECOMOG placed renewed efforts to stop the Sierra Leonean civil war. 
These efforts led to the Lomé Peace Accords in July 1999, in which the United States 
participated as an outside observer and guarantor. The amnesty provisions of the Lomé 
Peace Accords were included in the presence of the U.S. team, which was led by the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson.  
The position of the United States on the Lomé Peace Accords was a result 
of Jackson’s initiative. After he secured the Africa-American vote for the Bill Clinton’s 
1996 re-election campaign, Jackson became an informal advisor to the President. For his 
help in the re-election campaign, President Clinton appointed Jackson as his Special 
Envoy to Africa.235 In a time in which U.S. attention to Africa’s problems was 
overshadowed by the host of international crises, Jackson had significant leeway in 
making policy decisions. Jackson was active on the ground in West Africa. In July 1998, 
for example, Jackson brokered a meeting between President Kabbah of Sierra Leone, 
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President Taylor of Liberia, who was a staunch supporter of the RUF, Secretary-General 
Annan, and Nigerian President Abubakar.236  
While the Sierra Leonean conflict continued, Jackson’s connection with 
President Clinton had grown even closer, with the former becoming the latter’s spiritual 
advisor over the Monika Lewinsky scandal that had broken out in early 1998. As a result, 
during the negotiations of the Lomé Peace Accords, Jackson was able to arrange for 
President Clinton to telephone both President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh to put 
pressure on both towards accepting the agreement.237 When the agreement was negotiated 
and concluded, Jackson, to the surprise of several individuals within the State 
Department, failed to object to the amnesty language.238 By failing to do so he sided with 
President Kabbah of Sierra Leone, who considered the amnesty to be the quid pro quo for 
the RUF’s cessation of hostilities.239 
David Scheffer, the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, was 
among those dismayed by the use of the amnesty provisions in the Lomé Peace Accords. 
He was the person most responsible for the implementation of zero tolerance to atrocities 
within U.S. foreign policy. On a parallel track with Jackson’s forays into peace-building 
for Sierra Leone, Scheffer had, in 1998, travelled to Sierra Leone to confront both the 
Kabbah government and the rebels over the need to end the atrocities and seek 
accountability. Upon returning from his trip, where he realized the gravity of what was 
occurring, he held several meetings with other State Department officials and with the                                                         
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Atrocities Prevention Interagency Working Group to argue the need for a swift judicial 
process for those most responsible for the atrocities. In the end, despite his ambassadorial 
rank and interest in Sierra Leone, Scheffer “had not been privy to the final days of 
negotiations” on the Lomé Peace Accords. He “was taken aback to read the breadth of 
[the Accords’] terms on pardon and amnesty.”240 Scheffer realized that “the priority for 
the Africa specialists in the State Department was a peace deal, apparently at whatever 
cost to justice.”241 Mirroring this observation, the official U.S. statement on the Lomé 
Peace Accords congratulated both sides for working together and expressed support for 
the agreement “which will bring to an end the tragic war of Sierra Leone.”242 
Scheffer’s surprise was not limited to Jackson’s decision to support the 
agreement despite the amnesty clause. Throughout his career, Scheffer opposed any 
dichotomy between peace and justice, and saw the two as intertwined and inseparable. In 
the case of Sierra Leone, others in the State Department considered that the amnesty 
provision offered an opportunity for Sankoh to transform the RUF into a political party. 
Scheffer found the hope that such amnesty would lead to national reconciliation to be 
“almost unbearable gobbledygook.”243 Additionally, as a practical matter, Scheffer 
believed that international criminal law would override any agreement on amnesty for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Sierra Leone.244 In his eyes, the 
preference for “peace on the cheap” was legally and practically wrong.                                                           
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Despite Scheffer’s personal preferences, the Lomé Peace Accords were 
signed and no one in the U.S. government publicly spoke up in favor of justice. In 
October 1999, three months after the signing of the Lomé Peace Accords, U.S. Secretary 
of State Albright formally visited Freetown. Her visit was emblematic of the 
administration’s approach. It included a visit to a recovery camp for war amputees, $55 
million in aid, and $65 million in debt forgiveness. Yet, Secretary Albright also had a 
private meeting with RUF leader Sankoh and AFRC leader Koroma. When asked about 
the issue of an amnesty in the Lomé Peace Accords, Albright conceded that “[u]ltimately, 
the only way that reconciliation really can come is if people have a sense that justice has 
been done and those who have perpetrated the terrible crimes are punished individually.” 
But, she prioritized consolidating peace before proceeding with justice.245  
The events on the ground proved that the Clinton administration’s 
approach was misguided, as the RUF violated the terms of the peace accords and 
continued carrying out atrocities. Even after the capture by the RUF of 150 peacekeepers 
in late April 2000, the administration followed Jackson’s advice. In a statement on May 
12, 2000, President Clinton clarified that “I have asked Reverend Jesse Jackson, my 
special envoy for democracy in Africa, to return to the region to work with leaders there 
for a peaceful resolution of this crisis.”246 But, before landing in Freetown, Jackson 
managed to make himself irrelevant to the process. He first considered that Sankoh has to 
be brought back to a political position. Then, he notoriously compared the murderous 
Sankoh to Nelson Mandela. Sierra Leoneans were furious. Abu Mbawa Kongonba, a                                                         
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Sierra Leonean legislator, captured the general mood in saying that “I cannot help 
believing that the Rev. Jackson is a collaborator of Foday Sankoh….he has a hidden 
agenda.”247 The Kabbah government clarified that it could not guarantee Jackson’s safety 
in Freetown, effectively making him a persona non grata. 
While the peacekeepers were released through Jackson’s contacts with 
Liberian President Charles Taylor, the poor performance of the Clinton administration 
over the Sierra Leonean crisis incited a litany of complaints. Initially, the international 
community and the UN criticized the administration for discriminating against African 
problems. Why was the United States involved in Kosovo and East Timor, but not in a 
brutal civil war in Sierra Leone? Powerful Republicans also voiced strong opposition to 
maintaining the Lomé framework. Republican Senator Judd Gregg, of New Hampshire, 
head of the Senate’s appropriations subcommittee and advisor to the 2000 presidential 
campaign of George W. Bush, opposed the Lomé Peace Accords by blocking $368 
million in State Department funds from going to United Nations peacekeeping 
missions.248 Finally, the public pressure culminated in July 2000 with the publication of 
Ryan Lizza’s account of the Clinton administration’s actions in Sierra Leone. 
Characterized as “the most grotesque,” and “a policy of coercive dishonesty,” Lizza 
asserted that Clinton’s policy towards Sierra Leone sent a positive message towards the 
RUF atrocity perpetrators.249 The administration’s foreign policy on Sierra Leone was 
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thus entirely exposed and it was obvious to most that it was in need of a significant 
change. 
Meanwhile, Scheffer renewed his efforts to convince the various State 
Department offices of the need for accountability in the efforts to stop atrocities from 
recurring. To that end, he travelled—in February 2000—to Sierra Leone to meet with the 
local government, the UN peacekeeping mission and the victim groups. During the spring 
of 2000, Scheffer presented the options for accountability in meetings with senior State 
Department officials and pressured Secretary of State Albright to include accountability 
in the Sierra Leonean peace process.250 In May 2000, he also met with Under-Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs Hans Corell to explore the options for a UN court in Sierra 
Leone.251 As a result, by late Spring 2000, less than a year after the Lomé Peace Accords, 
confidential sources informed the New York Times that high level political appointees 
within the Clinton Administration, such as Harold Koh, assistant secretary of state for 
human rights, Julia Taft, assistant secretary of state for refugees, and David Scheffer 
opposed power-sharing with the RUF in Sierra Leone.252 Scheffer continued building his 
case for accountability up until June 3, 2000, when Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador 
to the United Nations, informed him that the United States would propose to the UNSC 
the creation of an international criminal tribunal for the atrocities committed in Sierra 
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Leone. Scheffer was explicitly instructed to act towards the creation of such a tribunal. In 
his own words, “[t]hat was the green light [he] had been waiting for”.253 
Case Study of Discretion: United Kingdom and Foday Sankoh (after the Lomé Peace 
Accords) 
The third case study of diplomatic activity took place after the signing of 
the Lomé Peace Accords and involved Jeremy Greenstock and Clare Short and the 
foreign policy apparatus of the U.K. government. Greenstock and Short used the 
discretion afforded to them as part of their official duties to the role assigned to RUF 
leader Foday Sankoh in the post-Lomé political system of Sierra Leone. Once again, this 
section provides the context for the events and then explains the debates among several 
high-ranking members of the Blair administration on the role Sankoh should have in 
Sierra Leone following the Lomé Peace Accords. 
As described in Tony Blair’s memoirs, the United Kingdom did very little 
with regards to Sierra Leone’s civil war before 2000.254 In its first years in power, the 
Blair cabinet was focused on the international crises in the former Yugoslavia—
particularly Kosovo—and the attempted inspections of Saddam Hussein’s WMD 
programs in Iraq. In 1999, once a large number of atrocities started receiving 
international attention, the United Kingdom slightly shifted its interest towards Sierra 
Leone. The Blair family had some personal ties to Sierra Leone, as Blair’s father had 
been a lecturer at the Sierra Leone University in Freetown.255 The United Kingdom also                                                         
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had colonial ties with that country, a reality that influenced the perception of U.K. policy-
makers towards the civil war.256 These ties were so important that the BBC coverage 
remained the primary news media not only for the U.K. government, but also for all 
fighting parties in the civil war. More importantly, another former U.K. colony—
Nigeria—had taken the lead in fighting the AFRC/RUF rebels. Mindful of the atrocities 
and of Nigeria’s financial difficulties in fighting this war, the Blair government decided 
to contribute £1 million to the logistical needs of ECOMOG forces in January 1999.257 
By January 20, 1999, in its effort to bolster the anti-rebel front, the United Kingdom had 
also sent a frigate to Freetown.258 At the same time, however, Blair was also preparing for 
an air campaign against Serbia for the protection of Kosovar Albanians.  
The contrast between the United Kingdom’s interest towards Kosovo’s 
war of succession and general apathy towards Sierra Leone’s civil war could not have 
been starker. The double-standard was not lost on The Guardian, which reported that 
“[t]he UN's consolidated humanitarian appeal for Kosovo is $690m[illion], of which 58% 
has been met, while $2.1b[illio]n has just been pledged for regional reconstruction. A UN 
appeal for $25m[illion] for Sierra Leone met profound international indifference and a 
mere 32% of the appeal has been covered.”259 Various commentators—such as the UN 
Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson—tried to galvanize the United Kingdom’s 
attention to Sierra Leone by noting that there were more atrocities in Sierra Leone than in 
Kosovo.                                                         
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In contrast to its intervention in Kosovo, the United Kingdom favored a 
power-sharing agreement with the goal of national reconciliation for Sierra Leone. In 
July 1999, at the same time that U.K. ground troops entered the war in Kosovo, the Lomé 
Peace Accords on Sierra Leone were signed. In an effort to support the peace process 
held in Lomé, the U.K. government paid for the costs of the month-long negotiations.260 
Then, upon the completion of the negotiations, the United Kingdom encouraged the 
warring parties to abide by their agreement.261   
The United Kingdom was willing to work with the text of the Lomé Peace 
Accords despite the significant concessions made by Kabbah’s government to the rebels. 
The United Kingdom’s comments on the Lomé Peace Accords indicated support for the 
agreement while recognizing its flaws. The inclusion, for example, of an amnesty 
provision was “one of the many hard choices that the Government and the people of 
Sierra Leone had to make in the interests of securing a workable agreement.”262 
Similarly, the U.K. Foreign Secretary—in answering questions to Parliament—
acknowledged that Sankoh’s appointment to the Ministry for Mining, which oversaw the 
lucrative diamond trade—a major source of rebel funding, was integral to the deal and, 
thus, an important step towards peace.263  
In its efforts to support the reconciliation effort, the U.K. government 
became increasingly invested in the post-Lomé peace process by cooperating with the                                                         
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government of President Kabbah in the efforts to end the civil war. The United Kingdom 
shipped armaments and ammunition to the government of Sierra Leone.264 It sponsored a 
UNSC resolution on the creation of a 6,000 soldier strong peacekeeping force, which was 
eventually adopted in late October 1999. Again, at the request of the United Kingdom, 
the UNSC increased this mission to 11,000 troops in February of 2000. A U.K. police 
officer was also assigned to retrain the Sierra Leonean police.265 The Inspector General of 
Sierra Leone, Keith Biddle, came from the United Kingdom. The U.K. Department of 
Foreign International Development (‘DfID’) further undertook a significant task in the 
process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the former rebels. Clare 
Short, the DfID Minister “became very involved personally and travelled to Sierra Leone 
many times to try to get the demobilization process going.”266 DfID also funded the 
creation of political structures that would “challenge the endemic corruption” in Sierra 
Leone.267 In an effort to deprive a principal source of the rebels’ income, the U.K. 
Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, proposed a restriction in the sale of uncut diamonds.268 
Finally, the United Kingdom committed to pay £250,000 to the creation of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. By early 2000, the U.K. commitments to Sierra Leone thus 
amounted to £40-50 million.269 
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The United Kingdom’s insistence on supporting the Lomé Peace Accords 
continued despite several indications that the RUF was not abiding by the terms of the 
agreement. In January 2000, Sankoh had a “businesslike” meeting with U.K. Foreign 
Office Minister for Africa, Peter Hain, and admitted that—while he supported the Lomé 
Peace Accords—there would be a delay in disarming his supporters in eastern Sierra 
Leone.270 In February 2000, Sankoh violated an international travel ban and went to 
South Africa, where he was arrested and deported. He was rumored to have travelled 
there to strike an arms deal.271 A few days later, staff of the United Nations World Food 
Program were temporarily taken hostages by RUF rebels. RUF rebels blocked other UN 
troops from access to several towns in Eastern Sierra Leone.272  
Not all members of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy apparatus, 
however, believed in the potential success of the Lomé Peace Accords. The U.K. 
Permanent Representative at the UNSC, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, together with Clare 
Short, the DfID Minister,273 began having doubts about the applicability of the Lomé 
Peace Accords. In early March of 2000, Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s visit to Freetown, as 
part of an official UNSC mission to Sierra Leone, coincided with Clare Short’s trip, 
which was part of a DfID mission. As senior officials, Greenstock and Short both enjoyed 
significant discretion in their actions. In their trip to Sierra Leone, they also had to avoid 
create false impressions or expectations about the UK’s preferences.                                                          
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Acting within the discretion afforded to them as part of their official 
duties, Greenstock and Stock had a joint private meeting with Foday Sankoh.274 They 
both reported that this meeting proved unnerving at the time. Sankoh refused to admit 
that the RUF was impeding the peace process. Moreover, Sankoh gave the appearance of 
a man with a deeply flawed character, “confused” and “worried about his own 
position.”275 For Greenstock and Short, accepting this person as an honest interlocutor in 
the peace process appeared impossible. Including Sankoh in the rebuilding efforts, such 
as disarmament or amnesty, no longer made sense since Sankoh thought “that he must 
retain a military option.”276  
Despite Greenstock’s and Short’s initiative to meet with Sankoh and the 
conclusions they relayed to London, the United Kingdom’s foreign policy in Sierra 
Leone stayed the same with regards to Sankoh. The United Kingdom abandoned the 
Lomé framework only after the RUF took peacekeepers as hostages, in May 2000. 
Secretary Annan increased the pressure on powerful governments to intervene. No longer 
bogged down in Kosovo, Blair had a good opportunity to implement his principled view 
of foreign policy in Africa.277 At this time, in a cabinet meeting over the events in Sierra 
Leone, many cabinet members proposed military action.278 The public also appeared to 
be supportive of such action.279 After the Kosovo experience, Blair did not even think 
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about seeking UNSC approval.280  700 paratroopers were—unilaterally and—rapidly 
deployed to secure the airport serving Freetown, in the neighboring town of Lingui. 
Blair’s spokesperson clarified that “it would be wrong [for the United Kingdom] not to be 
there.”281 
The United Kingdom’s military presence turned the tide of events. Soon 
after, Sankoh was arrested by a mob in Freetown and handed over to the Kabbah regime. 
This detention marked the last turn towards the end of the civil war in Sierra Leone. 
Some years later, Secretary-General Annan wrote that: 
“Rather than watch Sierra Leone fall into another bout of 
atrocious civil war of the kind that had devastated the 
country throughout the 1990s, what followed in May 2000 
was a decisive military intervention by a British military 
task force that routed the rebel factions and returned the 
balance to Sierra Leone’s political system.”282  
In the words of a Sierra Leonean folk expression, the military intervention 
indicated that the United Kingdom would no longer ‘try to scare the monkey with a dead 
baboon.’283 It also signaled the end of the Lomé framework. In reality, the conclusions 
reached by Short and Greenstock were validated, as Sankoh proved that he could not be 
trusted. Subsequently, in July 2000, Greenstock negotiated with his U.S. counterparties at 
the UNSC over the creation of an international criminal trial for the Sierra Leonean civil 
war, which the UNSC approved in August of that year. Sankoh died in prison, awaiting 
trial.                                                         
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Diplomats matter. And, they matter in many different ways. This Chapter 
explains why a diplomat becomes the patron-supporter of specific atrocities. As the 
literature on diplomatic actions has recognized, diplomats decide to seize the attention of 
the UNSC on specific atrocities according to (i) the instructions of their state, (ii) the 
discretion afforded to them by their state, or (iii) rarely, by disregarding the instructions 
of their state. This Chapter also highlights how diplomats can do so (iv) by disagreeing 
with their state and convincing the state of the need for new instructions. This Chapter 
presents a framework for understanding why and how diplomatic disagreements end up 
being successful.  
The theoretical expectations, however, on diplomatic actions are full of 
mechanical steps. If for, example, a diplomat receives instructions, a diplomat is expected 
to act. Additionally, if a diplomat has some discretion, a diplomat may take a stance. Yet, 
in reality, diplomatic life is complicated and multi-faceted. This color in the diplomacy 
relating to atrocities investigation is depicted in the three case studies from the Sierra 
Leonean civil war. Viewed together, these case studies indicate that diplomats are active 
participants within the foreign policy process, whose actions are influenced by, and can 
only be understood within, a constant movement of international affairs. 
Once a patron diplomat brings specific atrocities to the attention of the 
UNSC, the UNSC begins its deliberations. As Table 4a indicates, a patron diplomat has 
brought to the attention of the UNSC the atrocities committed in fifty-two of the ninety-
two states. With the attention of the UNSC seized, the UNSC members commence their 















Chapter Five. The Second Step: The Use of Third-Parties  
Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, on 
18 September 2004 the Security Council adopted resolution 
1564 requesting, inter alia, that the Secretary-General 
‘rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in 
order immediately to investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in 
Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts 
of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators 
of such violations with a view to ensuring that those 
responsible are held accountable’. 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Geneva, 
25 January 2005.284 
Once a patron diplomat has brought specific atrocities to the attention of 
the other UNSC members, the UNSC members begin their deliberations. As indicated in 
Chapter Three, if a patron diplomat is successful in mobilizing the attention of the other 
UNSC members on specific atrocities, while deliberating their preferred course of action 
on an atrocities investigation, the UNSC members have consistently sought the advice of 
a commission of inquiry.285 In numbers, as noted in Table 5 and Map 5, the UNSC has 
created a commission on inquiry only in twenty of the fifty-two states that had 
experienced atrocities and had a patron diplomat at the UNSC (see Map 5). With the 
exception of Libya,286 the UNSC has created a commission of inquiry for all the atrocities 
that received an investigation. Finally, the UNSC has never acted against the 
recommendations of a commission of inquiry.                                                         
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But, why would the UNSC members seek help from, and follow the 
recommendations of, a third-party in an otherwise straightforward decision? And, why 
would the use of third-parties become part of the UNSC’s de facto institutional 
procedures, even though it is not per se required by the Charter or the Rules (see Chapter 
One)? Finally, why did only twenty cases of atrocities, out of the fifty-two that had a 
patron diplomat, receive a commission of inquiry? This Chapter answers these questions. 
Borrowing from the economics literature, a third-party can be defined as 
an entity that is not currently affected by, and will not in the future be affected by its 
decision on, the present situation.287 This Chapter argues that the UNSC members’ 
decisions to use third-parties before deciding on the creation of an atrocities investigation 
can be explained by examining the interplay of power and legitimacy at the UNSC. 
Claude describes how the authority of the UNSC is a function of both its power and its 
legitimacy.288 But, as Part I demonstrates, power and legitimacy actually often clash, 
rather than complement each other. The use of third-party mechanisms allows the 
members of the UNSC to square these two sources of authority. Surprisingly, despite the 
numerous past studies on the use of third-parties, only Johnstone has recognized the 
importance of legitimacy in their use (but focuses only on the Secretary-General). This 
Chapter thus contributes to filling this gap in the literature.289   
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Table 5. Diplomat Patron and Commission of Inquiry 
Patron Diplomat but no Commission on Inquiry Patron Diplomat and Commission on Inquiry 
1. Afghanistan 1. Angola 
2. Burma 2. Bosnia 
3. Cambodia 3. Burundi 
4. Central African Republic 4. Croatia 
5. Chad 5. East Timor 
6. Colombia 6. FYROM 
7. Congo 7. Iraq 
8. Cote d'Ivoire 8. Israel 
9. Democratic Republic of the Congo 9. Kosovo 
10. El Salvador 10. Kuwait 
11. Eritrea 11. Lebanon 
12. Ethiopia 12. Libya 
13. Georgia 13. Montenegro 
14. Guatemala 14. Pakistan 
15. Guinea 15. Palestine  
16. Haiti 16. Rwanda 
17. Honduras 17. Serbia 
18. Kenya 18. Sierra Leone 
19. Liberia 19. Slovenia 
20. Mali 20. Somalia 
21. Mozambique 21. South Sudan  
22. North Korea 22.  Sudan 
23. Sri Lanka  
24. Syria   
25. Tajikistan  
26. Uganda  
27. Ukraine  
28. Western Sahara  
29. Yemen  
30. Zimbabwe  
 
The argument of this Chapter explores how the complicated decision-
making procedure of the UNSC affects the likelihood of the creation of an atrocities 
investigation. As mentioned above, out of the ninety-two atrocities of the post-Cold War 
era, the UNSC has authorized the investigation into only the eleven that had received the 
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prior support of a commission of inquiry. Similar to prosecutors of international criminal 
tribunals (see Introduction), the reports and recommendations of these third-parties are 
non-political, as they are mainly based on legal criteria and the availability of evidence. 
To the contrary, the decision of the UNSC members to request their opinion is a purely 
political one. This Chapter thus clarifies another step in the UNSC’s decision-making 
process on atrocities investigations.  
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that this Chapter applies beyond 
the UNSC’s work on atrocities. Third parties are used in most other areas of the UNSC’s 
operations. The UNSC members, for example, routinely seek information and 
recommendations relating to a specific conflict situation from the Special Envoys of the 
Secretary-General and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which have regular 
contacts with that conflict. When deliberating about the use of sanctions or terrorism, the 
UNSC also uses the advice of the sanctions committee and the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee. Additionally, the questions of this Chapter are important to the broader 
literature on international organizations. Some international organizations, such as 
NATO, never use third-parties; others use third-parties in a few instances, such as the 
WTO dispute settlement body that sometimes relies on scientific experts; others still, 
such as the UNSC, the Human Rights Council and UNDP, use third-parties constantly. 
By presenting one new reason behind the use of third-parties at the UNSC, this Chapter 
sheds light on this larger variation. 
To answer the above questions, this Chapter starts, in Part I, by explaining 
how, despite the fact that power and legitimacy are complementary, they continue to 
clash at the UNSC. Part II then illustrates how a third-party can bridge the gap between 
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considerations of power and legitimacy. Part III presents other competing explanations on 
the use of third-parties by UNSC members. Part IV presents the research design of this 
Chapter. The UNSC’s decision to use a commission of inquiry into the atrocities 
committed in Burundi is used, in Part IV, to test and illustrate the argument.  
Part I. Interplay of Power and Legitimacy 
Power and legitimacy have long been considered complementary in 
international affairs. Yet, as discussed below, it is often difficult for both to coexist. 
Before demonstrating how the clash plays out at the UNSC, this Part explains how 
considerations of power and legitimacy both compel the UNSC to take specific actions.  
The Role of Power 
Power-politics are instrumental in most UNSC decisions with regards to a 
threat to international peace and security. Power-politics, which mirror the ‘logic of 
consequences’ category developed by March and Olsen,290 are based on rationalist cost-
benefit calculations. The initial design of the UNSC, in Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, was 
predicated on such calculations.291 It was agreed then that each great power would have 
an exclusive geographic sphere of influence, and would maintain its tenure over its 
sphere without interfering in the other spheres. The polarization of the Cold War further 
supported the same reasoning, and also gave rise to quid pro quo solutions to 
international problems. After weighing the pros and the cons, Soviet missiles were, for 
example, removed from Cuba and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (‘NATO’) missiles 
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from Turkey.292 Even today, such considerations continue to be anecdotally referenced on 
all UNSC issues.293 It is constantly rumored that the P5 tacitly agree that France, for 
example, gets its preferred results with regards to the situation in Ivory Coast; Russia in 
Georgia; China in Sri Lanka; and the United States in Afghanistan.  
As outlined in Chapter Two, many academics have recognized that 
rationalist calculations of the UNSC members are central to the actions of the UNSC. The 
earliest works on the UNSC emphasize the value of the veto, and the effect of this voting 
power on all substantive and procedural decisions of the UNSC.294 More recently, Voeten 
argues that the possibility of a UNSC member taking military action on its own—without 
UNSC approval—changes the extent to which the other UNSC members value a UNSC-
approved operation.295 Thompson further demonstrates the power of rationalist 
calculations at the UNSC, as he finds that coercer states channel their actions through the 
UNSC, not because the UNSC confers legitimacy upon their operations, but because the 
decisions of the UNSC can better inform the coercer’s target audience of its true 
intentions.296 Finally, some proposals for UNSC reform are also based on rationalist 
calculations. For these, it makes little sense that India is not a P5, while France holds 
such a seat, since the former surpasses the latter in most measures of material strength.297  
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Power-politics explain why some diplomat-backed atrocities never 
received a commission of inquiry. In the case of Sri Lanka, for example, allegations of 
war crimes emerged after the end of the local civil war in 2009. In particular, the 
magnitude of the allegations against the Sri Lankan government was such that diplomats 
from several of the E10, including Japan, Costa Rica, Mexico and Austria, are rumored to 
have persistently kept the matter at the attention of the other UNSC members. Yet, as the 
Sri Lankan government enjoyed the diplomatic and financial support of China, the UNSC 
never considered creating a commission of inquiry. It is because of this context that the 
Secretary-General created, in June 2010, the Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri 
Lanka. Even though the panel’s mandate did not extend to fact-finding or investigations, 
its report is replete with details of atrocities.298 Yet, the report did not overcome China’s 
support for Sri Lanka. To the contrary, in reacting to the report, China suggested that the 
domestic government of Sri Lanka should be allowed to take its own measures for 
accountability,299 thereby conclusively ending the possibility of a UNSC commission of 
inquiry, or other involvement, in these atrocities.  
The Role of Legitimacy 
Considerations of legitimacy also empower the UNSC to act when it 
comes to threats to international peace and security. Classified by March and Olsen under 
the ‘logic of appropriateness,’300 the legitimacy of the UNSC ‘pulls’ other actors to abide 
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by its decisions.301 The significance of maintaining legitimacy for the UNSC was not lost 
on the drafters of the UN Charter. In the aftermath of World War II, it is very likely that 
the great powers could have imposed the UN Charter on the lesser powers. Yet, as Hurd 
demonstrates,302 they chose to hold the San Francisco conference and to allow lengthy 
debates on all of the Charter’s provisions. Current debates at the UNSC also highlight the 
important role that the UNSC’s legitimacy has in international relations. In 1995, for 
example, the UNSC debated the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace, which outlines 
the ways that the UN can promote and safeguard peace in the post-Cold War era. During 
this debate, the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ibrahim Gambari, asserted that the 
UNSC should support the goals of this Agenda “so that the continuing legitimacy of the 
United Nations can be assured.”303  
Claude was the first academic to explicitly recognize the value that 
legitimacy had for the actions of the UNSC.304 Since his writings, however, others have 
also highlighted the important role that legitimacy has at the UNSC.305 Some argue that 
the United States’ determination to act through the UNSC before commencing the first 
Gulf War was in part motivated by considerations of legitimacy.306 By associating with 
the UNSC, it cloaked its actions with the shield of the UNSC’s legitimacy.  Similarly, 
Hurd shows how Russia insisted on getting UNSC approval for peacekeeping missions in                                                         
301 Franck (1988). 
302 Hurd (2007). 
303 S/PV.3492 (January 18, 1995), Agenda for Peace, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: position paper of 
the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (S/1995/1). 
304 Claude (1966). 
305 See e.g. Caron (1993). 
306 See e.g. Voeten (2005). 
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former Soviet states, and even painted its trucks white and the helmets of its soldiers blue 
to show that these missions fell under the ambit of the UN rather than being part of an 
expansionist agenda.307 The important role that legitimacy has at the UNSC was also 
considered by Voeten, who examines the impact of the UNSC decisions on the use of 
force.308 Voeten argues that governments and citizens seek “political reassurance about 
the consequences of proposed military action” from the UNSC. Because the UNSC 
functions as an elite pact, its decisions bestow legitimacy on those military actions that 
“transgress a limit that should be defended.” In turn, this legitimacy triggers the 
acceptance of a military action by all other governments and citizens.  
The UNSC’s preoccupation with its legitimacy may explain why a 
commission of inquiry was never considered for some atrocities that were supported by a 
patron diplomat. The UNSC has, for example, been involved in the Western Sahara since 
1991,309 when it empowered the Secretary-General to hold a referendum for the 
independence of Western Sahara and also authorized a peacekeeping mission 
(MINUSRO). Since then, the UNSC has heard regular briefings from the representatives 
of the Secretary-General on this issue and has followed the various peace talks among the 
different sides. Were the UNSC to create a commission of inquiry, it would indirectly 
admit that its diplomatic efforts over the past 25 years did not rectify or account for past 
atrocities. More importantly, a commission of inquiry would also undermine the role of 
the MINUSRO peacekeepers and the various special representatives, as it would                                                         
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recognize that, despite their efforts, atrocities (such as the continued separation of 
Sahrawis due to the existence of the Moroccan sand berms or Polisario’s treatment of 
refugees in the Tindouf Refugee Camps in Algeria) continue to take place.310    
Clash between Power and Legitimacy 
Power-politics and legitimacy are both important sources of authority for 
the UNSC. Often, they feed off each other, as power increases legitimacy by its 
dissuasive effect on potential violators and legitimacy supplements power by its 
normative pull on potential challengers. But, there are three significant reasons for which 
these two sources of authority do not always go hand-in-hand. Legitimacy can be broadly 
defined as “a normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed.”311 
A UNSC decision will thus be considered legitimate if:  
(i) the actor evaluating the decision’s legitimacy 
(ii) believes it ought to  
(iii) respect that UNSC decision.  
Any action taken under a rationale of power-politics conflicts, in 
significant ways, with these three foundational elements of legitimacy.  
The role of legitimacy at the UNSC, first, presupposes that the UNSC 
members will take an interest in what other actors think about their actions. With the end 
of the Cold War and an increasingly globalized world, such “other actors” have become a 
more divergent group, and now include other member states of the UN, citizens groups, 
NGOs and academic commentators. Yet, under rationalist considerations, each UNSC                                                         
310 See e.g. Human Rights Watch (2014). 
311 This definition is borrowed from Hurd (2007).  
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member is expected to define its material gains foremost in terms of itself. The priorities 
of other actors, which are crucial for the legitimacy of a UNSC action, are not important 
for such action if taken under a power-politics rationale. The interests of other actors will, 
for example, be left by the wayside, if Kosovo and South Ossetia are recognized as 
independent states as part of a U.S.-Russian quid pro quo.312   
A rationalist approach towards the UNSC decisions also clashes with the 
way that the belief of legitimacy is formed. A legitimate action is one that is respected 
not because of coercion or self-interest.313 While there is some disagreement among 
scholars of legitimacy on how such non-materialistic beliefs are formed, most emphasize 
the roles that procedural and substantive fairness play in this process. UNSC actions 
taken under considerations of power-politics clash with both of these.  
Procedural fairness requires that a decision “was made and is applied in 
accordance with ‘right process.’”314 While often the adherence to the process in place is 
considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements of procedural justice, many argue that a 
correct procedure requires some minimum guarantees. Among these, various thinkers 
highlight the value of a proper debate. Rousseau, for example, insisted on the 
participation of all citizens in the decision-making process.315  Habermas equally 
highlighted the importance of discourse.316 Rawls identified as legitimate a decision taken 
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under a constitution (i.e. decision-making process) accepted by all citizens.317 Weiler uses 
the term “social legitimacy” to convey a similar belief. 318 Under this line of thought, a 
decision will enjoy procedural fairness if the process allows all affected parties to voice 
their concerns.  
Yet, as compared to both western democracies and other international 
institutions (e.g. EU, WTO), at the UNSC “procedures are opaque and unfair.”319 As 
highlighted in the Introduction, the UNSC ordinarily decides behind closed doors, often 
after the initiation of the P5, who also usually start deliberating after the P3 have reached 
a preliminary agreement among themselves as to a certain topic. Sometimes, at the 
request of a non-UNSC state, the UNSC allows a concerned state to participate in its 
debate and even to speak in favor or against a specific issue. Such comments take place, 
however, in the UNSC’s public sessions, which routinely are held after the UNSC has 
already decided an issue.  
Precisely because of this opaque nature of deliberations, the European 
Court of Justice, in the prominent Kadi case, which involved the legal status of a UNSC 
resolution in the European Union (i.e. did EU states have to comply with the UNSC 
resolution?), found that UNSC resolutions on sanctions lacked procedural justice and thus 
violated fundamental freedoms of EU citizens, such as the right to be heard and the right 
to an effective legal remedy. 320 A few exceptions exist to this opacity, when the UNSC 
holds public debates on specific issues. These debates are considered very important to                                                         
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the non-UNSC members, who get to voice their concerns. But, even then the deliberation 
is deficient.321 And, such debates usually lead to broad decisions, which enjoy support 
among the UN member states (e.g. commitment to protect women or children in 
conflicts), but do not immediately change the situation on the ground vis-à-vis any 
particular threat to international peace and security. As UNSC decisions are generally not 
made under transparent conditions and after proper debate,322 they thus suffer from a lack 
of procedural fairness. 
In addition to these, decisions taken under rationalist-based calculations 
also lack substantive fairness. Past studies highlight that substantive fairness requires 
consistent action across similar cases. Franck, for example, argues that when the other 
sources of legitimacy “are dispensed capriciously, the desired effect of legitimization 
may not accrue.”323 For Chayes and Chayes equally, consistent compliance with 
international norms is a prerequisite for substantive fairness.324  Hurd summarizes the 
above by noting that legitimacy includes “a sense that [the decision-maker] treats people 
fairly.”325 When such a sense is lacking, the legitimacy of the decision-making institution 
itself is challenged.326 
Because of the differences in power-politics between different threats to 
international peace and security, the UNSC will often resort to different solutions when 
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faced with almost identical problems. In the mid-1990s, for example, the former 
Yugoslavia got peacekeepers and multiple diplomatic missions, while Rwanda got 
nothing. From a rationalist viewpoint, such distinctions make sense—after all, the former 
Yugoslavia is located in Europe on the east-west fault line—while few states had any 
interests in Rwanda. The consequences of this distinction, however, for the legitimacy of 
the UNSC were far-reaching, as they indicated a lack of substantive fairness by the 
UNSC.327  
It is, finally, difficult to square considerations of power politics at the 
UNSC with the third foundational element of legitimacy, namely its normative 
characteristics. The latter presupposes a common understanding. Yet, norms in the 
international system are often contested. It is extremely rare for the UNSC to deal with 
conflicts like the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, which all actors believed to be a condemnable 
act of aggression. When acting, however, on the basis of power politics, the UNSC does 
not take into account the normative preferences of all actors. Ordinarily, the preferences 
of the weaker actors (i.e. the Melians) are the ones to be left unsatisfied. These actors 
then question the legitimacy of the UNSC’s actions. A vivid recent illustration of this 
comes from the debates on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect in 
Libya, where some of the P5 suggested actions (i.e. regime change) that contradicted the 
normative understanding of the other P5 and E10. A more mundane example comes from 
the creation of the ICTR. The UNSC knew that the creation of the ICTR was opposed by                                                         
327 The former Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali summed up this feeling in an interview with PBS, 
saying that “in Yugoslavia the international community was interested, was involved. In Rwanda nobody 
was interested. So we have to fight two problems. The tragedy as such and the indifference of the 
international community.” Ghosts (2004). 
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the Tutsi government in Rwanda, which represented the victims of the genocide. In the 
eyes of the Tutsi government, the ICTR should have investigated additional crimes and 
should have been secondary to the domestic courts of Rwanda. By alienating the victims 
of the genocide from the ICTR—which was explicitly designed to punish the 
genocidaires—the UNSC led to more disagreement over the legitimacy of this tribunal 
and decreased the likelihood that other actors in the international system would consider 
it to be a legitimate attempt to secure justice. 
As a result, when the UNSC members decide on the basis of power-
politics, they are often undermining the UNSC’s legitimacy because:  
1. by remaining focused only on their own material interests, the 
UNSC members and, namely, the P5, do not deal with the concerns of the other 
international actors; 
2. the lack of procedural and substantive fairness in the UNSC 
decision-making process leads few actors to believe they ought to (i.e. due to non-
material reasons) follow the UNSC’s decision; and 
3. a decision by the UNSC does not reflect a common international 
normative understanding, because it does not resolve and may even exacerbate the 
normative disagreements over a specific course of action. 
Two past studies have attempted to demonstrate how power and 
legitimacy considerations can become complimentary in the context of the UNSC.328 In 
the first study, Claude argues that legitimization at the UN takes place through the UN                                                         
328 Some have attempted to reduce the role of power-politics. See e.g. Bowett (1994) (suggesting judicial 
review of UNSC decisions). 
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General Assembly, which includes more actors and, at the time that Claude was writing, 
was329 less polarized than the UNSC.330 For Claude, a state will consider a UNSC 
decision to be legitimate if, after its procedure of open debate and majority vote, the UN 
General Assembly agrees with the UNSC decision. Such decisions by the UN General 
Assembly indicate that the actions of the UNSC are accepted by more actors, reflect an 
outcome over which there is less normative disagreement, and are more likely to be 
followed out of a sense of non-materialistic obligation. 
By contrast, Hurd presents a different explanation.331 Assuming that 
legitimacy is a subjective quality and that all goal-driven actors are conditioned by their 
social context, Hurd argues that it is almost impossible to decouple any decision from 
considerations of legitimacy. The present question (‘how does the UNSC maintain its 
legitimacy in light of power-politics?’) is thus impossible to evaluate without considering 
that the UNSC (the agent) and the notions of legitimacy and power-politics (each, a 
structure) are intertwined. Hurd explains how actors do not evaluate the legitimacy of a 
UNSC decision (i.e. not a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer), but fight over it just as they fight over 
material gains. He thus traces how rationalist-states contest the symbolic power of the 
UNSC and try to appropriate its language and arguments. 
Both of these theories offer important insights into the subject of this 
Chapter. Claude’s theory defines the relative actor (UN General Assembly) and explains 
how beliefs, norms and respect are formed or reinforced (i.e. by majority vote and open                                                         
329 On a side note, it is doubtful that the UN General Assembly was ever less polarized than the UNSC, 
particularly after decolonization started in 1960. 
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debate). He does not, however, explain how the members of the UNSC, who are 
interested in preserving their power and legitimacy, can act in accordance with his 
argument. In reacting to a specific threat to international peace, the members of the 
UNSC cannot ex ante predict the actions of the UN General Assembly. For example, 
before its decision to create the ICTR, how could the UNSC know if the UN General 
Assembly would support this tribunal without openly seeking a vote on the matter? 
Additionally, Claude relies too much on the value of the majority vote at the UN General 
Assembly. This vote can also produce unfair results, whose legitimacy will be contested. 
The General Assembly has, for example, consistently voted against Israel’s actions in 
Palestine, even in situations in which most commentators and P5 members side with 
Israel. Since such votes appear to be politically biased, they lack substantive fairness and 
do not engender respect for their outcome. The legitimacy, therefore, of the UNSC’s 
actions cannot be satisfactorily judged by the UN General Assembly.332  
Hurd’s approach is more detailed and more persuasive. Hurd defines the 
relevant actors as encompassing all states and argues that the creation and sustenance of 
beliefs, norms and respect cannot be decoupled from an analysis of power-politics. 
Hurd’s case studies are also convincing. A drawback of Hurd’s analysis, however, is its 
lack of clarity on the possibility of time-lagged reactions to the UNSC’s legitimacy. In 
many instances, the legitimacy of a UNSC action is challenged months or years after it 
was taken, a possibility that is accounted for in Hurd’s case studies.333 Hurd, however, 
                                                        
332 It is, nevertheless, important to note that Claude’s idea has some proponents. For a more recent similar 
take, see Reisman (1993). 
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does not explain how, at the moment they take a decision, the members of the UNSC 
prepare themselves for the possibility that their actions will be contested at some point in 
the future.334 The explanation suggested in this Chapter proposes a mechanism for 
dealing with this limitation.  
Table 6. Power Politics and Legitimacy  
 Element Mechanism for Legitimacy 
1 actor all international actors 
2 beliefs procedural and substantive fairness 
3 ought to be respected agreement over norms 
 
Before proceeding any further, a short summary of the previous discussion 
is in order (see also Table 6). The authority of the UNSC derives from its material power 
and its legitimacy. Yet, the exercise of material power contradicts three main 
prerequisites for legitimacy, leading to a clash between the two. Claude’s proposal to 
bridge this gap stumbles due to its reliance on the actions of the UN General Assembly. 
Hurd proposes a satisfactory framework to bridge the gap between these two elements of 
authority,335 but does not explain how present power-politics take into account the 
likelihood that legitimacy of an action will be challenged in the future. The next section 
proposes an additional manner through which power-politics and legitimacy can be 
squared, namely the use of a third-party. 
Part II. Third-Party to Avoid Clash 
The members of the UNSC can bridge the gap between power politics and 
legitimacy by seeking a recommendation on their course of action from a third-party. 
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Such third-parties may include the Secretary-General, Special Envoys or Special 
Representatives of the Secretary-General, fact-finding missions, commissions of inquiry, 
and special rapporteurs.336 This section argues that, under certain circumstances, the use 
of third-parties can help to overcome the clash between power and legitimacy that was 
highlighted in the previous section.  
First, a third-party can be more capable than the members of the UNSC at 
considering the preferences of all international actors. 337 A third-party that does not have 
a constituency of its own and whose members are selected for their skills, rather than 
their material interests, can probe into both the preferences of the P5 and the other UN 
member states, and also examine the positions of the targeted state and the other 
international actors (e.g. NGOs, religious leaders, and journalists). By being independent, 
a third-party can also suggest a course of action that better reflects the material incentives 
of all international actors, rather than only those of the UNSC members. 
A third-party is, furthermore, capable of arriving at its conclusions through 
a process that is both procedurally and substantively fair. A third-party can act as a jury, 
hearing evidence from all sides, giving the target a chance to rebut any allegations against 
it, distancing itself from the actual UNSC decision and justifying its decisions in writing. 
The contribution of third-parties to the procedural fairness of the UNSC has already been 
recognized by the UNSC itself. In response to the criticism that the UNSC received for its 
lack of procedural fairness from the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case, the                                                         
336 For an early overview of these third-party roles, see Young (1967). 
337 Prantl (2005) argues that the informal groups of UNSC states also allow the UNSC to access a broader 
audience. This claim is plausible, but its applicability assumes that the informal group of states will (i) exist 
vis-à-vis a specific matter in front of the UNSC, (ii) listen to the advice of other non-UNSC states and (iii) 
be able to influence the P5 decision-making process.  
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UNSC created the office of an independent Ombudsman to oversee the creation of the 
UNSC sanctions lists.338 A third-party can also use past UNSC decisions or international 
law as a guidepost for its suggestions, thereby bridging the gap between the pressing 
rationalist-based preferences of the UNSC members and the need—under considerations 
of legitimacy—for substantive fairness across decisions. The recommendations of such a 
third-party are therefore more likely to be perceived as legitimate, rather than as part of 
the power-based calculations of the UNSC members. 
The suggestions of a third-party are also better suited to dealing with 
normative disagreements at the UNSC. As argued above, situations that threaten peace 
and security are rarely neat. A depoliticized body, which is independent from the 
members of the UNSC, can be well positioned to respond to normative disagreements 
over a course of action. It may, for example, use deliberative processes to persuade the 
international audience that a specific norm is misplaced. It may also become a crusader in 
favor of developing a more clear normative position vis-à-vis a certain topic.339  
Finally, a third-party can provide the UNSC members with a great line of 
defense against subsequent complaints. If the legitimacy of any UNSC action is 
questioned in the future, the UNSC members can point to the recommendations of a 
third-party as a way to signal that they performed their due diligence and acted in 
accordance with the interests of all international actors on the basis of an accepted 
normative position. Similar to parishioners who ask their priest about a difficult personal 
decision and later justify their actions by reference to the priest’s recommendations, the                                                         
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UNSC can refer its opponents to these independent suggestions and maintain its own 
integrity vis-à-vis the international community. 
As the above four paragraphs highlight, the ability of a third-party to 
legitimize the UNSC in any situation depends on the skill set of the third-party in that 
specific situation. As a result, the UNSC cannot delegate all of its tasks to the same third-
party (e.g. the Secretary-General). If it is interested in its institutional legitimacy, the 
UNSC has to pick the third-party that best reflects the interests of the international 
community on that specific issue. Additionally, this third-party has to use a fair and 
transparent procedure in reaching its decisions with regards to the situation at hand. Its 
recommendations should be consistent with UNSC actions in similar cases. The third-
party should further engage with the normative disagreements relating to the specific 
situation at issue. Finally, once the third-party has made its recommendations, the UNSC 
has to abide by them. 
H1: If UNSC members believe that legitimacy and power-politics clash over a specific 
issue, they are more likely to seek the recommendation of a third-party before acting on 
this issue. 
There is significant anecdotal evidence that UNSC members use third-
parties in this way. The IAEA has, for example, been used by the UNSC members in 
dealing with Iran. The UNSC, particularly on issues of nuclear weapons, has the capacity 
and willingness to take action against proliferating states. If the UNSC members were, 
however, to demand that Iran take some specific action with regards to its nuclear 
program, everyone would wonder if that action were legitimate, and one that ought to be 
obeyed. Such questions become particularly important in this context, where the P5 are 
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all nuclear powers, trying to convince Iran not to become one. By including the IAEA in 
their talks, the UNSC has added a third-party that represents a vast majority of the 
international community and justifies its decisions through its annual reports. 
Additionally, as the vanguard of the non-proliferation treaty, the IAEA is the foremost 
crusader on non-proliferation, uniquely suited to dealing with the obvious normative 
antithesis of the ‘haves’ telling others to remain as ‘have-nots.’  Finally, if in the future, 
others accuse the UNSC’s plan with regards to Iran, the UNSC members can always 
deflect criticism by pointing to the suggestions of the IAEA.  
But, such evidence is anecdotal. Similar to the existence of quid pro quos 
at the UNSC, it is easier to base such allegations on conjecture rather than real examples. 
Part V presents one such example, by examining why the UNSC decided to create a 
commission of inquiry into the 1993 massacres in Burundi rather than proceed with the 
creation of an international criminal tribunal as it had originally planned. Before reaching 
this case study, however, the next part presents a few different reasons for which the 
UNSC may use a third-party. 
Part III. The Alternative Explanations 
Apart from the above, four other explanations exist for which the UNSC 
members may decide to use a third-party. This Part presents these alternative 
explanations and their major characteristics in order to facilitate their examination by the 
case-study on the creation of an international commission of inquiry into Burundi in Part 
V. 
International organizations sometimes lack the ability to provide expertise; 
remain impartial; and maintain their international focus. To overcome these three 
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shortcomings, international organizations routinely resort to third-parties for help. It is 
also believed that international organizations use third-parties as a way to delay an 
eventual decision. 
International organizations are bureaucratic institutions, which ordinarily 
lack the capacity to understand and decide on technical matters. They are thus in need of 
the expertise that third-parties can provide. The WHO, for example, delegates some of its 
tasks to private laboratories and states, as it lacks the in-house capacity to perform 
complicated tests that require advanced equipment, procedures and materials. In such 
instances, decision-making bodies will look for third-parties with proficient knowledge of 
the required task. 
H2: If UNSC members lack expertise over a certain issue, they are more likely to seek the 
recommendation of a third-party before acting on this issue. 
In several instances, particularly in situations of conflict, international 
organizations—due to the heavy influence of certain states—are incapable of appearing 
impartial. In such instances, impartial third-parties have the potential to accomplish the 
task at hand in a more efficient manner than the organizations. The most known example 
of such a third-party has been the Secretary-General, who routinely intervenes in 
conflicts on behalf of the UNSC and the United Nations at large.340 Similar roles have 
been played by other international actors (e.g. Pope John Paul II, Julius Nyerere, the 
Community of Sant’ Edigio), who leverage their indifference towards a specific dispute 
to mediate between the disputing parties. In such cases, the international organization is 
                                                        
340 Urquhart (1995); Skjesbaek (1991). 
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likely to pick individuals or entities of international significance with no connection to 
the underlying problem. 
H3: If UNSC members are biased over a specific issue, they are more likely to seek the 
recommendation of a third-party before acting on this issue.  
Finally, third-parties are routinely used by international organizations in 
an effort to keep themselves above the fray of every day politics and remain truly 
international in focus. While the EU Commission is the most notable example of such a 
third-party—one that is actually tasked with supranational powers—other instances of 
this type of power delegation occur at the WTO and the ICC. The former includes a 
secretariat341 and a dispute settlement body,342 which is tasked with revising the 
incomplete trade treaties and, in turn, maintaining the functionality of the international 
trade regime. The prosecutor of the latter is positioned to maintain the focus of the court 
on the work of global justice, rather than veer off towards parochial state preferences. At 
the UNSC, it is likely that a third-party can act as a common agent, bridging the gap 
between parochial member state preferences and the larger goals of the UNSC. 
H4: If UNSC members are focused on their parochial preferences over a specific issue, 
they are more likely to seek the recommendation of a third-party before acting on this 
issue. 
The UNSC has a long history of using the UN Secretariat, independent 
commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions and other third-parties in a consultative 
function. Sometimes these third-parties fulfill the expertise, impartiality and international                                                         
341 Nordström (2005).  
342 Mavroidis (2012). 
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roles highlighted above. But, in some instances, the UNSC uses third-parties for tasks 
that it can accomplish on its own. The UNSC has, for example, consistently commenced 
investigations into atrocities without having first created an independent commission to 
inquiry into the facts of the situation. Contrary to the above three categories, the use of 
third-parties in such instances does not add to the UNSC’s decision-making capacity. It 
only prolongs the decision-making process. For this reason, it is widely believed that the 
UNSC uses third-parties to delay a final decision and avoid committing to a specific 
position. The UNSC members punt an issue by pushing it to a third-party and hope that 
they will not have to deal with it. This function of third-parties can be particularly helpful 
if the debated issue is politically contentious among UNSC members. Anecdotal evidence 
seems to support the existence of such dilatory use of third-parties. In the 2003 debates 
on Iraq, for example, the states that opposed a U.S. invasion called for more IAEA 
inspections. 
H5: If the UNSC members want to delay any action on a specific issue, they are more 
likely to seek the recommendation of a third-party before acting on this issue.  
With these four alternative hypotheses in mind, the next Part presents the 
research strategy for examining the argument of this Chapter. 
Part IV. Research Design  
To test the applicability of the current argument on the UNSC’s decisions 
to create commissions of inquiry into atrocities, this Chapter resorts to a detailed case 
study on the events in Burundi.  
Under certain conditions the states creating a third-party may be able to 
predetermine its outcome, thereby making the third-party itself irrelevant. One way that 
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UNSC members can do so is through their control over the work of the third-party. 
Alternatively, UNSC members can obtain their preferred outcome by institutional 
capture, through the individuals comprising the third-party. None of these issues plagued 
the commission of inquiry into Burundi. 
To begin with, the UNSC can control the work of a third-party in three 
ways. First, the UNSC members could control the budget of the third-party. Second, the 
UNSC members could control the facts (i.e. evidence) to which the third-party would 
have access. Third, the UNSC members could create a third-party only for those 
situations that allow for one outcome (e.g. those places that have undoubtedly 
experienced significant crimes). All three mechanisms would allow the UNSC members 
to predetermine the recommendations of the third-party.  
None of these problems plague the commissions of inquiry into atrocities 
created by the UNSC. First, the UNSC members outsource the formation and budgetary 
process of all commissions of inquiry to the Secretary-General, who uses the general UN 
budget for such investigations.343 Second, all commissions are given broad leeway to 
investigate all facts and have the power to collect information from any source they find 
credible.344 As such, the UNSC members are not guaranteed to successfully spoon-feed 
                                                        
343 E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“8. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a supplement to 
financing as an expense of the Organization, a trust fund to receive voluntary contributions to finance the 
commission of inquiry;”). 
344 E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“3. Calls upon States, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, 
international humanitarian organizations to collate substantiated information in their possession relating to 
acts covered in paragraph 1 (a) above, to make such information available as soon as possible and to 
provide appropriate assistance to the commission of inquiry; … 5. Calls upon the Burundi authorities and 
institutions, including all Burundi political parties, to fully cooperate with the international commission of 
inquiry in the accomplishment of its mandate, including responding positively to requests from the 
commission for security, assistance and access in pursuing investigations, including…”). 
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evidence to the commission.345 Third, the UNSC members may create commissions of 
inquiry only into situations that have experienced significant atrocities, but have not 
narrowed the mandate of their recommendations to specific questions or issues. The 
commissions are thus created with the power to opine broadly. In practice, their 
recommendations have sometimes been unpredictable. The commission of inquiry into 
Darfur, for example, while staying within its mandate, disagreed with the findings of the 
United States that the atrocities constituted genocide. Yet, the commission still compiled 
a list of suspects for crimes against humanity and war crime,346 which was not required 
by its mandate.347  It, overall, appears that, in line with the main argument of this 
Chapter, the UNSC members relinquish control over the work and outcome of the 
commissions of inquiry. 
In addition to these, the individuals comprising the third-party may 
transform their mandate into a tool for the benefit of certain members of the UNSC. 
Similar to bureaucracies or institutions, third-parties created by the UNSC are ripe venues 
for institutional capture,348 as their individual members are given significant discretion in 
investigating, compiling a report and suggesting conclusions. In creating, however,                                                         
345 In Burundi, for example, the commission collected evidence from a broad variety of sources, see 
S/1996/682 (e.g. pp. 39-43). 
346 International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2005) (p. 133). 
347 The commission’s mandate comes from the following UNSC resolution: “12. Requests that the 
Secretary-General rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to 
investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all 
parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of 
such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable, calls on all parties to 
cooperate fully with such a commission, and further requests  the Secretary-General, in conjunction with 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to increase the number of 
human rights monitors deployed to Darfur;”, Resolution 1564 (2004). 
348 Bendor and Moe (1986); Barkow (2010). 
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commissions of inquiry, the UNSC members minimize the potential for institutional 
capture by outsourcing the process of selecting individual members to the Secretary-
General.349 The Secretary-General, in turns, chooses legal experts to fill these spots. In 
doing so, the commissions of inquiry into atrocities end up with independent legal experts 
beyond the direct reach and influence of any UNSC member state.   
This selection process, however, creates fear of a different sort of 
institutional capture. By resorting to legal experts, the commissions of inquiry are staffed 
by individuals generally sympathetic to human rights, international law and the 
associated norms of combating impunity and ending atrocities. As a result, institutional 
capture of these commissions, rather than favoring specific UNSC member states, may 
translate in a general tendency to recommend atrocities investigations. The fact that most 
commissions of inquiry support the creation of atrocities investigations plays into this 
potential. It is not, however, clear how this affects the political calculus behind the 
creation of the investigations. Perhaps, the UNSC members—who know that the 
commissions will ex ante recommend atrocities investigations—are interested in the 
substance of the investigation’s findings. It might also be, however, UNSC members are 
mostly interested in protecting the legitimacy of the UNSC before deciding to create an 
atrocities investigation, and resort to the commission for its legitimizing effect than the 
substance of its decisions. 
                                                        
349 E.g. Resolution 1012 (1995) (“2. Recommends that the international commission of inquiry be 
composed of five impartial and internationally respected, experienced jurists who shall be selected by the 




To deal with this uncertainty, this Chapter presents a case study on the 
commission of inquiry into the atrocities committed in Burundi. From 1993 onwards, 
Burundi has been the scene of significant atrocities, which due to their connection to the 
Rwandan genocide troubled the UN system. As a result, Burundi received a lot of 
attention by the UNSC in the mid-1990s. As documented below, it was the destination of 
two of the UNSC’s missions, two missions of the Secretary-General, and, finally, a 
commission of inquiry. Yet, the commission of inquiry into the atrocities committed in 
Burundi ended with a clearly negative recommendation against creating an atrocities 
investigation. This conclusion does not only negate the possibility of the commission’s 
institutional capture by pro-accountability lawyers, but also countered the pro-
investigation sentiment expressed at the UNSC before the results of the investigation. 
Apart from overcoming the possibility for selection effects, the 
commission of inquiry into Burundi provides, more than any other instance, a clear 
indication that commissions of inquiry have a real impact on the work of the UNSC. In 
this case, the UNSC and the Secretary-General accepted the negative recommendations 
of the commission, despite their prior preference to create an investigation. Examining 
why this commission was given such deference poses a real question for scholars of the 
UNSC. As the next Part describes, the UNSC members’ considerations of legitimacy 
provide a satisfactory answer. 
Prior to turning to the case study, it is important to highlight that the main 
argument and the four alternative hypotheses expect different facts from the historical 
records of the UNSC’s involvement with the atrocities in Burundi. To support the main 
hypothesis, the historical records should indicate a significant difference between the 
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power-politics of the UNSC members and the UNSC’s need of legitimacy. They would 
also have to show that the commission of inquiry could be helpful to bridging this gap. 
To the contrary, to support the first alternative hypothesis, the historical records should 
indicate that the UNSC members are in need of legal expertise in dealing with the 
atrocities in Burundi and consider the commission of inquiry as a source for such 
expertise. For the second alternative hypothesis, the records should demonstrate that the 
UNSC members were biased in their examination of the atrocities in Burundi and created 
the commission of inquiry to bring about some impartiality. In the case of the third 
alternative hypothesis, the UNSC members should be plagued with parochial concerns 
and create the commission of inquiry to act as a common agent on behalf of the 
international community. Finally, to support the final alternative hypothesis, the historical 
records should indicate a desire by the UNSC members to delay their involvement with 
the atrocities in Burundi. 
With these five different expectations in mind, the next Part turns to the 
case study on the decision by the UNSC members to create a commission of inquiry into 
the atrocities committed in Burundi.  
Part V. International Commission of Inquiry into Burundi 
In 1994, two neighboring African countries, with the same Hutu-Tutsi 
ethnic composition, were each experiencing grave atrocities. In November 1994, to 
prosecute the atrocities committed in Rwanda, the UNSC created the ICTR. Earlier, in 
August 1994, the UNSC also indicated a preference to create a tribunal for Burundi. 
Then, in September 1994, the warring parties in Burundi all acknowledged that the 1993 
atrocities constituted acts of genocide. Yet, the UNSC first created the “International 
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Commission of Inquiry established under resolution 1012 (1995) concerning Burundi,” 
instead of a tribunal. And, when the commission of inquiry advocated not creating an 
atrocities investigation, the UNSC members shelved their plans for an atrocities 
investigation for the atrocities committed in Burundi.  
So, why did the UNSC create a commission of inquiry for Burundi? And, 
why did the UNSC follow the negative recommendations of the commission of inquiry? 
This section argues that the answer to these questions lies in the UNSC’s desire to square 
its calculations of power-politics with its need for legitimacy.  It first presents the events 
relating to the commission of inquiry and then explains the reasons for which the UNSC 
formed it and followed its recommendations. In doing so, it confirms that the alternative 
four explanations were not at play in the present facts. 
A. Leading up to the Commission of Inquiry 
The atrocities in Burundi began in October 1993, when the majority 
elected Hutu Prime Minister Melchior Ndadaye was overthrown in a coup d’état, arrested 
and executed. By way of background, Burundi achieved independence from Belgium in 
1962 and had since undergone several cycles of Hutu-Tutsi interethnic violence, with the 
worse one being the genocide of Tutsis in 1972. At the same time, none of the world’s 
big powers had a particular interest in this country. To the contrary, only France and the 
United States had embassies there in 1993.350 Additionally, the UNSC, and the rest of the 
UN system, had very little past involvement with Burundi. Burundi, it appeared, largely 
had been off the international affairs radar until the execution of Prime Minister Ndadaye. 
                                                        
350 Kruger and Kruger (2007). 
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In Burundi, following the execution of Prime Minister Ndadaye, Tutsi 
soldiers took control of the government and attacked Hutu leaders. Soon thereafter, Hutu 
paramilitary groups attacked Tutsi civilians. A vicious cycle of violence expanded, with 
the situation soon spiraling out of control. In New York, the UNSC immediately 
condemned the coup and “the acts of violence and the loss of life.”351 The Secretary-
General sent a Special Envoy to the region, who tried to stop the violence and restore 
democratic rule. On November 16, the UNSC asked the Secretary-General to “consider 
dispatching…a small United Nations team…for fact-finding.”352 This preparatory 
mission, composed of Siméon Aké (former foreign minister of Cote d’Ivoire), Martin 
Huslid (former Permanent Representative of Norway to UN) and Michèle Poliacof 
(political affairs officer at UN Secretariat), arrived in Bujumbura on March 22, 1994. 
Two days later, the preparatory mission met with President Cyprien Ntaryamira, and 
continued its extensive investigation. After Ntaryamira and Rwanda’s President 
Hyabarimana were shot down over Kigali, Rwanda, on April 6, 1994,353 the commission 
attended Ntaryamira’s funeral in Bujumbura and continued investigating. Its report 
makes for some somber reading. After estimating that approximately 50,000 to 100,000 
people had been massacred, 700,000 had taken refuge abroad and 200,000 had been 
internally displaced, the preparatory commission wrote that:  
It will merely stress here that the massacres were carried 
out with knives, machetes, spears, stakes, bamboo poles, 
arrows, rocks, fire arms and grenades against men and 
women, infants and children, young people and adults, old                                                         
351 S/26631 (October 25, 1993). 
352 S/1995/157 (p. 4). 
353 This event sparked the Rwandan genocide. 
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people and the elderly, everywhere in the hills, public 
places and commercial centres, in fields, on footpaths, in 
schools and even in churches, as was the case in Rusengo, 
in the province of Ruyigi. 
 
According to the accounts by witnesses and the written 
statements, entire families were killed and horrible 
atrocities were committed in which people, including 
women, children, infants and elderly persons, were killed 
and thrown into latrines; others were bound hand and foot 
and thrown into rivers. Still others, sometimes bound up, 
were locked in houses and shops which were set on fire in 
order to burn them alive. This was the case of the 
secondary-school pupils in the town of Kibimba in the 
province of Gitega, whose charred bodies were left 
unburied for several weeks, as well as the peasant farmers 
from Kibiza in the town of Mwumba, the province of 
Ngozi, who were burned to ashes in a shop into which 
soldiers had thrown grenades. This was also the case of the 
persons who had sought refuge in the bishop’s residence in 
Ruyigi, some of whom also died in bedrooms that had been 
set on fire, and, lastly, of the young people in the inn in 
Banga who, in order to escape the killing, had sought safety 
in a tree which was then doused with gasoline and set 
ablaze, and the poor people who had died in a room set on 
fire in the same inn, managed by a congregation of the 
Bene sisters. 
 
Persons of all categories and walks of life and all ages - 
peasant farmers executives and militant members of 
political parties, government agents, medical and 
paramedical personnel, and lay and religious persons - were 
killed in atrocious ways in the bloodthirsty madness which 
caused the people of Burundi enormous suffering and 
which cannot in any way be justified.354 
 
Having presented the history, the facts and the causes, the preparatory 
mission provided some recommendations. Among the recommendations, it suggested that 
“now that the preparatory Mission has completed its political inquiry … a mission should 
                                                        
354 S/1995/157 (p. 20-21). 
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be sent which would concentrate on the legal aspects, so as to establish more precisely 
the responsibility for the events of October 1993 and identify the guilty parties so that 
they can be brought to justice.”355 
The preparatory mission submitted its report to the Secretary-General on 
May 20, 1994. It was circulated to the UNSC members on February 24, 1995. In the 
intervening nine months, the UNSC had undertaken the highly unusual step of visiting 
itself Burundi, not once but twice.356  
The first UNSC mission to Burundi took place on August 13-14, 1994. It 
was composed of four UNSC members (the Czech Republic, Nigeria, the Russian 
Federation, and the United States of America). The mission found “a general breakdown 
of law and order.”357 “In this context, it stressed that impunity from justice is one of the 
most serious problems Burundi is facing.”358 Among its nine recommendations, the 
UNSC included: 
Bringing to justice perpetrators of the October 1993 
attempted coup d’état and the subsequent massacres, and 
investigation of violations of international humanitarian 
law in Burundi as appropriate (possibly by an International 
Tribunal to be established); 
This statement provides important insight into the goals of the UNSC 
members. On July 1, 1994, the UNSC had established a commission of experts to 
                                                        
355 S/1995/157 (p. 29). 
356 To put this number in perspective, it should be noted that the UNSC has conducted only 47 missions 
since its inception in 1945. 
357 S/1994/1039 (p.6). 
358 S/1994/1039 (p.6). 
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investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda.359  Two of the 
four members of the UNSC mission to Burundi, the Czech ambassador, Karel Kovanda, 
and the Nigerian Ambassador, Ibrahim Gambari, had taken part in the deliberations 
leading to the creation of the commission of experts for Rwanda, with Kovanda speaking 
repeatedly on the record in favor of that commission. In Burundi, by contrast, the UNSC 
mission did not start by suggesting the need for an independent commission, but 
recommended upfront the creation of a tribunal.  
Following the first UNSC mission to Burundi, and as the massacres were 
continuing, two significant political events occurred. First, on September 10, 1994, the 
warring parties in Burundi agreed to the Convention on Governance.360 Article 11 of the 
Convention states that the warring factions in Burundi agreed to call the coup d’état and 
the assassination of President Ndadaye “genocide, without prejudice to the findings of the 
independent national and international investigations.”361 Article 36 of the Convention 
further “requested that an international judicial fact-finding mission be formed within 30 
days” to investigate the events that had been referred to as a “genocide.”362 Second, on 
November 8, 1994, the UNSC created the ICTR, for the Rwandan genocide.  
Following these events, the second UNSC mission to Burundi took place 
on February 10-11, 1995. This time, the mission was composed of seven UNSC members 
(China, the Czech Republic, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Nigeria, the Russian 
Federation, and the United States of America). The members of the mission again wrote                                                         
359 S/RES/935 (1994). 
360 Convention on Governance, S/1995/190 (March 8, 1995). 
361 Convention on Governance, S/1995/190 (March 8, 1995) (Article 11). 
362 Convention on Governance, S/1995/190 (March 8, 1995) (Article 36). 
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that the situation was “precarious and … potentially explosive.”363 They also recognized 
that “the persistence of a culture of impunity constitutes a fundamental problem.”364 Yet, 
in its recommendations, instead of requesting the establishment of a tribunal, the UNSC 
mission this time suggested that:  
An international commission of inquiry into the October 
1993 coup attempt and the massacres that followed, which 
was proposed by the Government in accordance with the 
Convention, should be established as soon as possible. 
After an additional meeting on the situation in Burundi,365 the UNSC 
explained, on March 29, 1995, that “if acts of genocide are committed in Burundi, it will 
consider taking appropriate measures to bring to justice under international law any who 
may have committed such acts.”366 To that end, it requested “the Secretary-General to 
report to the Council on an urgent basis on what steps should be taken to establish such 
an impartial commission of inquiry.”367 In order to determine what steps were necessary, 
Boutros-Boutros Ghali resorted to the services of Dr. Pedro Nikken, who had been the 
UN Human Rights Committee’s Independent Expert on El Salvador from 1992 to 1995. 
Nikken, after conducting another detailed fact-finding mission on Burundi, 
recommended that “neither a commission of the truth on the Salvadoran model nor an 
international commission of judicial inquiry whose mandate is limited to purely judicial 
matters would be an adequate response.”368 Instead, “[a]n international judicial                                                         
363 S/1995/163 (p. 4). 
364 S/1995/163 (p. 4). 
365 S/PV.3506 (March 9, 1994). 
366 S/PRST/1995/13.  
367 S/PRST/1995/13. 
368 S/1995/631 (p. 1). 
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commission of inquiry…could be viable and useful if its mandate gave it powers that 
would guarantee that its conclusions and recommendations would be put into effect and 
achieve the objective of prosecuting and punishing those responsible”369 for the atrocities. 
In arguing that there was a need for effective prosecutions, Nikken highlighted that the 
national judiciary in Burundi would be unable to punish the perpetrators or would do so 
following discriminatory criteria.370 He also warned that the government of Burundi 
would be unlikely to cooperate with such prosecutions.371 The Secretary-General 
transmitted Nikken’s report to the UNSC on July 28, 1995. 
After more deliberations on Burundi, 372 the UNSC established, on August 
28, 1995, “as a matter of urgency, an international commission of inquiry.”373 Reflecting 
the concerns of the Nikken report, the commission’s mandate was to “establish the facts” 
and “recommend measures of a legal, political or administrative nature, as appropriate, 
after consultation with the Government of Burundi, and measures with regards to the 
bringing to justice of persons responsible for those acts…”374 
B. Commission on Inquiry as a Safeguard for the UNSC 
The creation of another commission for Burundi may appear initially to 
have been redundant. After all, as indicated by the below timeline, the members of the 
UNSC had conducted two missions (August 1994; February 1995) and the 
                                                        
369 S/1995/631 (p. 1). 
370 S/1995/631 (p. 12). 
371 S/1995/631 (p. 17). 
372 S/PV.3569 (August 23, 2014). 
373 S/RES/1012 (1995). 
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representatives of Secretary-General another two (March 1994; June 1995). All four 
deplored the impunity and highlighted the ethnic nature of the civil war in Burundi. They 
also blamed both Tutsis and Hutus, called for a return to democracy and the punishment 
of those who assassinated Melchior Ndadaye. At the same time, the peace agreement was 
tenuous, the presence of Rwandan Hutu refugees and Interahamwe members,375 who had 
been fleeing Rwanda, led to more ethnic tensions in Burundi, the Tutsi led armed forces 
of Burundi lacked the support of the Hutu majority, and massacres were continuing. 376 
But the UNSC only created another mission of inquiry. 
From a rationalist-perspective, the actions of the UNSC members appear 
sensible. Burundi, a small land-locked country in Africa, was beyond the radar of most 
UNSC members. Only two of the P5, France and the United States, had embassies 
there.377 During the massacres, these embassies were functioning with only essential 
personnel. With the exception of Rwanda,378 none of the other UNSC members had a 
close connection to Burundi. While all of the UNSC members expressed repeated 
interests in stopping the massacres, their other international interests often took priority.  
                                                        
375 The Interahamwe (Kinyarwanda, meaning “those who stand/work/fight/attack together”) is a Hutu 
paramilitary organization. The militia enjoyed the backing of the Hutu-led government leading up to, 
during, and after the Rwandan Genocide. 
376 Kruger and Kruger (2007). 
377 Kruger and Kruger (2007). 
378 Rwanda was on the UNSC in 1994-1995. During the UNSC’s debates on Burundi, the Tutsi-led 
Rwandese government had close ties to the Tutsi factions in Burundi. Rwanda was also actively fighting 
against the Interahawme elements in Burundi. It, therefore, had no interest in highlighting the plight faced 
by the residents of Burundi. 
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While they were dealing with the massacres in Burundi, the UNSC members were also 
confronted with the Rwandan genocide and the civil war in Bosnia. The latter was 
politically sensitive, as it had the potential to divide the UNSC again into its Cold War 
camps. It was also a European conflict, closer to home for many of the UNSC members. 
The former required an unprecedented humanitarian response, as the Rwandan Hutu 
refugees kept pouring into Zaire.379 Additionally, no member of the UNSC appeared 
interested in sending its own troops to Burundi. To the contrary, even UN peacekeeping 
missions were hard to create, because after the events in Somalia, they faced criticism 
from the United States. In light of these facts, the UNSC resorted to verbal 
condemnations of the atrocities, tried to encourage diplomatic solutions, and created four 
commissions of inquiry. 
Furthermore, the UNSC members also had good reason to shy away from 
creating yet another tribunal. By the end of 1995, the UNSC members had already 
created two tribunals, one for the former Yugoslavia and one for Rwanda, and understood 
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the bruising diplomatic process needed to create those. Additionally, due to the ‘fatigue’ 
from the prior two experiences, the UNSC members realized that a tribunal would require 
money from the United Nations, costly political cooperation from the local government, 
and relative safety for witnesses and the investigatory teams. None of these elements 
existed in the case of Burundi. The United Nations coffers were already struggling to 
keep up with the refugee crisis in Zaire. The government of Burundi, led by a Tutsi group 
and backed by a Tutsi army, had expressed considerable opposition to the UNSC’s 
actions in Burundi. Appearing at the UNSC public meetings as an invited party, the 
delegate from Burundi made the UNSC members aware of these views. While supportive 
of the idea of an international commission of inquiry in theory, the delegate from Burundi 
told the UNSC that there was “[a] malicious campaign orchestrated by foes of the 
Burundian army aim[ed] at poisoning international opinion.”380 In the view of the 
Burundian government, its military was “far from being perpetrators of or accomplices in 
the abortive coup or in the assassination of President Ndadaye.”381 The UNSC members 
knew that the similar tactics of the Kagame regime vis-à-vis the ICTR were impeding the 
operations of that court in Rwanda. Finally, the situation in Burundi remained so volatile 
that politicians and members of parliament were often assassinated even when they were 
guarded around the clock. The UN commission of inquiry was also facing security 
                                                        
380 S/PV.3571 (August 28, 1995). 
381 S/PV.3571 (August 28, 1995). 
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problems.382 In such circumstances, it would be difficult for a court to collect evidence, 
take testimonies and find witnesses. 
A decision, however, not to proceed with a tribunal risked undermining 
the UNSC’s legitimacy, in the eyes of many international actors who were not 
represented in the UNSC. Following the atrocities in Burundi, these other international 
actors, such as human rights NGOs and the UN Human Rights Committee, called for the 
creation of an investigation.383 Furthermore, the normative understanding prevailing in 
the international community was in favor of creating atrocities investigations. After the 
creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, the international human rights community supported 
the prospect of international atrocities investigations with enthusiasm. It was, 
furthermore, difficult for other actors to believe that the UNSC’s lack of action in 
Burundi ought to be respected, as there was no substantive fairness in the decision of the 
UNSC not to create a tribunal in Burundi while it had recently created a court for the 
same type of atrocities committed in Rwanda. Procedurally, the UNSC also made the 
decision not to act without including many relevant actors. Tanzania and Zaire, for 
example, were not parties to the UNSC decision, even though they had received hundreds 
of thousands of Burundian refugees. Burundi’s Hutus were also not heard, as the local 
government represented exclusively the Tutsi minority. 
As Table 7 summarizes, the use of the commission on inquiry allowed the 
UNSC to overcome these problems. First, the commission was well positioned to reflect                                                         
382 S/1996/6 (letter from Secretary-General to UNSC); S/PV.3639 (March 5, 1996) (Statements from the 
United States, by Amb. Madeleine Albright, and Honduras, by Amb. Martínez Blanco). 
383 E.g. Human Rights Commission, Report on Displaced People, E/CN.4/1995/50/Add.2 (November 28, 
1994); Human Rights Commission, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions on his mission to Burundi, E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.1 (July 24, 1995). 
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the interests of all international actors. At the instructions of the UNSC to select five 
impartial and internationally respected, experienced jurists, the Secretary-General 
selected five such members from Madagascar, Morocco, Turkey, Venezuela and Canada 
for the commission.384 Their stature and diversity allowed the commission to be 
cognizant of the preferences of the international human rights community and of states 
beyond those represented at the UNSC. The selection process, with the intervention of 
the Secretary-General, also dispelled any fears for endogeneity in the UNSC’s actions, as 
it became highly unlikely that these commission’s members would have a predetermined 
view on the creation of an atrocities investigation and to have been selected because of 
their views.  
Additionally, due to their backgrounds in human rights law, the members 
of the commission understood the normative clash between the need for an end to the 
conflict and the requirement for proper judicial process. To that end, the commission 
conducted its work as if it was a judicial investigation, gathered facts from witnesses, 
conducted visits at the places of the massacres, presented written findings of fact and 
justified its recommendations.  
The commission was well suited to dispensing with the lack of substantive 
fairness by the UNSC’s actions. There was no ICTR for Burundi, but the commission’s 
work highlighted the differences in the situation between Rwanda and Burundi. While the 
numbers of the victims were disproportionately large in both cases, the genocide in 
Rwanda was one-sided. In Burundi, the commission established that the Tutsi military                                                         
384 The members of the commission were: Edilbert Razafindralambo (Madagascar) (Chairman), Abdelali El 




killed Hutu civilians and Hutu armed groups targeted Tutsi civilians, who then called 
upon the Tutsi military, which in turn targeted Hutu civilians. Similar to Rwanda, Tutsis 
were systematically hunted and were the victims of “acts of genocide.”385 Contrary to 
Rwanda, however, the commission’s findings established that Burundi was in the midst 
of a cycle of violence, with no clear separation between perpetrator and victim, thus 
indicating why a tribunal would have a heavier case-load in Burundi.  
Additionally, the commission imbued the UNSC’s decisions with some 
degree of procedural fairness. It justified its findings through a long and detailed report 
and conducted meetings with numerous individuals. It also developed Rules of 
Procedure, weighed the evidence presented to it, and heard testimony both in Bujumbura 
and at the site of massacres from leaders, soldiers, victims, and foreigners. In doing so, it 
made sure to respect both the local laws and the constitution of Burundi, as well as 
international human rights. It therefore acted as an arbiter of fact and law, satisfying the 
requirement of procedural justice in the work of the UNSC.  
At the end of its investigation, the commission recommended that 
“international jurisdiction should be asserted with respect to” the acts of genocide.386 But, 
it believed “that it is not possible to carry out an adequate international investigation of 
these acts while the present situation persists in Burundi.”387 The commission, thus, 
supported the creation of a tribunal, but considered it inappropriate to create one at that 
time. It also clarified that “making the suppression of impunity a precondition for the                                                         
385 S/1996/682 (p. 74). 
386 S/1996/682 (p. 75). 
387 S/1996/682 (p. 75). 
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solution of the crisis is complete unrealistic and can serve only to give excuses to those 
who are unwilling to take the necessary actions.” 388 The commission thus recommended 
that the political solution be prioritized and decoupled from the issue of impunity.  
The commission’s report was transmitted to the UNSC on July 25, 1996. 
That same day, the government of Burundi that was established under the Convention of 
Government was overthrown in a coup d’état and Pierre Buyoya ascended to the 
presidency. The situation once again was explosive and remained so for a few more 
months. The UNSC took a strong stance against this new coup. After holding a public 
debate,389 which is a rare occurrence, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1072 calling for the 
restoration of the old government and threatening to place economic sanctions and an 
arms embargo against the Buyoya government. In the preamble to the resolution, the 
UNSC:   
Recall[ed] that all persons who commit or authorize the 
commission of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law are individually responsible for such 
violations and should be held accountable, and reaffirm[ed] 
the need to put an end to impunity for such acts and the 
climate that fosters them.390 
The creation of a tribunal for the atrocities in Burundi was now only an 
aspirational goal. Despite their initial preference for the creation of a tribunal, the 
members of the UNSC could, on the basis of the findings of the commission of inquiry, 
adopt this other approach without risking the legitimacy of the UNSC. 
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389 S/PV.3695 (August 30, 1996). 
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Finally, the creation of the commission ensured that the UNSC’s 
legitimacy would be shielded from future attacks. The conflict in Burundi gradually 
ended after the 1996 coup, only to resurface in the mid-2000s. At that point, 
commentators reasonably wondered if the UN’s actions in the mid-1990s were to be 
blamed for the resurgence of the armed conflict.391 No one, however, questioned the 
UNSC’s earlier decision to forgo the creation of an international criminal tribunal. Since 
an independent commission had recommended against creating a tribunal, the UNSC had 
good reason to follow that recommendation.392  
Table 7 
UNSC Tension Between Power-Politics and Legitimacy for Burundi at the UNSC 
The Gap Independent Commission of Inquiry 
Focus only on UNSC member Brings more perspectives 
Indifferent with procedural fairness Adopts fair procedures 
Assumes difference with Rwanda Explains differences 
Prioritize the end of the conflict vs. the 
justice cascade norm 
Minimizes the norm clash 
Present oriented  Becomes point of reference in future 
Apart from supporting the argument of this Chapter, the above facts 
cannot be explained by the four alternative explanations. First, the UNSC members had 
the knowledge and competence to assess the situation in Burundi and decide on a tribunal 
without specialized help from a third-party. As the record demonstrates, in creating the 
commission, the UNSC members were not seeking outside expertise. UNSC members 
had undertaken two missions to Burundi, had witnessed the effect of the atrocities first 
hand, and had expressed a preference for an atrocities investigation.  
                                                        
391 Boulden (2013). 
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Additionally, there was no need for an independent decision by an 
impartial third-party. As indicated by their lack of any meaningful action towards the 
conflict, none of the UNSC members had an interest in Burundi. They were thus not 
biased in their perceptions and their reactions to the conflict.  
The UNSC members were, furthermore, not concerned with how other 
international actors would react to the atrocities in Burundi. The UNSC missions to 
Burundi had included a wide mix of UNSC members, ranging from China, Russia and the 
United States to Honduras, Indonesia and Nigeria. Their recommendations were thus 
already indicative of broader support for an atrocities investigation. Additionally, 
numerous other international actors were already supportive of a tribunal.393 
Finally, the use of a commission of inquiry was not intended to prolong a 
decision by the members of the UNSC. While the atrocities were continuing in Burundi, 
no less than four reports were issued on the need to end impunity and the difficulties of 
this process. If the UNSC desired to avoid a decision on this issue, it could have stopped 
at the fourth report. The creation of the commission of inquiry did not so much delay the 
decision, as it kept a dying issue alive. 
As indicated above, however, by relying on a third-party commission of 
inquiry, the members of the UNSC were able to balance their power preferences with the 
legitimacy of their action. Precisely, because of the wisdom of this decision, when 
atrocities reappeared in Burundi in the mid-2000s, in 2004, the UNSC again requested a 
recommendation from another third-party assessment team on the Burundian request for                                                         
393 See e.g. Human Rights Commission, Initial report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 




an international criminal tribunal. The description of those events, however, exceeds the 
boundaries of this Chapter.394  
Conclusion 
The commission’s negative recommendation against creating an 
international criminal tribunal influenced not only the decision of the UNSC, but also the 
views of the Secretary-General. After the publication of the commission’s report, the 
Secretary-General in his subsequent report on the situation in Burundi, on July 15, 1997, 
declined to recommend the creation of an international tribunal.395 Yet, the UNSC’s 
decision to follow the advice of the commission seems to clash with the fact that the 
UNSC wields unlimited power. Why should UNSC members defer to the findings of a 
third-party commission? And why should they even seek a commission’s advice?  
Despite the capacity of its members to decide on their own, the UNSC 
routinely outsources parts of its deliberations to an independent third-party. This Chapter 
has argued that the members of the UNSC resort to the use of independent third-parties in                                                         
394 In summary, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 stipulated the creation of an 
international judicial commission of inquiry. After the government of Burundi sought the help of the 
United Nations, the UNSC requested that the Secretary-General dispatch an assessment mission to Burundi 
to consider the advisability and feasibility of establishing an international commission. The mission 
recommended the establishment of “a twin mechanism: a non-judicial accountability mechanism in the 
form of a truth commission, and a judicial accountability mechanism in the form of a special chamber 
within the court system of Burundi.” Aware of Burundi’s recent history, the mission also noted that the 
“United Nations can no longer engage in establishing commissions of inquiry and disregard their 
recommendations without seriously undermining the credibility of the Organization in promoting justice 
and the rule of law.” S/2005/158 (March 11, 2005) The UNSC requested the Secretary-General to engage 
in negotiations with the government of Burundi on the implementation of these two goals. S/RES/1606 
(June 20, 2005) These negotiations proved fruitless. In April 2014, the government of Burundi launched a 
reconciliation commission without the help of the United Nations, which is considered within Burundi as 
an unfair attempt to shield the ruling party from accountability  (see e.g. Nduwimana, 2014). 
395 S/1997/547 (July 15, 1997) (“that given the circumstances prevailing in Burundi I was not in a position 
to recommend to the Security Council the establishment of such a tribunal at the present time. It is my 
intention to remain seized of the matter, however, and to review the question of the establishment of such a 
tribunal at a later date.”). 
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order to balance their rationalist-calculations with their desire to maintain and promote 
the legitimacy of the UNSC. In the case of Burundi, there were obvious rationalist-
calculations that stopped the UNSC from taking any significant action, even though the 
massacres were continuing. As the Secretary-General stated, however, “if another tragedy 
befalls the Burundian people…it will cause untold human suffering and gravely damage 
the credibility of the United Nations.”396 The creation of the commission of inquiry aimed 
to preserve this credibility. As Table 7 summarizes, the commission was able to bridge 
the gap between materialist and legitimacy concerns at the UNSC. 
The explanation of this Chapter is applicable beyond Burundi to all 
instances the UNSC has deliberated its options on atrocities. But, more interestingly, it is 
important to pause and briefly consider how the argument of this Chapter is applicable to 
the outlier case of Libya. For the atrocities in Libya, the UNSC members created an 
international atrocities investigation without creating an international commission of 
inquiry. In that case, however, the UNSC did not suffer from a clash between 
considerations of power-politics and legitimacy. 
In brief, several important elements in the UNSC’s deliberations over the 
atrocities in Libya negated the usual imbalance between power-politics and legitimacy. 
The international community was openly and vociferously against the atrocities 
committed by the Qaddafi regime. The Arab League, a traditional bastion for Arab states 
such as Libya, suspended Libya’s membership in the League on February 22, 2011, three 
days before the UNSC’s decision on the creation of an investigation.397 On the same day,                                                         
396 S/1996/116 (p. 9). 
397 Galla (2011). 
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the fifteen UNSC member states held a closed meeting with a representative of the 
Secretary-General, the Libyan ambassador to the UN and seventy-five(!) other 
countries.398 The next day, the African Union, another traditional supporter of Libya, 
strongly condemned the violence of the Qaddafi regime and urged all Libyans to stop 
fighting.399  
The opposition of the Arab League and the African Union, combined with 
the vast participation of other states at the UNSC discussion guaranteed increased 
procedural fairness in the decision-making process. The right afforded to the Libyan 
ambassador to address the UNSC and present Qaddafi’s perspective further contributed 
to such fairness. Both facts decreased the reasons for which a commission of inquiry 
would be necessary to the UNSC’s institutional legitimacy. 
Additionally, a commission was not required to deal with the normative 
clash between peace and justice, as this clash was well captured by the debates among the 
UNSC members. The presence of India, Nigeria and South Africa on the UNSC, coupled 
with the permanent representation of China and Russia, meant that the traditional 
normative preference for state sovereignty and peace, rather than the focus on 
                                                        
398 These seventy-five states were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chad, Comoros, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Republic of Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Viet 
Nam, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
399 African Union, Communiqué (February 23, 2011). 
 
183 
interventions and justice, was well represented in the debates on Libya.400 This view was 
counterbalanced by the presence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, France, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom, which were state-parties to the ICC and supported a role for 
justice. A commission of inquiry had nothing to add to this normative clash.  
Through the vast international support for an investigation, the procedural 
safeguards and the lack of normative clash at the UNSC, the UNSC’s deliberations did 
not suffer from the preponderance of power-politics to the detriment of legitimacy. As 
such, it appears that the outlier status of the UNSC’s actions on Libya lends support to 
the argument of this Chapter on the use of third-parties as a bridge between 
considerations of power-politics and legitimacy at the UNSC. When there is nothing to 
bridge, the UNSC forgoes the use of a third-party. 
The use, furthermore, of third-parties to bridge the gap between 
rationalist-calculations and legitimacy complements the previous studies in this field. 
Rather than considering these two elements as polar opposites, this chapter follows the 
lead of Claude (1967) and Hurd (2007) in identifying ways in which power and 
legitimacy work together. Building on these studies, it proposes that an independent 
third-party has been used by the UNSC to bridge the gap between materialist interests 
and legitimacy by (a) reflecting the interests of the international community, (b) using a 
fair and transparent procedure, as well as prioritizing consistency, and (c) engaging with 
the normative disagreements over a specific course of action. It has the additional benefit 
of providing the UNSC with a response to potential time-delayed criticisms. By 
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recognizing that third-parties can play this function, this Chapter also highlights a new 
way in which such actors can influence international politics. 
More importantly for this dissertation, the role that third-parties have in 
protecting the legitimacy of an international institution also explains the constant demand 
by UNSC members, across all issues, for recommendations from third-parties. The 
recommendations of these third-parties allow the UNSC to come to a decision over a 
specific matter. At that point, the decision has to be codified. The politics behind the 





Chapter Six. The Third Step: The Use of Precedent 
Now, the language of this resolution is virtually identical 
with language which has been used before, notably in the 
action under Article 29 of the Charter, in the Spanish case 
in 1946. In that case the vote in the Security Council was 
10 for, none against, and 1 abstention; and the member 
who abstained was the then representative of the Soviet 
Union, Mr. Gromyko, who is now the Foreign Minister of 
the Soviet Union. This resolution is squarely within the 
provisions of Article 29 of the Charter. It is a step which is 
necessary for the Council in the performance of its 
functions in this case. It is a subsidiary organ—that is, 
when it is created it will be a subsidiary organ—which will 
in effect provide for the continuation of the Council’s 
consideration on this subject. 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the UNSC, 
supporting the creation of an investigation in the situation 
in Laos (September 7, 1959).401 
Once the attention of the UNSC members has been seized on specific 
atrocities by a patron diplomat and the UNSC members have received the support of a 
commission of inquiry for the creation of an atrocities investigation, the UNSC members 
consider their options. At that moment, as outlined in Chapter Three, the states leading 
the deliberations put forth draft resolutions with their proposals and try to convince other 
UNSC members to support these drafts.  
As expected, a myriad of political tricks are used to convince, or even 
coerce, other UNSC members on accepting specific proposals. Quid pro quos, alliances, 
economic aid, and all the other tools of traditional diplomacy come into play in the 
drafting process. For example, as detailed below, the United States and France both used 
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such methods to convince other UNSC members to support their respective proposal for 
an investigation into the atrocities of Darfur.  Like the topics of the previous two 
Chapters, the use of such diplomatic tools in the drafting process defies a neat 
classification or understanding.402 
Apart from the traditional diplomatic tools, the drafting phase also gives 
rise to textual arguments amongst the participants. The syntax and grammar of the 
operative clauses are of central importance to the decision, as they set the legal 
parameters of all subsequent actions. In dealing with peacekeeping missions, for 
example, it is important to distinguish if these missions can use force, arrest belligerents, 
or receive weapons from specific countries. As this Chapter illustrates, in addition to the 
traditional diplomatic tools highlighted above, some states try to persuade other states of 
the viability of specific text by pointing to properties of the text itself. Interestingly 
enough, during the drafting phase across all topics, the UNSC members constantly rely 
on precedent UNSC decisions. But, why would the UNSC members rely on precedent in 
forming their decisions? 
This Chapter argues that, when decision-makers are divided over a 
specific issue, some of them convince their other colleagues through the use of precedent. 
Precedent thus becomes a bargaining tool.  
This argument is developed in six parts. Part I sets the stage by explaining 
why the use of precedent by the members of the UNSC is surprising. Then, Part II 
presents the literature and the three accepted explanations on the use of precedent. Part III 
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presents an alternative fourth explanation, while Part IV explains the research design of 
this Chapter. Part V includes five short case studies and, Part VI presents the discussion. 
The Chapter concludes by summarizing its main argument and extending the findings to 
decision-making bodies other than the UNSC.  
Part I: Precedent at the UNSC 
The UNSC’s decisions rarely innovate. As detailed in the Chapter One, 
the UNSC has always resorted to diplomatic initiatives, sanctions, peacekeeping 
missions, international courts or the use of force in dealing with international problems 
since 1945. These tools have been consistently applied across international problems with 
little variation. In 1997, for example, the UNSC authorized a peacekeeping mission in 
Angola that was very similar to the one it had created for that country nine years earlier, 
in 1988.403 Despite its unrestricted freedom to use its great powers, the UNSC generally 
elects to follow its prior decisions in subsequent cases.  
Precedent can be defined as a prior decision taken in response to a 
situation reasonably analogous to the situation at hand.404 Contrary to domestic law, 
precedent is not restricted in the present Chapter only to the legal elements of a specific 
issue. Courts, for example, often apply the same precedent to different facts and reach 
entirely different outcomes. To a certain extent, the UNSC does the same. For example, it 
has made the same decision to limit the scope of ICC investigations both in deferring all 
investigations405 and in authorizing specific investigations several times.406 But, the use                                                         
403 S/RES/626 (1988); S/RES/1118 (1997). 
404 Deutsche (1974). 
405 S/RES/1422 (2002); S/RES/1487 (2003). 
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of precedent at the UNSC is usually targeted to reaching the same outcome with that 
chosen in an analogous situation in the past.407 For this reason, in dealing with precedent, 
this Chapter examines not only the legal reasoning behind the outcomes of the UNSC 
deliberations, but also the outcomes of these deliberations. 
For several reasons, it is surprising that the UNSC most often decides by 
reference to a past decision. Theoretically, the UNSC, as the top decision-making body at 
the UN, is unrestrained in the exercise of its powers. From a legal point of view, as long 
as it acts within the boundaries of jus cogens, i.e. the peremptory norms of international 
law, the UNSC can take any decision it desires on issues of peace and security.408 In the 
task of maintaining international peace and security, the UNSC has legal power to go so 
far as abrogating a state’s sovereignty.409 Even more, the UNSC has the unfettered 
freedom to deploy such powers as it sees fit, since it enjoys supremacy over other 
international institutions and individual states.410 It is also unlikely that its decisions will, 
or even can, be reviewed by the UN General Assembly or the International Court of 
Justice.411 Finally, while enjoying such discretionary powers, it does not have to worry 
about “set[ting] general legal precedents.”412 
There are also practical reasons for which the UNSC should not constantly 
rely on its precedent. To begin with, the insistence on following precedent stifles                                                                                                                                                                      
406 S/RES/1593 (2005); S/RES/1970 (2011). 
407 In doing so, the UNSC is also safeguarding the substantive fairness of its decisions (See Chapter Five). 
408 See e.g. Orakhelashvili (2005).  
409 UN Charter, Chapter VII.  
410 UN Charter, Article 2(2) and Article 103. 
411 Johnstone (2003); Alvarez (1996). 
412 Doyle (2015) (p. 114). 
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innovation. When certain UNSC actions do not eradicate or even mitigate international 
threats to peace and security, one would expect deviations from precedent in dealing with 
similar situations at a later time.413 After, for example, ten consecutive renewals of the 
peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia had failed to stem the violence in 1992 
and 1993, it is puzzling that the main elements of the eleventh renewal followed those of 
the ten prior renewals rather than allowing for any innovation.414 Furthermore, crises in 
international affairs are multivariate products. A solution for an older crisis will rarely, if 
ever, work for a present crisis without being tailored to meet specific demands. It is thus 
difficult to understand why the UNSC developed a sanctions regime against the Central 
African Republic in 2014 that mimicked the one put in place against Iraq in 2003.415 In 
addition to these, prior studies on decision-making highlight that precedent should be less 
prominent in situations where the relevant decision-makers interact repeatedly.416 Since 
the most-relevant decision-makers at the UNSC are the P5, who enjoy perpetual tenure 
on the UNSC (i.e. they do not discount the future), ruling by historical analogy is not 
necessary to overcome decision-making problems. The P5’s long-term outlook should 
have led the UNSC to effectively use the ICC in Libya, rather than repeat the—highly 
                                                        
413 This assumes that the UNSC members care about the outcome. In more cynical situation, the UNSC 
members may be relying on precedent for efficiency (see below), which is less puzzling.  
414 UNPROFOR was established under S/RES/743 (1992). It was renewed and extended by a series of 
UNSC resolutions, see e.g. S/RES/749 (1992); S/RES/758 (1992); S/RES/761 (1992); S/RES/762 (1992); 
S/RES/770 (1992); S/RES/779 (1992); S/RES/786 (1992); S/RES/787 (1992); S/RES/802 (1993); 
S/RES/842 (1993). 
415 The sanctions regime against the Central African Republic was instituted under S/RES/2127 (2013). The 
latest sanctions regime against Iraq was created under S/RES/1518 (2003). 
416 Maggi and Staiger (2011). 
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criticized and ineffective—manner in which the ICC had been used in Darfur.417 Finally, 
precedent does not exist in the field of international law.418 In so far as the UNSC is 
acting as an international legal body, it should not be bound by its own precedent. 
Despite the issues outlined above, the UNSC’s insistence on following its 
own precedent mirrors the practice of highest courts in all domestic and international 
legal systems. Courts such as the U.S. Supreme Court, the French Cour de Cassation, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice have the 
wherewithal to decide each dispute as they see fit, despite their prior decisions. Yet, these 
courts routinely adhere to their own precedent and make only gradual departures from 
their past rulings.  Past studies have highlighted three reasons for which these highest 
courts adhere to their own precedent, namely the need for consistency, predictability and 
efficiency. The following Part presents these reasons. 
Part II: Literature Review 
As the use of precedent forms a building block for most legal systems, the 
present question has received significant attention from legal scholars, who have 
attempted to understand why the highest court of any legal system would consistently, 
both historically and across many different issues, abide by its prior jurisprudence. 
Overall, these past studies suggest three answers to the present question. Namely, 
precedent allows a court to (i) consistently treat an issue,419 (ii) respect the reliance of 
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418 See Article 59 of the International Court of Justice. 
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parties on the court’s past decisions, and (iii) optimally allocate its decision-making 
resources.  
The following section presents the legal literature on each of these three 
approaches. It also examines the applicability of these three approaches to the UNSC, in 
order to evaluate if and how these three uses of precedent can explain the drafting 
decisions of the UNSC members. Finally, it derives a testable hypothesis from each of the 
three approaches. 
Before proceeding, however, in thinking about the role precedent, it is 
useful to consider examples of ordinary individuals who use precedent in their daily 
decisions. The favorite example of past studies involves parental decision-making in a 
family of two parents and two children of different ages.420 Each child in this example 
wants to attend a concert when it reaches age fifteen. The parents’ decision whether to 
allow the first child to attend the concert becomes a critical factor when making the 
decision with regards to their second child. While it is obviously simplistic to compare 
the UNSC’s decisions on maintaining peace and security or the legal decisions of a 
highest court to parents’ decisions with regards to their concert-going children, this 
Chapter will use this analogy to provide some context and levity in the subsequent 
discussion. 
1. Present Issue 
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Past studies demonstrate that decision-makers have a strong preference for 
consistent decisions on similar matters, as consistency ensures the legitimacy and fairness 
of their decisions. The use of precedent allows them to achieve such consistency.  
Consistency ensures that all decisions made by a decision-making body on 
a specific issue are substantively similar. Over time, assuming that prior decisions have 
been otherwise correct,421 the attribute of consistency strengthens the credibility of the 
decision-making institution and the legitimacy of its decisions. Blackstone, for example, 
considered that the legitimacy of the common law judicial system came from its 
“custom” and “immemorial usage.”422 More recently, Spriggs and Hansford documented 
how the U.S. Supreme Court uses precedent as a way to bolster the credibility of its 
decision, when the Justices are trying to “increase the likelihood that their opinions will 
be efficacious [in lower courts].”423  
The value of consistency in decision-making is also closely related to 
theoretical discussions on legal equality, which is a foundational element of the rule of 
law.424 Postema, for example, argues that consistency and equality are closely related 
manifestations of impartiality and fairness.425 While these considerations appear abstract, 
they influence the decision-making process through the normative pull that consistency 
exerts on decision-makers.426  
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426 Knight and Epstein (1996). 
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The use of precedent is an ideal way to maintain consistency in the 
decision-making process. Through the use of precedent, decision-makers not only ensure 
that past decisions are respected, but also that these past decisions are strengthened. 
Examples of such use of precedent abound. In the U.S. legal system, courts have 
consistently relied on precedent in holding that the President has to respect the powers of 
Congress when conducting foreign relations, even though such powers are limited.427 
While aspects of this doctrine have been clarified over time, the consistent opinion of the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the distribution of foreign policy powers has ensured that lower 
courts and other branches of the U.S. government perceive the U.S. Supreme Court to be 
a legitimate judicial institution and respect its decisions. It has also ensured the 
appearance of fairness as all Presidents are treated the same with regards to their foreign 
policy powers. In the case of the children who wanted to go to the concert, the parents’ 
decision to consistently follow the rule established for their first child with their second 
child has the same effects. 
Returning to the focus of this article, the UNSC, as it is tasked with 
dealing with all threats to international peace and security across time and space, could 
attempt to deal with each threat on a case-by-case basis. Doing so, however, would risk 
creating an inconsistent record, which would likely delegitimize its actions in the eyes of 
other international organizations and individual states. Inconsistent decisions by the 
UNSC would also give rise to criticism and complaints by parties, who might feel that 
they were being discriminated against. When compared to the referral of the atrocities in                                                         
427 E.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company, et al. v. Charles Sawyer, Secretary of Commerce, 343 U.S. 
579; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324-32; Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996-1007; Kucinich v. 
Bush, 236 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-18 (D.D.C. 2002). 
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Libya to the ICC, the absence of any action on the atrocities in Syria has engendered such 
criticisms. A consistent approach across similar issues most easily avoids these two 
problems. Such consistency can be achieved by the UNSC through the repetition of its 
precedent. 
H1a: If decision-makers are concerned with the legitimacy of their decisions, they are 
more likely to resort to precedent. 
H1b: If decision-makers are concerned with the fairness of their decisions, they are more 
likely to resort to precedent. 
2. The Interested Parties 
Every decision made by a decision-making body affects a series of actors, 
who internalize the decisions and structure their behavior in light of them. Past studies 
have highlighted how decision-makers use precedent to structure third-party expectations. 
The use of precedent allows a decision-maker to accomplish two goals 
that are crucial to the functioning of the decision-maker’s community. First, precedent 
can act as an informational device for a wide variety of actors.428 It allows various parties 
to predict future rules and to structure their actions accordingly.429 When domestic courts, 
for example, reaffirm their precedent in an age discrimination lawsuit, they send a strong 
signal to all employers and employees, who are the future’s potential plaintiffs and 
defendants, about the scope of permissible conduct. Precedent also informs the two 
                                                        
428 Schotter (1978). 
429 Deutsche (1974). 
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opposing sides of their probabilities to succeed in a dispute and determines their 
settlement target.430  
Additionally, the use of precedent bolsters the integrity of the decision-
maker’s community, as it ensures stability of societal practices. As Postema notes on this 
topic, “[p]eople tend to rely on past decisions.”431 The use of precedent rewards the 
parties that relied on these prior decisions and ensures the continuity and stability of 
communal practices. By extension, precedent is a tool through which decision-makers 
minimize future uncertainty within their community. Anderson notes that precedent can 
be seen as “the basis for sustaining desired expectations.”432 If, for example, after having 
granted permission to their elder child in the past, the parents of the family in the concert 
example deny their younger child permission to go to the same or a similar concert, the 
family dynamics will be awkward, if not hostile, with both children incapable of ex-ante 
structuring their behavior towards any issue requiring parental approval. 
The informational and community-stabilizing role of precedent may 
explain why the UNSC most often repeats its prior decisions. As the UNSC is at the top 
of the UN system, other UN bodies, international organizations and individual countries 
structure their behavior according to the decisions of the UNSC.  By relying on its prior 
decisions, the UNSC sends a clear and coherent informational message to all these 
interested parties. The UNSC can also use precedent to ensure that its decisions promote 
                                                        
430 Che and Yi (1993). 
431 Postema (1991). 
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international peace and stability, while rewarding those actors who structured their 
behavior according to the UNSC’s precedent and have contributed towards that goal.  
H2a: If decision-makers are concerned with the informational properties of their 
decisions, they are more likely to resort to precedent. 
H2b: If decision-makers are concerned with maintaining stable community practices, 
they are more likely to resort to precedent.   
3. The Decision-Making Process 
It is usually difficult for different actors to agree on one decision 
especially in situations in which there is no easy solution. Scholars have highlighted how 
the use of precedent can facilitate the decision-making process in at least two ways—by 
relying on the collective logic of the past and by safeguarding an efficient use of 
resources. 
The use of precedent can simplify the decision-making process by 
allowing decision-makers to avoid mistakes. By relying on precedent, the decision-maker 
is not only relying on a decision that has already been formulated, but is also drawing on 
the collective logic of prior decision-makers.433 Writing on legal precedent, in 1881, 
Justice Holmes held that “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been 
experience….the law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many 
centuries.”434 By relying on the experience and knowledge learned through the trials and 
errors of prior times, a decision-maker can use precedent to avoid pitfalls. 
                                                        
433 Oliphant (1928). 
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The use of precedent can also simplify the decision-making process 
through its efficiency implications. As each decision takes time and effort, a decision-
maker can save resources and cut costs by relying on prior decisions.435 In such use of 
precedent, efficiency considerations have to be balanced against the risk of error, as prior 
decisions may not always match the present facts.  When two issues, however, are very 
similar, and assuming the first decision is considered to be correct, there is less risk of 
error in using precedent. Decision-makers can thus rely on precedent without fearing 
errors, and turn their attention to more pressing novel matters.  
These two functions of precedent may explain why the UNSC sometimes 
resorts to the use of precedent rather than innovating. The majority of threats to 
international peace and security, such as civil wars, are repeatedly in front of the UNSC. 
By relying on prior decisions, the UNSC may be acting with humility and risk-aversion, 
as collective knowledge is likely to outweigh the benefits of innovation. At the same 
time, the UNSC is regularly faced with multiple crises at once. Currently, a list of the 
problems at the UNSC includes the conflicts in South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Central African Republic, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel-
Palestine, Yemen, and the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Reliance on 
precedent allows the UNSC to rapidly dispense with another topic of its agenda without 
having to reinvent the proverbial wheel. 
H3a: If decision-makers are concerned with avoiding mistakes, they are more likely to 
resort to precedent. 
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H3b: If decision-makers are concerned with an efficient decision, they are more likely to 
resort to precedent.  
Part II: Precedent in Decision-Makers’ Bargaining  
When the decision-making body is comprised of more than one individual, 
decisions are only made after an agreement among the various decision-makers. At the 
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, five of the Justices have to agree to a common position 
to have a majority when deciding a case. Such agreements, however, are fraught with 
coordination and cooperation problems. This Chapter argues that the use of precedent can 
overcome these problems, by enabling decision-makers to reach agreements on issues 
over which they disagree. Precedent becomes a bargaining tool.  
The use of precedent as a bargaining tool presupposes that precedent can 
be applied strategically for the benefit of a decision-maker’s ulterior goals. So far, the 
strategic application of precedent by decision-makers has received some attention in the 
literature on domestic courts. Landes and Posner, who considered that precedent is a form 
of legal investment, argued that a judge strategically adheres to precedent to avoid 
undermining his own prior decisions and increase the value of his investment.436 
Rasmusen, through the use of a different formal model, reached a similar conclusion.437 
Other commentators have found that lower court judges selectively use precedent to 
signal their willingness to be promoted.438 Appellate judges have also been found to use 
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precedent as a way to guide trial judges towards their own preferred outcomes.439 Finally, 
the strategic use of precedent can be seen in the fact that justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court are more likely to follow the court’s precedent when they are less experienced, and 
thus less confident about their own views.440 
Since precedent can be applied strategically, the use of precedent can 
improve decision-making through a two-step bargaining process. It is assumed that a 
decision involves two players, who both have symmetric bargaining power and who 
cannot act unilaterally (i.e. no outside option). Both of these assumptions are well suited 
to describing the interaction of UNSC members when it comes to the creation of an 
international investigation into the commission of atrocities. 
First, decision-maker A suggests the use of precedent to convince his or 
her colleague B to follow a specific course of action in line with A’s goals. In selecting 
precedent, A is departing from his or her preferred course of action in favor of a choice 
that is acceptable, but not ideal. A does so because a decision can only materialize if B 
agrees. To convince B, A suggests the use of precedent, because B has already accepted it 
in the past and is likely to feel more comfortable with its implications rather than those of 
a different, non-precedential, course of action. This is a fairly uncontroversial suggestion. 
Such use of precedent has been found to exist in opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where the writer of the majority opinion is more likely to use precedent when attempting 
to stave off criticism from other judges.441 This step of the process is an attempt by                                                         
439 Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson (2002). 
440 Hurwitz and Stefko (2004). 
441 Lupu and Fowler (2013). 
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decision-maker A to take a conservative course of action towards accomplishing his or 
her own preferences.  
In the second step of the decision-making sequence, there are three ways 
in which decision-maker B may respond. First, B may be a priori opposed to the use of 
the suggested precedent for reasons unrelated to precedent itself. In Syria, for example, 
Russia does not support an ICC referral, not because it opposes the ICC and the previous 
UNSC referrals to the ICC, but because it supports the Assad regime. In this case 
bargaining fails. Second, B may be, again a priori, supportive of the use of the suggested 
precedent, for reasons that are, again, unrelated to precedent itself. In this case, B’s 
preferences happen to be independently centered around the course of action that was 
previously applied in a different situation. When, for example, the UNSC condemned the 
terrorist attacks in London, it acted in line with several previous actions, not because of 
their precedential value, but because the UNSC members independently came to the same 
conclusion. Neither of the two above mechanisms is controversial or counter-intuitive, as 
they are based on the assumption that B assigns a higher value to items other than the 
UNSC’s precedent.  
Apart from the above two possibilities, there is a third way in which B 
may react to A’s proposal, one which allows for an independent role for precedent. In this 
case, the precedent action is not B’s top preference. After receiving A’s offer to follow 
precedent, B is also uncertain about the actions that decision-maker A may be willing to 
take in order to advance A’s preferences. More importantly, A’s potential future actions 
may be further away from B’s preferences than the use of precedent. The use of 
precedent can independently be instrumental in solving this uncertainty, with decision-
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maker B accepting the suggested use of precedent as a way to contain the more eager 
decision-maker A, even though precedent is a second-best option for B.  The use of 
precedent as a mechanism to remove uncertainty has previously been recognized by 
Crawford and Haller, who present a formal model in which precedent is a focal point for 
the coordination of decision-makers with divergent preferences.442 The second step 
indicates that decision-makers can tackle uncertainty through the use of precedent. 
An illustration can clarify the above. In the family from the earlier 
example, the second child, who is otherwise shy and anti-social, has received three 
invitations for Thursday night, one to a friend’s house for dinner, another to a concert 
with his music class, and a third to his high school’s basketball game in the neighboring 
town. The mother thinks that the friend’s house would be more appropriate for a school 
night. The father prefers that his shy child get exposure to loud public events, and hopes 
that his child would attend the basketball game that night. The father also remembers 
that, a few years ago, the mother had acquiesced to the first child’s request to attend a 
concert with his music class. To convince the mother to forget about the friend’s 
invitation in favor of a public event, the father suggests to the mother that they allow their 
second child to attend the concert with class. The mother not only remembers her 
experience with her first child, but is also afraid of the rowdiness of the basketball game. 
She also suspects that the father prefers the basketball game, but does not trust that her 
husband would admit his preference if she asked, as they constantly disagree over the 
shyness of their second child. As she is faced with uncertainty and desires to avoid the 
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basketball game, the mother acquiesces to precedent and remains closer to her comfort 
zone.  
Such strategic use of precedent may take place at the UNSC. As the 
epigraph of this Chapter illustrates, a precedent of the UNSC indicates a solution that was 
acceptable to the P5 in a prior setting and can act as a focal point for negotiations. During 
the intra-council bargaining, the leading states can resort to precedent as a way of 
building winning majorities. At the UNSC, however, the P5 can veto any decision over 
which they have low preferences. The presence of the veto changes the range of available 
options. Because the consent of both players is required in a two-player interaction, it is 
unreasonable to expect that any option that falls within one player’s veto zone would be a 
viable option for the UNSC. In this instance, A and B will be indifferent towards some 
options and will seek all options that are preferable to both. These zones of preferences 
are not set in stone, but fluctuate overtime and over different issues. They capture, 
however, the preferences of the P5 in a particular negotiation, where some options are 
unacceptable, others are ideal and some are merely acceptable. In essence, for bargaining 
to succeed at the UNSC, A has to propose an acceptable precedent that will bring B 
outside its veto zone. 
H4: If decision-makers are concerned with overcoming uncertainty in reaching a 
common decision, they are more likely to resort to precedent.   
The five short case studies presented in Part IV of this Chapter illustrate 
the full potential of this explanation. Before proceeding to these, the next Part outlines the 




Part III: Research Design 
The scope and conditions of the above hypotheses is markedly different. 
They have different focus, different ambit and different expectations. Apart from the 
resort to precedent, their sole similarity is that they all arise within the decision-making 
process. This Part explains how the use of case studies allows for a proper evaluation of 
this decision-making process. It then clarifies the scope and conditions of the above 
hypotheses, which will be tested through the case studies in the following Part. 
Use of Case Studies 
To examine the applicability of the above hypotheses, this Chapter has to 
examine the details of the decision-making process. The UNSC is a political deliberative 
institution with extensive media coverage. While the principal of secrecy remains 
important in the non-public deliberations of the UNSC, frequent and significant leaks, the 
large number of public deliberations, the cross-referencing of the UNSC’s public records 
with biographies and historical analyses, and the use of interviews permit a robust 
understanding of the role of precedent at the UNSC. Precisely because of this 
understanding, this Chapter does not have to focus only on the use of precedent in the 
final decisions of a decision-making body, and is thus able to acknowledge that precedent 
can also be useful in the decision-making process. 
The focus on the UNSC precludes a quantitative analysis on the use of 
precedent, such as those used in past studies relating to legal opinions.443 Relying on 
citations to past cases, those studies created datasets measuring the adherence to a                                                         




specific opinion in subsequent cases and identifying the judges who supported or refuted 
their prior decision(s). At the UNSC, the possibility that a disagreeing state can halt the 
decision-making process before arriving at an official disagreement (particularly if the 
disagreement comes from a P5) prevents the possibility of a quantitative analysis. It is, 
for example, impossible to count how many times France has disagreed with a prior 
UNSC decision by counting the subsequent decisions of the UNSC, as France’s 
disagreement may silently lead to no action (i.e. nothing to observe) by the UNSC on this 
issue. As dissents are not the only way disagreements may be expressed at the UNSC, a 
quantitative study would miss substantial information. 
Faced with this drawback, this Chapter examines case studies on the use 
of precedent when authorizing an international criminal investigation. By focusing on one 
specific issue, a substantial historical record of the UNSC deliberations can be compiled 
and analyzed, which allows the observation of the otherwise subtle or even silent 
disagreements among the UNSC members, precisely the items that would have been 
overlooked in a quantitative analysis. Furthermore, in the past twenty years, the UNSC 
has debated the text of a resolution on atrocities investigation only a handful of times (the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Libya, Syria). While such a small 
collection of cases precludes the examination of alternative or interacting hypotheses, it 
creates a closed universe of cases, in which it is possible to trace the role of precedent in 
the otherwise secretive deliberations of the UNSC. Finally, precedent has always been 
central in the creation of these investigations. In deciding the details of each 
investigation, the members of the UNSC, academics and commentators have made 
frequent reference to the precedent set by prior investigations. For example, the one-year 
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time span for the investigation into Rwanda was regularly compared to the open-ended 
nature of the precedent investigation into the former Yugoslavia.444 
Case studies are additionally well suited to overcoming the possible 
spurious effects of precedent. Previous analyses are divided over the role of precedent. 
Some argue that precedent has important weight in decision-making both in domestic 
courts445 and international courts, such as the WTO.446 At the UNSC, Johnstone notes 
that concerns about creating precedent influenced the positions that states held in the 
debates on the Kosovo intervention.447 Other studies argue, however, that the use of 
precedent does not necessarily indicate its causal explanatory power. Precedent may 
instead be used as an ex post legitimating factor in decisions.448 By focusing on the 
details of specific case studies, this Chapter highlights how, but-for precedent, decision-
makers would have reached different results, a counter-factual scenario that is difficult to 
test with quantitative methods.449 
Defining the Scope of the Hypotheses 
Before testing the above hypotheses through the five case studies on the 
UNSC’s debates on atrocities, it is important to delineate the ambit, and present the 
testable expectations, of each hypothesis.                                                         
444 Reydams (2005) (“Most striking, however, is the different temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The 
ICTY, established in February 1993, has jurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian 
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. The jurisdiction of the ICTR, on the 
other hand, is limited to the period 1 January 1994–31 December 1994—an artificial and politically 
convenient time-frame.”). 
445 See e.g. Epstein and Knight (1996). 
446 See e.g. Pelc (2014). 
447 Johnstone (2003). 
448 Segal and Spaeth (1996). 
449 Pelc (2014). 
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It is sometimes hard to distinguish the effect of the explanations set forth 
above, as their rationales coalesce into a single decision to use precedent.450 Yet, as 
summarized in Table 8, these explanations play out in very different ways vis-à-vis the 
actions of the UNSC. The first explanation predicts that the UNSC will resort to 
precedent in an attempt to treat all issues in a consistent manner out of concerns for its 
legitimacy (H1.a) and fairness (H1.b). The second explanation expects that the UNSC 
will use precedent to safeguard the reliance of all interested parties (H2.a) and to signal 
its position on a given issue (H2.b). According to the third explanation, the UNSC will 
follow precedent to streamline the decision-making process, either because it believes in 
the wisdom of its past actions (H3.a) or is concerned with the efficiency of its decision-
making process (H3.b). Finally, the fourth explanation presents a two-stage interaction, in 
the first stage of which one UNSC member suggests the use of precedent, which a second 
UNSC member accepts in the second-stage as a way to deal with uncertainty even though 
it is a second-best option (H4). Because the explanations have a different focus, the 
hypotheses derived from these explanations have different ambit and conditions. 
In the case of the first set of hypotheses, decision-makers are expected to 
have a strong interest in resolving the issue at hand in a manner consistent with prior 
decisions, so as to improve the legitimacy or fairness of the decision. These hypotheses 
can be valid only if decision-makers have an a priori interest in the legitimacy or fairness 
of a UNSC decision (i.e. an interest not influenced by precedent) by the UNSC. 
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In the second set of hypotheses, rather than focusing on the present issue, 
decision-makers are expected to focus on the affected parties. In this instance, decision-
makers are expected to consider if and how their decision to use precedent will affect 
others. For these hypotheses to be valid, decision-makers should (i) agree on the message 
sent by using precedent and (ii) demonstrate an interest in how that message will be 
understood by the interested parties. The use of precedent is thus predicated on an 
external orientation by decision-makers. 
Table 8. Questions and Goals 
Explanation 
Focuses on: 
Main Question of this Explanation: Use of Precedent for 
(Hypotheses): 




2. The interested 
parties 







How will the decision-making body arrive 











The third set of hypotheses turns the focus to the decision-making process 
itself. There, decision-makers are expected to shed considerations for the present issue 
and the affected parties and focus, instead, on how they arrive at a decision. Contrary to 
the scope of the prior hypotheses, decision-makers are expected to consider precedent as 
the appropriate tool to accomplish markedly self-centered reasons (avoiding mistakes or 
remaining efficient). These hypotheses can be valid only if (i) the decision-makers agree 
on a specific outcome but (ii) disagree on how to best reach that outcome. 
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The fourth hypothesis focuses on the disparities among decision-makers. 
Contrary to the prior hypotheses, in this instance decision-makers are not seen as a 
collective unit with clearly defined goals and priorities. Amidst their different 
preferences, decision-makers are expected to use precedent as a focal point. In doing so, 
there are two important conditions for the use of precedent. First, the independent power 
of precedent arises only in those situations where decision-makers do not know, and 
cannot control for, the preferences of their opposing state.  Second, the negotiating 
member states have to disagree about their preferred outcome. Outside the boundaries of 
these two conditions, the bargaining role of precedent is curtailed. As a result, if the 
fourth hypothesis is valid, the case studies should demonstrate that decision-makers use 
precedent in cases they face (i) uncertainty and (ii) competing preferences. 
The ambit and conditions of each hypothesis is summarized in Table 9. 
Because of the different orientation behind each set of hypotheses, the task of process 
tracing appears, at first, to be relatively straightforward. If the facts of a case study 
indicate that the actions of the UNSC members fulfilled the above conditions, then it is 
possible that the UNSC members resorted to the use of precedent because of the 
independent variable suggested by the relevant hypotheses.  
Yet, as past studies on precedent argue, multiple hypotheses may be valid 
simultaneously.451 This complicates the task of process tracing, as it is possible that 
several of the above conditions will co-exist. Decision-makers may, for example, have a 
desire to help the affected parties and an independent interest in the decision-making 
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process. To account for this possibility, the next Part only presents the facts surrounding 
each of the five case studies, without attempting to present the facts through the prism of 
the above conditions. Then, Part V examines which of the above hypotheses (i.e. their 
conditions and independent variables) are supported by the facts of each case-study. 
Table 9. Questions, Goals and Conditions 
Explanation 
Focuses on: 





Under what Conditions: 
1. Present issue How will a decision 
affect the present 
issue? 
Legitimacy • A priori interest in 
fairness or legitimacy of 
a decision 
Fairness 
2. The interested 
parties 
How will a decision 
affect the interested 
parties? 
Information • Agreement on message 
sent by precedent 
Communal 
stability 





How will the 
decision-making body 
arrive at an optimal 
decision?  
Efficiency • Agreement on outcome 




How will the 
decision-makers 
arrive at a decision? 
One proposes • Uncertainty 
Other accepts • Competing preferences 
 
The next Part presents five brief case studies that revolve around five 
instances in which the UNSC created an international criminal investigation. The role of 
precedent in each of these case studies is significant. Through these five case studies the 
Chapter argues that, out of the above hypotheses, most commonly precedent is used at the 
UNSC as a bargaining tool. 
Part IV: Case Studies 
A. Rwanda  
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On April 6, 1994, almost eleven months after the UNSC created the ICTY, 
the plane carrying the Hutu Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down as it was 
approaching Kigali airport. Soon after the shooting, an organized massacre of Tutsi 
civilians began in Rwanda. We now know that the massacre was well-planned. It 
amounted to the genocide of Tutsis and systematic killings of moderate Hutus. In what 
turned into to the most horrific collective crime since the Holocaust, more than 800,000 
people died in the course of 30 days.  
As the international condemnation of the genocide increased and at the 
prodding of Colin Keating, Ambassador from New Zealand, and Karel Kovanda, 
Ambassador from the Czech Republic, the UNSC decided on July 1, 1994 to establish a 
Commission of Experts to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian law 
in Rwanda.452 Three months later, on October 4, 1994, the Commission of Experts issued 
its report.453 This report determined that what occurred in Rwanda amounted to genocide 
of the Tutsis. It also stated that:  
“The Commission of Experts wishes to register its strong 
support for the creation of an international criminal tribunal 
(or perhaps expansion in the jurisdiction of an existing one) 
to undertake prosecutions of individuals on the basis of 
international law. It considers that prosecution of 
individuals for having committed crimes under 
international law during the armed conflict in Rwanda 
would be better undertaken by an international, rather than 
by a municipal, tribunal….” 
                                                        
452 S/RES/935 (1994). 
453 S/1994/1125 (October 4, 1994). 
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The Secretary-General endorsed this recommendation on October 6, 
1994.454 The following week, on October 13, the UN Human Rights Commission’s 
Special Rapporteur on Rwanda René Degni-Ségui added his endorsement.455 
While the commission had been investigating, the members of the UNSC 
had been deliberating on whether to initiate an atrocities investigation. There were two 
factors motivating their desire to create an investigation. To begin with, most delegates 
felt frustrated and angry that, during their watch, the UNSC had failed to act to prevent 
and stop the genocide. At the same time, and more central to this Chapter, the shadow of 
the newly created ICTY loomed large over their deliberations. Feeling a need to 
demonstrate that they would handle the various crises consistently, the UNSC members 
insisted on the need for a legal investigation.  
ICTY precedent guided much of the debate among the members of the 
UNSC. In early August 1994, the United States proposed expanding the jurisdiction of 
the ICTY to include the events in Rwanda, thereby having the same court investigate 
both sets of atrocities. A Russian-French proposal suggested the creation of a new court 
that would investigate only the events in Rwanda with all other features of the second 
court, such as jurisdictional scope, modeled after that of the ICTY.456 At the end, a 
solution was brokered through the indefatigable efforts of Colin Keating, the Ambassador 
from New Zealand.457 Keating, even in 2013 (19 years later), felt that there was a need 
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for consistency in dealing with the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.458 
If an investigation into Rwanda had not been created while there had been one for the 
former Yugoslavia, the UNSC would again be at fault. With the majority of UNSC 
members having decided that the atrocities in Rwanda constituted genocide and favoring 
an investigation, Keating took charge. He proposed a compromise between the U.S. and 
Russian-French positions, according to which the ICTY and the ICTR would share a 
prosecutor and an appellate chamber, but otherwise act as separate institutions. For their 
separate branches (e.g. the defense teams, trial judges, court facilities), the ICTY 
precedent would be duplicated for the ICTR. This proposal received significant support 
from the other members of the UNSC. 
The government of Rwanda, however, was a non-permanent member of 
the UNSC during 1994. While it had only one vote in the UNSC, the Rwandan delegation 
carried significant weight in the negotiations over the ICTR. After all, it represented the 
victims of the genocide. It could also play the sovereignty card, which carried special 
weight with the so far non-committal, and veto-wielding, Chinese delegation. Dealing 
with Rwanda in these negotiations was not easy,459 because the Tutsi RPF government 
had its own preferences when it came to establishing an international court. The 
Rwandans and the New Zealand-led western alliance reached a compromise only after 
trading on numerous points.460 
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After long negotiations, the Rwandans dropped their insistence on having 
Rwandan judges at the ICTR, the primacy of the ICTR over domestic Rwandan courts, 
the criminalization of group membership (i.e. collective culpability) and the right to 
pardon or commute sentences. The criminal jurisdiction of the ICTR thus followed that of 
the ICTY. The Rwandans, however, managed to limit the temporal jurisdiction of the 
court to one year (January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994), effectively barring the 
investigation from looking into many Tutsi committed atrocities that fell outside these 
dates.  They also convinced the other UNSC members to authorize the ICTR to look into 
crimes committed by Rwandan citizens outside Rwanda, which necessarily led to an 
investigation of actions committed by Hutu militias in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. As a result, the temporal and geographical boundaries of the ICTR differed from 
those of the ICTY precedent. 
Ultimately, despite these compromises from other UNSC members, the 
Rwandan government still voted against Resolution 955 establishing the ICTR.461 Its 
insistence on the use of the death penalty could not be squared with the strong feelings of 
western countries against the use of this punishment by an international court. The RPF’s 
negative vote foreshadowed many problems the ICTR would face with the Kagame 
regime.  
B. Sierra Leone 
As Chapter Four describes, a major turning point for the use of 
international criminal justice in the civil war in Sierra Leone was the inclusion of the 
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amnesty provision in the Lomé Peace Accords. Yet, after the Lomé Peace Accords, peace 
was not restored in Sierra Leone. The RUF rebels continued fighting. Among others, on 
May 2, 2000, they notoriously disarmed approximately 500 UN peacekeepers and held 
them hostages. In the midst of more atrocities, the UNSC, on August 14, 2000, 
unanimously voted in favor of Resolution 1315. Through this resolution, the UNSC 
“[r]equest[ed]  the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of 
Sierra Leone to create an independent special court consistent with this resolution.” The 
subject matter of this special court would include crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and “other serious violations of international humanitarian law,” and—since it would be a 
Sierra Leonean creation—would also include crimes under the laws of Sierra Leone. The 
court would have jurisdiction over those “who bear the greatest responsibility” for these 
crimes.462 The UNSC thus took actions that led to the creation of a court.  
[Yet,] unlike either the International Tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, which were 
established by resolutions of the Security Council and 
constituted as subsidiary organs of the United Nations, or 
national courts established by law, the Special Court, as 
foreseen, is established by an Agreement between the 
United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone and is 
therefore a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed 
jurisdiction and composition.463  
A court was created, albeit one that diverged greatly from the precedent of 
the ICTY, ICTR or the blueprint for the ICC. 
The negotiations for the creation of the SCSL started two months before 
the ratification of Resolution 1315, in early June of 2000. At that point, Richard                                                         
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Holbrooke, the U.S. Ambassador at the UNSC, presented a draft resolution to the UNSC 
in favor of an international criminal tribunal. The U.S. proposal envisioned the creation 
of an ad hoc tribunal, similar to the ICTY and ICTR. The United Kingdom, as well as 
France and Russia, opposed this proposal. As, however, Russia, France and China had 
secondary roles in the UNSC’s negotiations over Sierra Leone, the main negotiations 
took place between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In the years following the creation of the ICTR, the U.K. relationship with 
international criminal justice was a troubled one. On the one hand, as the decision of the 
House of Lords, the United Kingdom’s highest court, in March 1999 verified that the 
former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet, could not use his official immunity as a bar to 
atrocity prosecution, the United Kingdom was, domestically, at the forefront of 
accountability. On the other hand, the United Kingdom’s experience with the prosecutor 
of the ICTY dampened their desire to create another international tribunal.   
Following the 1998 military campaign into Kosovo, the ICTY Prosecutor 
Louise Arbour received requests to investigate the actions of the NATO aerial bombings. 
In her last months in office, during the Spring of 1999, Arbour notified all NATO 
countries of the preliminary investigation that she was conducting, but did not indicate 
that she would investigate their actions.464 Her successor, however, Carla del Ponte, 
known for her more brash and aggressive style, fanned the flames of tribunal-resentment 
in all NATO capitals. In December 1999, in an interview published in The Observer, Del 
Ponte informed the NATO governments that once the preliminary report was ready, she 
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was going to “read it very attentively and decide what to do.”465 Washington and London 
were extremely concerned about the possibility of a prosecutor targeting their 
governments’ military actions. Yet, they cooperated with the ICTY investigation, which 
turned out to be the end of the matter. In June 2000, Prosecutor Del Ponte found 
insufficient evidence to open a proper investigation into the NATO crimes.466  
Despite the outcome of this investigation, the Blair government worried 
over the possibility of any independent prosecutor backed by UNSC powers reviewing 
the actions of its own troops. With active combat troops on the ground in Sierra Leone, 
the stakes were high for the United Kingdom, higher than for any other UNSC member. 
When, in June of 2000, U.S. Secretary of State Albright called U.K. Foreign Secretary 
Cook about the creation of a court in Sierra Leone, “[s]till smarting from the Yugoslav 
Tribunal prosecutor’s review of NATO bombing decisions during the Kosovo campaign, 
Cook did not want another Carla Del Ponte in charge as a prosecutor.”467  
In addition to their fear of an overly zealous prosecutor, the United 
Kingdom was also concerned about the financing and operational difficulties of an 
international criminal tribunal. It had been experiencing tribunal fatigue. For the past six 
years, the United Kingdom—through the UNSC—had financed and supported the ICTY 
and the ICTR in the face of consistent Russian criticism. As neither of these courts 
seemed to be producing concrete results—and with the Rome Statute for the creation of 
the permanent International Criminal Court having been agreed upon in 1998—the                                                         
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United Kingdom did not want another UNSC court.468 They preferred that, with 
international assistance, a domestic court in Sierra Leone be tasked with handling these 
atrocities. 
To overcome their disagreements, the United States and the United 
Kingdom engaged in bilateral negotiations over a Sierra Leonean court for two months in 
the summer of 2000. At various times, these talks implicated the UN Office of Legal 
Affairs and the government of President Kabbah in Sierra Leone.  
Realizing that the ad hoc precedent was not convincing the United 
Kingdom, the United States changed its proposal during their bilateral talks. Instead of a 
purely international or purely domestic court, the United States proposed to create a 
mixed tribunal following the precedent of the Cambodian tribunal. While travelling to 
Phnom Penh in April 1999, in an effort to overcome serious opposition within the 
Cambodian government towards an atrocities investigation, Senator John Kerry had 
proposed the creation of a mixed tribunal for the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders.469 By July 
1999, the creation of such a tribunal had become the official position of the United States 
for Cambodia. Understanding that the benefits of a court modeled after the Cambodian 
example could satisfy the United Kingdom demands, the United States changed its 
proposal for Sierra Leone in July 2000.  The court would be national and international. It 
would also remain outside the control of the UNSC, both administratively and 
financially. The United States also proposed that the UNSC instruct the Secretary-
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General to create a court with a treaty between his office and the government of Sierra 
Leone, rather than create the court through UNSC resolution.  
By the end of July, the United Kingdom informed the United States that it 
would support this U.S. innovation.470 While the United Kingdom was reluctant to 
establish any court, the United Kingdom was also uncertain over the U.S. position in 
Sierra Leone. As described in Chapter Four of this dissertation, the United States had 
been conducting its diplomacy there through envoys such as Jesse Jackson, who had 
attempted to appease RUF leader Foday Sankoh and in his last visit to Sierra Leone had 
even compared Sankoh to Nelson Mandela, earning the ire of the local government and 
stirring resentment towards his interventions. To the contrary, the United Kingdom had 
troops on the ground and had conducted its diplomacy through high level government 
officials, such as Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, and its 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeremy Greenstock. Generally hesitant 
towards any idea that could threaten reconciliation in Sierra Leone,471 the United 
Kingdom was satisfied with a mixed tribunal, which would target those few individuals 
most responsible for the atrocities rather than another time consuming and all-
encompassing ad hoc tribunal. 
In order to accommodate the concerns of the United Kingdom, the United 
States undertook these extensive revisions to the court’s design on the basis of the 
Cambodian precedent. Then, on July 27, 2000, Holbrooke presented to the UNSC a 
proposal for an idiosyncratic international criminal tribunal for Sierra Leone. This                                                         
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proposal was met by the immediate support of the United Kingdom. The other UNSC 
members, who continued to have a passive role on the events in Sierra Leone, were also 
supportive.472  
The tribunal was subsequently created by the Secretary-General’s Office 
of Legal Affairs. After many important discussions between the Secretary-General and 
the UNSC over the budgetary allocations towards this Court,473 and after important 
deliberations between the Office of Legal Affairs and the Government of Sierra Leone,474 
on January 16, 2002, an agreement was signed between “the Government of Sierra Leone 
and the United Nations on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone.”475 
C. Darfur  
The referral of the atrocities committed in Darfur to the ICC in March of 
2005 signaled the beginning of a new era in international criminal law. The UNSC had 
found a way to use the referral powers bestowed upon it by the Rome Statute. Instead of 
creating another ad hoc or mixed tribunal, such as the ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL or the 
ECCC, Resolution 1593 outsourced the investigation to the ICC.476 The decision to break 
with precedent was hardly surprising, as the ICC had been active since 2002 and the 
international human rights community was largely supportive of its mission. The ad hoc 
model had also been heavily criticized in the prior decade. Yet, the break with precedent                                                         
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was not easy. Since 2000, the United States had consistently and actively opposed the 
ICC. It became comfortable with the idea of referring the atrocities in Darfur to the ICC 
only after France agreed to exempt non-ICC nationals from the scope of the referral. This 
was an important compromise for France. To convince its negotiating partner to make 
this shift, the United States relied on language from UNSC resolution 1497 relating to 
peacekeeping in Liberia,477 which had established limits on the ICC’s investigative 
actions. This section illustrates why this added text, which has since been copied in all 
future ICC referrals, became part of Resolution 1593. 
Since 2003, the UNSC continued receiving negative news on Darfur.478 
Yet, even after it created a commission of inquiry that, in turn, suggested a referral of the 
atrocities to the ICC, the UNSC did not act. As has been well-documented elsewhere,479 
the United States had championed the creation of ad hoc and mixed tribunals, but felt 
uncomfortable with the creation and existence of the ICC. To stem the likelihood of an 
ICC investigation into U.S. actions, the first George W. Bush administration signed 
bilateral Article 98 agreements with a series of countries.480 The U.S. Congress also 
passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, which apart from authorizing an 
invasion of the Hague if a U.S. citizen was brought there for trial at the ICC, prohibited 
the U.S. government from funding or assisting the ICC.481 As a result, the United States 
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supported an international criminal investigation into Darfur, but opposed a referral to the 
ICC.  
On the other side of the spectrum, France had championed the ICC from 
early on. Satisfied with its French civil law elements, and following France’s desire for 
only one permanent international criminal tribunal, the French government signed and 
ratified the Rome Statute, and undertook a consistent effort to promote the court through 
its foreign policy.482 The prior ten years of UNSC practice had also exhausted many 
states’ patience with the ad hoc tribunals as the UNSC had to decide everyday items, 
such as their budget and the appointment of judges. The situation was worse for the 
ICTY, because of Russia’s opposition to that court. But, even for the ICTR, budgeting 
and personnel decisions took up a significant part of the UNSC’s time. The creation of 
the SCSL had also faced considerable funding obstacles.483 Additionally, France felt 
emboldened to focus its attempts for justice on an ICC referral because, that year, nine of 
the UNSC’s fifteen members happened to be state-parties to the ICC.484 This group of 
nine states, nicknamed by the U.S. Foreign Service “the ICC-9,” unofficially formed a 
working group to promote the referral of the atrocities in Darfur to the ICC.485  
To understand the nature of the diplomatic bargain on this issue between 
the United States and France, it is necessary to recall the larger context of the UNSC at 
that time period. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, cooperation at the UNSC had reached                                                         
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an all-time low. The main clash at the UNSC was based on a U.S.-French axis. The 
UNSC was in institutional paralysis, with very little being accomplished. In this 
environment, the U.S. opposition to the ICC took a different dimension. For France, and 
for several other UNSC members, this opposition was yet another manifestation of 
unreasonable policy from the United States Despite their beliefs, these countries realized 
that a referral to the ICC could have to face a U.S. veto. 
The United States fought hard to avoid a referral to the ICC. Afraid that 
such a referral would set precedent,486 the United States worried that referring the 
situation in Darfur was inconsistent with its agenda to undermine the ICC.487 It initially 
proposed expanding the jurisdiction of the ICTR to include the events in Darfur.488 The 
African states on the UNSC were supportive of this idea, but later changed their mind in 
light of European pressures. Understanding that the idea of expanding the ICTR’s 
jurisdiction was not gaining any traction, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Pierre 
Prosper met in New York with representatives from Tanzania, Benin, and the United 
Kingdom to convince them of referring the case to an ad hoc tribunal, which would be 
jointly administered by the UN and the African Union, and would use the infrastructure 
of the ICTR in Tanzania.489 
This diplomatic effort, however, was thwarted by extensive European 
resistance. With the guidance of French Ambassador at the UN, Jean-Marie de la 
                                                        
486 Fake and Funk (2009). 
487 Amnesty International Report (2007). 
488 Interview: 12. 
489 Hamilton (2007) (p. 58); Interview: 12.  
 
223 
Sablière, the ICC-9 states held together in the face of U.S. pressure.490 The French had 
understood that the U.S. administration would have a hard time vetoing a proposal on an 
international criminal investigation to actions it had already labeled genocide.491 De la 
Sablière was convinced of this after meeting with a group of conservative U.S. 
lawmakers, who opposed the ICC, but at the same time were horrified by the Sudanese 
atrocities.492 France thus circulated a draft resolution that referred the Darfur atrocities to 
the ICC, breaking with the precedent of ad hoc or mixed tribunals. France was also ready 
to put this proposal up for a vote when the U.S. delegation asked for an extra day.  
During that day, March 29, 2004, the United States countered with a 
proposal that agreed to the referral to the ICC, but at the same time, attempted to 
undermine the ICC’s powers. To do so, the United States relied on UNSC resolution 
1497, which in 2003 had approved a UN peacekeeping mission to Liberia. In that 
resolution, the UNSC had exempted citizens of non-ICC member states from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, as it:  
[d]ecid[ed] that current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing State, which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, shall be subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all 
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to the 
Multinational Force or United Nations stabilization force in 
Liberia, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been 
expressly waived by that contributing State; 493  
France had abstained from Resolution 1497, because it did:                                                         
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not believe that the scope of the jurisdictional immunity 
thus created is compatible with the provisions of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the norms of 
French law or the principles of international law. 
Furthermore, it causes a problem of consistency at a time 
when the Security Council has the intention of 
spearheading the movement to reject impunity in all its 
forms.494 
As France continued to feel uncomfortable with this jurisdictional 
exception, it was in a bind. On March 30, 2005, it adjourned the UNSC meeting on the 
Darfur atrocities for another 24 hours.  
During these 24 hours, France turned to the United Kingdom for help with 
the negotiations. If the United Kingdom would sponsor the resolution, France was willing 
to compromise as to the addition of the text proposed by the United States.495 This tactic 
would allow France to vote in favor of a Darfur referral without openly endorsing 
controversial jurisdictional exceptions. It also allowed France to pin the United States in 
support of the ICC, a position that was theretofore highly uncertain. 
The United Kingdom, which was one of the ICC-9, had so far taken a 
back-seat in this debate. Interested in having an international criminal investigation take 
place in Sudan and believing that another ad hoc tribunal was not a good idea, it agreed 
to take the lead from France. Yet, in a surprising move that day, U.S. Secretary of State 
Rice personally called her counterparts in some of the ICC-9 to explain that the United 
States still felt uncomfortable with the ICC.496 Even though it had originated in 
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Washington, no one was sure if the counter-proposal would escape the U.S. veto when it 
came up for a vote. 
The next day, going into the UNSC meeting on Darfur, the same 
uncertainty about the U.S. position remained.497 At 9:30 pm, on March 31, 2005, the 
UNSC members gathered for an informal private meeting. The U.K. Ambassador, Emyr 
Jones Parry, informed the UNSC members that he had a prepared resolution. He 
explained that “[i]f the President were informally to invite me to share it with the other 
council members, and if the Chair were to ascertain if there are nine votes in favor and no 
veto, then I would, for the U.K., be prepared to sponsor it.”498 When it was clear that the 
conditions set by Jones Parry were met, the UNSC’s deliberations opened to the public at 
10:30 p.m. on March 31, 2005. In a meeting that ended at 11:55 p.m., right before the end 
of the Brazilian Presidency of the UNSC, the referral of the Darfur atrocities to the ICC 
was adopted. By a vote of eleven in favor and four abstaining (China, Russia, the United 
States, and Brazil), the UNSC referred the investigation of atrocities in Darfur to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.499  
After the adoption of Resolution 1593, the mood at the UNSC was best 
captured by a story narrated in the early hours of April Fools’ Day, April 1, 2005, by the 
representative of the Philippines.  According to the story, 
 
[t]here was a middle-aged couple who had two stunningly 
beautiful teenage daughters, but who decided to try one last 
time for the son they had always wanted. After months of                                                         
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trying, the wife became pregnant, and, sure enough, 
delivered a healthy baby boy nine months later. The happy 
father rushed to the nursery to see his new son. He took one 
look at him, but was horrified to find that he was the ugliest 
child he had ever seen. He went to his wife and said that 
there was no way that he could have fathered the child. 
“Look at the two beautiful daughters I fathered”, he cried. 
Then he gave her a stern look, and asked, “Have you been 
fooling around?” The wife smiled sweetly and said, “Not 
this time….” 
Similar to the parents, France and the United States were in the aftermath 
of the Iraq war cooperating again. Yet, similar to the son above, the referral of the Darfur 
atrocities to the ICC was, in comparison to the previous ad hoc or mixed tribunals, rather 
ugly. The break from previous tribunals did not, however, occur in a vacuum. It was 
agreed on the basis of prior UNSC decisions that limited the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
reflecting both the incremental progress of the UNSC towards issues of justice and the 
manner in which prior decisions can be used to coordinate actors with different 
preferences. 
D. Libya 
The response of the UNSC with regards to the civil war in Libya was 
swift. The unrest in Libya began in Benghazi on February 15, 2011 and, by February 22, 
had spread throughout the country and escalated into civil conflict.500 On February 26, 
2011, at night, the UNSC imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on Libya, and referred 
the investigation of atrocities to the ICC.501 The need for efficient solutions to 
complicated problems was never more at a play.  
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As an offshoot of the Arab Spring, which had already taken root in Egypt 
and Tunisia, the protests in Libya began in the middle of February 2011. The response of 
the Qaddafi regime was heavy handed. On February 22, in a closed doors discussion on 
the events on Libya, the members of the UNSC and a great number of invited states were 
concerned that Qaddafi would violently suppress the revolution, as he had amassed a long 
rap sheet of, domestic and international, atrocities in his more than 30 years in power.502 
Aside from extensive media coverage, the interests of the UNSC members were stung by 
the public defection, on Monday, February 21, of a number of high officials of the Libyan 
mission to the United Nations in New York. The highest defector, Ibrahim Dabbashi, 
deputy chief of the mission, gave a detailed media presentation regarding the situation in 
Libya and, among his many comments, called Qaddafi a “genocidal war criminal” and 
requested an ICC investigation into the Libyan atrocities.503 At approximately the same 
time as the UNSC was holding its closed doors meeting, on February 22, 2011, a defiant 
Qaddafi, in a televised address to the Libyan people, called for the perpetuation of his 
regime. Standing in front of his Tripoli compound, which had been bombed by the United 
States in 1986, Qaddafi waved his green book and vowed to “die as a martyr” fighting 
against the “greasy rats” of the insurgency.504  
Four days later, on February 26, when the UNSC passed Resolution 1970 
authorizing—among others—the ICC referral, the situation in Libya had worsened. 
Rumors of atrocities continued to circulate, the fighting had intensified and was moving                                                         
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towards Tripoli, and Qaddafi appeared intransigent. The UNSC members needed a fast 
and substantive response. Yet, the negotiations at the UNSC, which had been continuing 
for several days, were not as straightforward as one would imagine.505 The United 
Kingdom and France were eager to intervene and topple the Qaddafi regime, even if it 
required a military intervention on behalf of the rebels. They clearly supported the use of 
the ICC in the conflict.506 Russia, while not outright hostile to the idea of an ICC 
intervention, was more skeptical of this option than its European counterparts. It was also 
not in favor of a NATO-led military intervention and seemed to prefer an incremental 
approach to solving the crisis. China’s public stance remained opposed to the ICC or any 
other violation of sovereignty (e.g. sanctions). Yet, China had also grown skeptical of the 
Qaddafi regime, which regularly attacked Chinese policies in Africa. Additionally, 
Chinese investments in Libya had become imperiled by Qaddafi’s actions and more than 
30,000 Chinese workers were stranded in Libya in the wake of the revolution.507 The 
United States, which had transitioned from the George W. Bush to the Obama 
administration and was finalizing its exit from Iraq, was also ambivalent. Not wanting to 
enter into another war, Obama and some of his advisers wanted no military involvement 
in the Libya crisis. However, three members of the Obama administration, Ambassador 
to the UN, Susan Rice, Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights at the 
National Security Council, Samantha Power, and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, 
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advocated for a U.S. intervention.508 As the later view gradually prevailed within the U.S. 
administration, the chances of an ICC referral in Libya increased.  
The P5 were frantically debating the UNSC’s reaction to the crisis in 
Libya, which included a travel ban, asset freeze, arms embargo, sanctions committee, a 
no-fly zone, military intervention and an ICC referral. As certain members of the P5 
remained ambivalent about the value of an ICC referral, the members of the UNSC 
debated if the referral to the ICC should be used as a threat.509 Or, did a direct referral 
make more sense in order to prevent any further atrocities? While debating these options, 
the delegates of the UNSC received a jolt from a letter sent by the Libyan permanent 
representative at the United Nations, who had not defected earlier with the rest of his 
staff. In his letter, dated and delivered on February 25, 2011, Libya’s permanent 
representative to the UN compared Qaddafi to infamous dictators such as Cambodia’s Pol 
Pot “who were willing to sacrifice large portions of their population for their own 
glory.”510 The call to the UNSC members was clear. An international criminal tribunal 
was investigating the actions of the Khmer Rouge. Similar tools were warranted for the 
actions of the Qaddafi regime. 
At that moment, the U.K. and French delegations suggested that a referral 
of Libya to the ICC be based on the Darfur referral from 2005. This was a very efficient 
decision, as the text would be copied and pasted, with no substantive discussion on its 
provisions. Yet, at the same time, the use of this text was controversial. The Darfur                                                         
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resolution had been repeatedly criticized as being ineffective and unfair.511 It shielded all 
people who were not citizens of Sudan from an ICC investigation, restricted the scope of 
the investigation to Darfur and exempted the UNSC from any duty to fund the 
investigation. It had also failed to stop the regime in Khartoum from committing 
atrocities and did not lead to the arrest of those Sudanese officials who had been indicted 
by the ICC.512 The human rights community, academics and members of the UNSC had 
repeatedly criticized this resolution. Despite these problems, the same precedent was 
proposed for Libya.  
Apart from the apparent need for an efficient solution, the hasty reliance 
on the Darfur precedent was also predicated on the need to secure the ambivalent votes of 
the United States, Russia and China. The sponsors of the resolution had to ensure that the 
reluctant countries would come on board.  
It was not hard to convince the United States. Couched among other 
provisions authorizing sanctions and an arms embargo, the U.S. agreement on the Libya 
referral was easily accomplished for two reasons. First, there was significant pressure 
from within the U.S. administration to act against Qaddafi. Second, since the Darfur 
referral in 2005, the United States had gradually changed its attitude towards the ICC. 
Starting with the second George W. Bush administration and continuing into the Obama 
presidency, the United States did not oppose the ICC as long as the court did not threaten 
U.S. interests. Paramount among the U.S. concerns on the ICC stood the possibility that 
the court would investigate U.S. troops, a particularly strong fear since a military                                                         
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intervention in Libya was still being debated. The text of the Darfur referral, which was 
being replicated word-for-word, included protections for these U.S. concerns.   
The use of the Darfur precedent was also important for the Russian and 
Chinese delegations. Despite its reluctance towards the use of the ICC in Libya, the 
Russian delegation had voted in favor of the Darfur referral, which signaled its comfort 
with the scope of the previous referral. After the U.K. and French proposal to replicate 
the Darfur resolution, a decision was taken at the highest levels of the Russian 
government in Moscow,513 which—at the time under the Medvedev presidency—
affirmed Russia’s continued comfort with the Darfur precedent. The information on 
China’s reaction to the Darfur precedent is not as clear. Towards the end of the 
negotiations, Mr. Li Baodong, the Chinese diplomat at the UNSC, received new 
instructions from Beijing to support the resolution.514 Perhaps China’s comfort with the 
text of the Darfur resolution, on which China had abstained in 2005, was one reason for 
which it supported the resolution. At the end, by copying and pasting the text of the 
Darfur referral, the UNSC, in the span of a handful of days, authorized its second referral 
to the ICC.  
E. Syria 
As of the writing of this Chapter, the UNSC has, thus far, remained in a 
gridlock over the civil war in Syria. In this context of institutional paralysis, there have 
been attempts from some UNSC members to achieve a referral of the atrocities to the 
ICC. These attempts have failed repeatedly, culminating in a Russian and Chinese veto in                                                         
513 Interview: 13. 
514 Interviews: 1, 9, 13. 
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June 2014. Despite the scant record of action with regards to Syria, the record of the 
UNSC’s deliberations on an ICC referral reveals that the Darfur/Libya precedent was 
very important. As the facts below illustrate, this precedent was geared towards collecting 
votes among the P5 rather than ensuring consistency, efficiency and predictability of the 
UNSC’s actions.  
Since the earliest massacres, in late 2011, the main state behind an ICC 
referral has been France. A strong supporter of the ICC, France has also been represented 
at the UN by a team that includes former-ICC employees.515 For the first stage of their 
efforts, the French were supported by the United Kingdom and a number of states that 
were not part of the P5. The most notable support came from fifty-seven other states, 
under the leadership of Switzerland, which, on January 13, 2013, authored a letter to the 
UNSC calling for a referral.516  
These initial French attempts were, however, mired with problems. First, 
some commentators thought that an outright referral would be misplaced. For example, 
Moreno-Ocampo, the former ICC prosecutor, argued that, to stop the killings, the UNSC 
should use the ICC as the sword of Damocles.517 An immediate referral could lead to 
more violence. The threat of a referral would be more likely to deter atrocities and stem 
the war. Additionally, the French actions and the Swiss letter failed to corral the support 
of some states that strongly supported the ICC. Guatemala—a non-permanent member of 
the UNSC at the time— and a vocal supporter of international criminal law was perhaps                                                         
515 E.g. The French legal adviser at the UN was former advisor to ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo. 
516 S/2014/361 (May 19, 2014). 
517 Moreno-Ocampo (2013). 
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the most surprising absence. For these states, another referral that lacked provisions on 
financing of the investigation and cooperation with the ICC was—again like Darfur and 
Libya—doomed to fail.518 Then, the proposal for an ICC referral also faced the hurdles of 
Russia and China, which had been opposed to any action on Syria. In private 
consultations with the other P5, Russia clarified its intent to use its veto against such a 
resolution.519 Before, however, even reaching a Russian veto, the ICC referral faced the 
opposition of the United States. 
The U.S. government supported the use of a justice mechanism for Syria. 
But, it did not think that this mechanism should be the ICC.520 Afraid that any ICC 
investigation in Syria could look into the status of the Golan Heights, the United States 
was skeptical about authorizing an investigation that could implicate Israel.521 
Additionally, many in the Obama administration were not convinced that an international 
court could be of any help. Having seen the constant failures of the Darfur and Libya 
investigations, as well as the inability of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to arrest any of 
those charged by its prosecutor, the United States preferred to support a Syrian justice 
mechanism as part of a future domestic transitional justice system. A court, together with 
a truth and reconciliation commission similar to those set up in Sierra Leone would 
provide the best option for U.S. preferences.522 
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Admittedly, the United States was not alone in its suggestion of a 
domestic judicial mechanism. Guatemala’s negative reaction to another ICC referral 
reflected some of the same concerns.523 Additionally, a few influential individuals in the 
field of human rights supported the regionalization of the justice mechanism. The Middle 
East, as a geographical region, would be better served with a permanent human rights 
court rather than a one-off ICC referral.524  
The position of the United States, however, changed significantly over the 
ensuing months. In January and February 2014, talks among the Syrian parties and the 
international community ended with little success. At the UNSC, Russia was holding out 
for the Assad regime’s survival. After months of debate, in February 2014, Russia 
accepted an innocuous UNSC resolution for humanitarian aid.525 Then, in the beginning 
of April 2014, the Ukrainian crisis became the focal point of the relationship between the 
United States and Russia, which had continued to stray in the course of the prior years.  
At approximately the same time, the French rejuvenated their efforts for 
an ICC referral on Syria. On April 3, 2014, France circulated to the UNSC members a 
report on the atrocities perpetrated by the Assad regime, which included 55,000 photos 
from Assad’s secret prisons provided by a defector code-named Caesar.526 The chilling 
report was accompanied by an interview with France’s ambassador to the UN regarding 
the need for accountability.527 Because the United States was generally comfortable with                                                         
523 Interview: 20. 
524 The New York Times (April 4, 2012).  
525 S/RES/2139 (2014). 
526 France, Press Release (April 15, 2014).  
527 The New York Times (April 4, 2014).  
 
235 
the language used in the Darfur and Libya referrals, the French included the most 
important provisions from this language in the Syria resolution. U.S. personnel would, for 
example, be exempted from investigation. 528 The temporal scope of the investigation 
was, similar to resolution 1970 for Libya, limited to the events of the Arab Spring. The 
draft resolution for Syria—like the Darfur and Libya referrals—clarified that none of the 
expenses of the Syria referral would be paid for by the United Nations.  It was thus clear 
that the text of the resolution was not predicated on the facts in Syria, where—for 
example—the ICC would have trouble investigating without UN funds, but was created 
to accommodate the U.S. interest in a referral. 
Despite the apparent problems with such a resolution, problems that have 
been known since the Darfur resolution in 2005, the French initiative was welcomed by 
various states. Again under Swiss leadership, on May 21, 2014, fifty-eight countries co-
sponsored the French resolution.529 By the time France submitted the resolution to the 
UNSC for a vote, on May 22, 2014, sixty-four states were listed as co-sponsors.530 
Satisfied with all the provisions,531 the United States was among them. 
When draft resolution S/2014/348 was put to the UNSC for a vote, it was 
quickly vetoed by Russia and China, who remained opposed to any intervention in Syria. 
The trajectory of the draft resolution, however, underscores how precedent was used to 
pull the United States into the ICC camp before the resolution was presented for a vote. 
Part V. Discussion                                                         
528 The New York Times (May 21, 2014).  
529 S/2014/361 (May 19, 2014). 
530 S/2014/348 (May 22, 2014). 
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Table 10 indicates how more than one explanation is generally at play 
whenever the UNSC decides to use precedent. This Part explains why the bargaining 
explanation carries more explanatory power than the other explanations in the use of 
precedent by the UNSC. 
Table 10. Summary of Findings 
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Consistency 
According to the consistency explanation, the UNSC is expected to rely on 
precedent in order to (i) safeguard and promote its legitimacy as an international 
institution, or (ii) ensure the fairness of its decisions. The above case studies indicate that 
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the members of the UNSC relied on these reasons for the use of precedent in the creation 
of the ICTR and the failed attempt to refer the Syrian atrocities to the ICC.  
As the events in Rwanda clearly amounted to genocide, the crime of 
crimes, the members of the UNSC considered the resort to an international atrocities 
investigation a fair and legitimate reaction.532 In line with the increasing power of the 
“justice cascade”, the UNSC members have expressed similar preferences in all other 
cases of atrocities examined above. As a result, the condition for the existence of the 
legitimacy and fairness hypotheses, namely the a priori belief in the legitimacy or 
fairness of an international atrocities investigation beyond the role of precedent, was 
satisfied in the above case studies. 
Yet, while the pre-existing condition for these two hypotheses was 
present, these hypotheses came into play only in the debates on Rwanda and Syria. In the 
case of Rwanda, the UNSC’s need for fairness offers the most likely explanation for the 
use of the ICTY precedent in the creation of the ICTR. The ICTY had been created only 
months before the Rwandan genocide, so the issue of fairness arose from the first 
moments of the UNSC’s debates on these atrocities. At that time, the UNSC was 
consistently—even from within533—criticized for not responding to an African crisis in 
the same way with the one engulfing the Balkans. In the case of Syria, the fairness 
consideration has also consistently been at the forefront. The obvious perception of 
unfairness of the UNSC’s actions in Syria as compared to Libya, and the consequences of 
                                                        
532 S/PV.3453 (November 8, 1994). 
533 E.g. statement by Nigeria to the UNSC, S/PV.3377 (May 16, 1994) (“we are not entirely satisfied with 
the manner in which African issues that come before the Council tend generally to be treated.”). 
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this unfairness for the credibility of the UNSC, is one of the many reasons for which 
some UNSC members support an ICC referral for Syria. 
The use of precedent in Rwanda and Syria can also be explained by the 
UNSC’s need for legitimacy. For Rwanda, the concerns over consistency with the ICTY 
were accentuated because of the UNSC’s failure to prevent or stop the Rwandan 
genocide. Not only did the UNSC’s failure challenge the positive tone of post-Cold War 
international cooperation, it also questioned the UNSC’s legitimacy. Reliance on the 
ICTY was a first step in recovering this lost legitimacy. Similar to Rwanda, the ongoing 
atrocities in Syria, and the paralysis at the UNSC, tarnish the UNSC’s legitimacy today. 
Involving the ICC in that conflict can be a legitimizing step for the otherwise sidelined 
UNSC. 
Beyond Rwanda and Syria, however, and even though the conditions for 
their existence were satisfied, the legitimacy and fairness hypotheses were not at play in 
the debates over Sierra Leone, Darfur and Libya. Despite the theoretical predictions, the 
decision-makers relied on precedent, but did not do so in order to satisfy the UNSC’s 
desire for legitimacy and fairness, highlighting thereby that other reasons should exist 
behind the reliance on precedent. 
Reliance 
According to the reliance explanation, the UNSC is likely to use precedent 
in order to (i) transmit credible information, or (ii) ensure the stability of the international 
community. As explained in Part III, both prongs of the reliance explanation presuppose 
that the UNSC members have a (i) common understanding on the role of precedent and 
(ii) are concerned about how their decisions will affect the interested actors. The case 
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studies indicate that these conditions were never fulfilled during the UNSC’s debates on 
the creation of an atrocities investigation. 
The case studies, first, indicate that all UNSC members do not view 
precedent the same way, mainly because there is no common understanding among the 
UNSC members on the use of international criminal investigations.534 The members of 
the UNSC, particularly the P5, disagree over the role that international criminal 
investigations should have in an international system of sovereign entities. As a result, 
and similar to most other actions of the UNSC, investigations are ad hoc and carry 
limited informational value for subsequent debates at the UNSC.  
In addition to the above, it is not clear that the UNSC members had a clear 
preference about the effects of an investigation on the affected parties. The absence of 
this condition does not mean that the UNSC members did not care about the affected 
parties. But, in all of the examined conflicts, the UNSC members never had a clearly 
preferred interlocutor who could benefit from an atrocities investigation. During the 
UNSC debates on each case of atrocities, there were significant allegations that the Hutus 
and Tutsis in Rwanda, the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF in Sierra Leone, the Sudanese 
government, the Janjaweed and the Sudanese rebels in Darfur, the Qaddafi forces and the 
Libyan rebels in Libya, as well as the military and the opposition in Syria had all 
committed atrocities that violated the UNSC precedent, international law and common 
ideas of universal morality. An atrocities investigation would target all sides in each of 
these conflicts. While an investigation would benefit the victims, it would also increase 
                                                        
534 See e.g. S/2012/731 (October 1, 2012).  
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the resentment of those holding the guns on both sides of each conflict against the UNSC. 
The message of using precedent had no value in such circumstances. 
As a result, it is not that reliance does not matter for the use of precedent, 
but the present study does not capture its causal power because its two main conditions 
were never met. Since the UNSC has no information to share with the outside world on 
the value and role of international criminal investigations, it could not use precedent to 
signal its expectations. Additionally, since very few actors obeyed the laws of war, the 
UNSC was not interested in using precedent to stabilize the local communities. For these 
two reasons, the present case studies cannot confirm or reject the applicability of the 
reliance explanation.  
Decision-making 
According to the decision-making explanation, the UNSC is likely to use 
precedent to (i) avoid mistakes, or (ii) efficiently arrive at decisions. These possibilities 
are predicated on the condition that the UNSC members (i) agree on the desirability of 
having an atrocities investigation, but (ii) do not agree on how to optimally create this 
investigation.  
With the exception of Syria, where the Russia and China oppose the use of 
an investigation, these conditions are satisfied in the other case studies of this Chapter. In 
Rwanda, all UNSC member states agreed that an investigation into the genocide was 
appropriate. Their debate focused around the properties of this investigation. Similarly, in 
Sierra Leone, the negotiations focused on the characteristics of the investigation more 
than the creation of the investigation itself. In Darfur, the debates between the United 
States and the ICC-9 centered on the use of the ICC or an ad hoc investigation, with both 
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sides accepting the need for an investigation. Again, in Libya, the minimal debate on the 
investigation focused on its jurisdictional scope, notably on how to protect western 
military members from being the targets of an investigation.  
Within these conditions, however, the case studies indicate that the UNSC 
members use precedent to efficiently arrive at decisions, rather than avoiding past 
mistakes. The first rationale of the decision-making explanation never appeared in these 
case studies, as the UNSC did not use precedent to avoid its past mistakes. If the 
applicability of the bargaining explanation is discounted, this realization should be 
surprising. After all, the UNSC’s attempts to create international criminal tribunals have 
been highly criticized. Even those UNSC members who most support them have 
acknowledged their problems.535 Yet, in using precedent, the UNSC has never sought to 
avoid these problems by tweaking the precedent.536 
Despite the above, the UNSC has used precedent to streamline its 
decision-making process, per the second prong of the decision-making explanation. This 
was demonstrated in the UNSC’s debates on Libya. Overwhelmed by the rapid escalation 
of Qaddafi’s response to the uprising of the Arab spring, the western UNSC member 
states desired a quick solution. By copying and pasting the Darfur precedent, and having 
no substantive debate on its provisions, the UNSC used precedent for decision-making 
efficiency. This rationale was also present in the negotiations over the creation of the 
ICTR, where the UNSC members agreed that the ICTR would share the Prosecutor and 
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY precisely to avoid re-inventing the wheel.                                                         
535 Interviews: 10, 20. 
536 Interview: 4. 
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Despite its applicability, the efficient rationale was absent in the debates 
over Sierra Leone and Darfur. In those instances, the UNSC members’ preference for 
efficiency was outweighed by their concerns for the substantive consequences of an 
investigation. In Sierra Leone, for example, both the United Kingdom and the United 
States were in favor for a tribunal, yet disagreed on its jurisdictional scope, financing 
plans, and general administration. Because of these disagreements, the two sides spent a 
few months deliberating on the details of a tribunal. Similar substantive disagreements 
also overshadowed the applicability of the efficiency hypothesis in the debates on Darfur.    
Overall, the decision-making explanation for the use of precedent is not as 
applicable at the UNSC as expected. The UNSC members have resorted to precedent for 
efficiency only in the cases of Rwanda and Libya. And, they have never used precedent 
to avoid past mistakes, despite the numerous critiques with their past actions in this field. 
This trend counters findings of past legal studies on the use of precedent,537 and points to 
the need for a different explanation on the use of precedent by the UNSC. 
Bargaining 
Despite their applicability, the explanatory power of the consistency and 
the efficiency explanations is limited. First, these explanations do not account for the use 
of precedent in most of the case studies. For example, both are absent with regards to the 
use of precedent in Sierra Leone and Darfur. Additionally, even for the case studies in 
which they are present, these two explanations are of secondary importance. The revolt, 
for example, that some states feel towards the atrocities in Syria would have been 
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sufficient for them to support a referral even if there had been no referral for Libya. 
Similarly, it is highly likely that the investigation in Libya would have mirrored the one 
in Darfur even if the UNSC did not need a fast solution, since the United States has 
strong preferences for jurisdictional exceptions.  
A better explanation for the use of precedent by the UNSC is provided by 
the two-step bargaining explanation. In all of the above case studies, the debates have 
been characterized by competing preferences and uncertainty among UNSC members. 
While these conditions exist in all case studies, the example of Libya is the most telling. 
In that case, as illustrated in the previous Part, western states were in favor of an ICC 
investigation as part of their efforts to transition to a post-Qaddafi era. They never, 
however, openly discussed the possibility of regime change. Other UNSC members, such 
as Russia and China, could see behind the smoke screen, but were not sure if the western 
states were fully determined to remove Qaddafi. They were also not sure if they wanted 
to support Qaddafi that much, as he had impinged on their own interests and both the 
Arab and African states were distancing themselves from him. The bargaining potential 
of precedent arose in light of the competing preferences and the underlying uncertainty.  
In most of the above case studies, one member of the UNSC who desired 
to take action proposed the use of precedent to the other members of the UNSC in order 
to nudge them towards that action. In the case of Sierra Leone, the United States 
suggested a mixed tribunal as a way to overcome the United Kingdom’s hesitation with 
regards to another ad hoc investigation. For Darfur, the United States put forth the 
exemption from the ICC jurisdiction for nationals of non-ICC state parties to overcome 
France’s insistence on an unlimited ICC investigation. In the case of Libya, the United 
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Kingdom and France supported the use of the Darfur precedent as a way to ensure that 
the other P5 would support an ICC investigation. Finally, for Syria, France included the 
Libya/Darfur precedent in its draft resolution as a way to accommodate U.S. concerns.  
In the second step of the bargaining, the receiving states agreed to the 
proposal to use precedent, even though precedent was a second-best option, in order to 
contain other possible actions of the proposing UNSC state. The receiving state thus 
limited its uncertainty over the actions of their counterparty. In the case of Sierra Leone, 
for example, the United Kingdom agreed with the idea of a mixed tribunal as a way to 
both placate its own preferences for justice and to stop the United States from 
destabilizing the Sierra Leonean conflict. In the case of Darfur, France accepted the U.S. 
proposal in order to get an ICC investigation for Darfur and also undermine the U.S. 
efforts to create an African criminal court, which would compete with the ICC. The 
United States agreed with the ICC referral in Libya, not only because it wanted the ICC 
to investigate the atrocities, but also because it was eager to protect U.S. service-members 
from an investigation, which would have happened if (at France’s prodding) the Libyan 
government would refer the case to the ICC on its own. 
It therefore appears that the fourth explanation has significant explanatory 
power, even if the literature has not yet recognized its significance. The historical facts of 
the five case studies indicate that the UNSC members independently prioritized the need 
to coordinate over the text of a resolution. Nonetheless, the use of precedent cannot be 
seen as the silver bullet of bargaining. Instead, the case studies illustrate the limitations 
that precedent has as a coordination tool at the UNSC.  As demonstrated in Parts I and II 
above, precedent can only work if it falls outside the veto zone of the other P5. The Syria 
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case aptly demonstrates this limitation, as the precedent of an ICC referral falls within 
Russia’s veto zone. In essence, the bargaining explanation confirms that the use of 
precedent cannot move mountains. It is more likely to tilt those undecided rather than 
those opposed to a specific course of action.  
By underscoring the role that precedent has in the bargaining stage, this 
section can also shed some light on the use of precedent for the creation of the ICTR and 
the Syria referral. As described in Part II above, A has no benefit from bargaining if all 
points acceptable to A fall within B’s veto zone. As a result, if the veto zones block out 
the decision-making space, we should see no negotiations. This may explain the lack of 
UNSC negotiations over issues such as Taiwan, Palestine, Chechnya and Gibraltar. It 
also explains why despite the New Zealand compromise, Rwanda still voted against the 
creation of the ICTR. The Tutsi RPF government of Rwanda considered that the ICTR’s 
inability to impose death sentences was unacceptable. For the western UNSC members, 
the death penalty was a non-starter. As a result, the area outside Rwanda’s veto zone fell 
entirely within the veto zone of the western UNSC members, and there was no room for 
an agreement.  
Apart from the Rwanda case, the attempt to refer the Syrian atrocities to 
the ICC takes on a new character in light of the significance of precedent. It appears 
likely that the western states did not put forth the Darfur/Libya precedent in order to 
convince Russia and China to ratify the resolution. Russia and China had repeatedly 
informed them of their opposition to any action on Syria, including an ICC referral.538 
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The western states knew that the precedent set by the Darfur/Libya atrocities 
investigations fell within Russia’s and China’s veto zones. It thus appears more likely 
that the western states decided on the Syria referral in order to name and shame the veto-
wielding countries. These two UNSC members now appear to be acting inconsistently, in 
violation of expectations, and against justice. As France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States knew that precedent remained in Russia’s and China’s veto zones, this 
resolution appears to, in the words of Louise Arbour, former ICTY prosecutor, belong 
more in the “museum of political scoring”539 than in the attempts to use precedent to 
reach an agreement.  
Conclusion 
Past studies have repeatedly recognized three reasons why decision-
makers recognize precedent. This Chapter describes how a fourth explanation exists, one 
which does not focus on (i) the debated issue, (ii) the interested parties or (iii) the 
decision-making process, but instead looks at the decision-making bargaining. This 
Chapter has explored the applicability of this explanation through the UNSC’s decisions 
on the creation of international criminal investigations into atrocities committed in 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Libya, Darfur, and Syria. As the five case studies indicate, the 
bargaining explanation carries significant explanatory power. Yet, as Schauer recognized 
for the prior three explanations,540 the fourth one also does not act alone. In most 
occasions, more than one explanation accounts for the use of precedent. 
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By distinguishing the applicability of the bargaining explanation, this 
Chapter clarifies why the UNSC remains tied to its prior decisions rather than using its 
unrestricted powers in new ways. It suggests that instead of hoping that the UNSC may 
one day innovate, it is more appropriate to examine how the UNSC members become 
comfortable with gradual departures from their prior actions. For the children of our 
paradigmatic family, this means that, after being allowed to attend a concert, their parents 
are more likely to accept a theatre outing or a museum visit rather than vacations in a 
foreign country. 
While precedent cannot change a state’s veto zone, it allows for 
coordination among the UNSC members over those issues that fall outside their veto 
zone. In essence, but for the use of precedent, the UNSC members would not have 
coordinated their actions to result in a UNSC Resolution on atrocities investigations. The 
value of the bargaining explanation is that it captures how this coordination on the basis 
of precedent takes place at the UNSC. By doing so, it sheds light into why the UNSC 
members routinely resort to precedent in drafting new resolutions. 
The use of precedent is also the third and final necessary step through 
which the UNSC members create an international atrocities investigation. As a result, the 
following Chapter returns to the main question posed by this dissertation and concludes 






The United States is obliged by international law to 
investigate its citizens suspected of engaging in 
torture, but even if it does not, Americans who 
ordered or carried out torture can be prosecuted 
abroad, by legal bodies including the International 
Criminal Court, legal experts say. 
 
Whether they will be is another question. That’s 
largely a political determination. 
 
Somini Sengupta, New York Times, December 10, 
2014.541 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this dissertation, the ICC Prosecutor, 
Louis Moreno-Ocampo, charged the President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide. Moreno-Ocampo’s power to investigate atrocities 
committed in a state that was not a party to the ICC stemmed from UNSC Resolution 
1593, whereby the UNSC members authorized an investigation into atrocities committed 
in Darfur. This dissertation explains the UNSC’s decisions to initiate such international 
atrocities investigations.  
This conclusion first summarizes the research question, the methodology, 
the main argument and the contributions of this dissertation. It then presents a short case 
study of the UNSC’s response to the atrocities in Darfur to illustrate how the three step 
argument of this dissertation comes together into one decision. Finally, it develops 
theoretical and policy implications of the findings of this dissertation. 
Summary of the Argument 
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The UNSC has authorized atrocities investigations in only eleven of the 
ninety-two states that have experienced atrocities since the end of the Cold War. As 
Chapter Two illustrates, however, past explanations on the creation of atrocities 
investigations cannot explain the work of the UNSC in this field, as they focus on 
individual states and omit the coordination difficulties that occur when it comes to having 
fifteen UNSC members agree on one course of action. Additionally, past studies on the 
UNSC offer explanations that do not capture the UNSC’s work on the creation of 
atrocities investigations. The main shortcoming of these studies is that they rarely apply 
to facts beyond their specific case studies. Because the political calculations of a fifteen-
member body are ever changing, this dissertation suggests that it will never be easy or 
feasible to theoretically generalize as to how the UNSC functions by focusing on the 
preferences of the UNSC members. 
To avoid this difficulty, this dissertation looks at the one constant feature 
of the UNSC, its decision-making process. To examine the role of the decision-making 
process on the actions of the UNSC members, this dissertation relies on the historical 
records of the UNSC’s actions on atrocities. Apart from the written archives, this record 
was supplemented by a series of original interviews with individuals who participated in 
the UNSC’s deliberations and decisions on atrocities.  
This dissertation argues that, while the UNSC’s decision-making process 
is not solely responsible for any specific decision taken by the UNSC, it has a central 
influence on the UNSC’s decisions by aggregating individual state preferences, 
controlling the process through which states respond to crises and guiding undecided 
states towards a single outcome. Because a UNSC decision is a committee process, each 
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step of the committee’s procedures is a step necessary for a final outcome. Additionally, 
completion of these steps is sufficient for reaching a final outcome. As a result, and since 
an explanation focusing on state preferences cannot explain the actions of the UNSC, the 
institutional procedures of the UNSC deserve independent study. To accomplish this, this 
dissertation looks at the three phases of the UNSC’s institutional procedures (i.e. 
preliminary steps, deliberation and issuance of decision) and identifies the central feature 
of each phase (i.e. patron diplomat, use of third-party, reliance on precedent). It then 
explains why these features have become part of the UNSC’s procedure. 
Through its analysis, this dissertation asserts that the creation of an 
atrocities investigation depends on three factors. First, it requires that a diplomat of a 
UNSC member state brings the atrocities to the attention of the UNSC. Past literature has 
explained how diplomats do so (i) at the instruction of their states, (ii) at the discretion 
afforded to them by their states, and (iii) rarely, against the instructions of their states. 
Chapter Four advances the understanding of the role of diplomats in the UNSC’s 
decision-making process by examining how atrocities often come to the attention of the 
UNSC as the outcome of a disagreement between the diplomats at the UNSC and their 
superiors. It also highlights, through its case studies, how the work of diplomats is far 
from mechanical. 
Second, the creation of an atrocities investigation by the UNSC requires 
that the UNSC members collectively believe that the investigation will benefit their states 
and the UNSC. The UNSC members are capable of weighing the material benefits of the 
investigation. They are, however, also concerned about the legitimacy of their action. As 
Chapter Five argues, UNSC members resort to the use of an independent third-party to 
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bridge the gap between these two competing concerns. Under this explanation, it makes 
sense that the UNSC consistently relies on the recommendations of an independent fact-
finding mission prior to authorizing an international atrocities investigation.  
Finally, the creation of an atrocities investigation by the UNSC requires 
that the UNSC members draft one resolution committing their agreement into words. 
Similar to the two above steps, many different reasons influence the negotiations that 
continue to take place in this drafting phase. But beyond political bargaining, the UNSC 
members routinely use precedent to convince other states to vote in favor of their draft 
resolutions. Chapter Six argues that the resort to precedent, contrary to prior 
explanations, is not used to (i) safeguard the interests of the affected parties, (ii) ensure 
consistent outcomes to similar issues, and (iii) render the decision-making process more 
efficient. Instead, the members of the UNSC use precedent as a bargaining tool to 
overcome the uncertainty inherent in UNSC deliberations. 
Compared to prior literature, the argument of this dissertation is 
innovative in two ways. On the one hand, it explains the work of the UNSC in a way that 
applies not only to atrocities investigations, but also to the other issues in front of this 
institution. As a result, the same three step explanation presented here can be applied to 
other examples of the UNSC’s activities, such as the creation of peacekeeping missions 
or imposition of economic sanctions. On the other hand, through the focus on the 
historical records and interviews, this dissertation was able to uncover how the UNSC 
works beyond limiting its focus on the role of state preferences. While these preferences 
always exist in the background, the UNSC is able to take important actions within their 
limits. To do so, however, requires the coordination of the fifteen UNSC members, a 
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topic that has so far been assumed away in prior studies, despite its central significance in 
arriving at decisions.  
Standard political reasons, such as alliances and national interests, carry 
some weight, but do not explain why the UNSC decided not to investigate the atrocities, 
for example, of Burundi in 1994 and Chad in 2005. The lack of investigations can be 
explained, however, by the diminishing likelihood of the UNSC undertaking an 
investigation as it progresses along its three step decision making process. Even though 
they had a patron diplomat, the atrocities in Chad, for example, never caught the attention 
of the entire UNSC, as it was dealing with the much more pressing issue of Darfur. An 
independent commission of inquiry suggested that the UNSC not authorize an 
investigation into the atrocities in Burundi. As indicated by Map 6, it appears that the 
UNSC rarely manages to complete all these three steps, which is why so few atrocities 
investigations exist.    
The UNSC’s referral of Darfur to the ICC 
Returning to the example presented in the Introduction, this dissertation 
has argued that the UNSC investigation into the atrocities committed in Darfur resulted 
from (i) the decision of the United States Permanent Representative at the UNSC to place 
the atrocities on the UNSC’s agenda, (ii) the recommendation of an independent 
commission of inquiry to refer the atrocities to the ICC, and (iii) the French compromise 
to the use of text from a prior resolution, which allowed the United States to get 
comfortable with the jurisdictional obligations of Resolution 1593. It is interesting, 
however, to see how these three steps came together in practice. 
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The impetus for the UNSC’s actions came from the United States, where 
political actors had begun referring to the atrocities in Darfur as genocide. In the early 
summer of 2004, Secretary of State Powell—who had hereto considered genocide a legal 
determination542—in collaboration with the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
created the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Team and sent a team of investigators to 
various points along the Chad-Sudan border. There, in the months of July and August 
2004, investigators interviewed more than 1,100 refugees.543 Even before their report was 
ready, the U.S. Congress unanimously—and concurrently in both House and Senate—
passed a resolution on July 22, 2004, urging the administration “to seriously consider 
multilateral or even unilateral intervention to stop genocide in Darfur, Sudan, should the 
United Nations Security Council fail to act.”544 
Six weeks later, on September 9, 2014, with the results of the investigation 
in hand, Secretary Powell informed the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee that the 
U.S. government had determined that the acts in Darfur constituted genocide against the 
non-Arab Sudanese. Yet, at the same time, instead of pressing for action, Secretary 
Powell invoked Article VIII of the Genocide Convention and referred the matter to the 
UNSC.545 This was the first time this article had ever been invoked.546 At the instructions 
                                                        
542 See e.g. Powell’s interview on June 30th, 2004, in Totten and Markusen (2006) (p.113). 
543 Totten and Markusen (2006) (p. xiii). 
544 H.Con. R. 467—S.Con.R. 124 (July 22, 2004). 
545 Article VIII reads: “Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to 
take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.”  
546 Totten and Markusen (2006) (p.123). 
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of the State Department, the U.S. permanent representative to the UNSC placed the topic 
of the Darfur atrocities on the UNSC’s agenda (Step 1). 
The UNSC greeted Colin Powell’s announcement that the atrocities in 
Darfur constituted genocide with concern. The U.S. declaration and the referral to the 
UNSC were unprecedented actions, which grabbed the attention of the international 
community. China and some African and Arab countries were hesitant to get the ICC 
involved. The United States. and other western states were, however, appalled at the 
magnitude of the atrocities. Since the United States had reached the conclusion that the 
events constituted genocide only after a detailed investigation into the facts, it made sense 
for the UNSC to do the same before proceeding with further action on the atrocities. As a 
result, on September 18, 2004, with Secretary-General Annan in attendance, the UNSC 
passed resolution 1564,547 which requested that the Secretary-General “rapidly establish 
an international commission of inquiry” to (i) investigate violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights, (ii) determine if acts of genocide occurred, and (iii) 
identify alleged perpetrators of these violations. 
On October 4, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of the 
International Commission on Inquiry into Darfur.548 Several months later, on February 1, 
2005, with the atrocities continuing, the International Commission of Inquiry into Sudan 
issued its report.549 The five-person committee included Antonio Cassese (Chairperson), 
Mohamed Fayek, Hina Jilani, Dumisa Ntsebeza and Therese Striggner-Scott. Their                                                         
547 S/RES/1564 (September 18, 2004). 
548 S/2004/812 (October 4, 2004). 
549 Report on Darfur (2005). 
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stature in the field of human rights added to the significance of the commission’s 
findings. The report: 
established that the Government of the Sudan and the 
Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian law amounting 
to crimes under international law. In particular, the 
Commission found that Government forces and militias 
conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of 
civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of 
villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging 
and forced displacement, throughout Darfur. These acts 
were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and 
therefore may amount to crimes against humanity.550  
Despite these findings, the commission determined that genocide was not 
taking place.  While genocidal acts occurred, the commission found that genocidal intent 
was missing.551 The possible genocidal intent of certain individual perpetrators was “a 
determination that only a competent court can make on a case-by-case basis.”552 
For this reason, and because the crimes committed in Darfur were of 
upmost importance, the commission “strongly recommend[ed] that the Security Council 
immediately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court, pursuant to 
article 13(b) of the Statute of the Court.”553 To that end, the commission compiled a list 
of people who it considered responsible for the perpetration of these atrocities. The 
                                                        
550 Report on Darfur (2005) (p. 3). 
551 Report on Darfur (2005) (p. 132). The commission concluded that the Government’s policy: 
does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a 
group distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds. 
Rather, it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on 
villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, 
primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.  
552 Report on Darfur (2005) (p. 161). 
553 Report on Darfur (2005) (p. 162). 
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commission sealed the list and gave it to Secretary-General Annan with the hope that it 
would be given to a prosecutor. Finally, the commission considered that a referral to the 
ICC would not only end impunity but also contribute “to the restoration of peace in the 
region.”554 (Step 2) 
The UNSC continued receiving negative news on Darfur.555 Yet, it did not 
act on the referral to the ICC suggested by the Commission of Inquiry. Because of this 
inaction, the UNSC was prodded towards a referral during its public deliberations on two 
occasions. Mr. Baba Gana Kingibe, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the 
Commission of the African Union in the Sudan, speaking on February 8, 2005 on behalf 
of the African Union, warned the international community to stop “allowing the guilty to 
escape punishment simply because there is no consensus on the appropriate forum in 
which to prosecute the crimes.” 556 Then, on February 16, 2005, the UNSC heard a 
presentation from Ms. Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Ms. 
Arbour—the former Prosecutor of the ICTY—summarized to the UNSC the 
recommendations made by the report International Commission of Inquiry. Similar to 
Mr. Kingibe, Ms. Arbour also focused on the fact that the commission had ruled out the 
establishment of a mixed or of an ad hoc tribunal.557 In effect, Ms. Arbour was pushing 
the UNSC towards referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 
The statements of both Mr. Kingibe and Ms. Arbour only make sense 
against the diplomatic backdrop at the UNSC. As has been documented in Chapter Six                                                         
554 Report on Darfur (2005) (p. 148). 
555 S/2005/68 (February 4, 2005). 
556 S.PV/5120 (February 8, 2005). 
557 S.PV/5125 (February 16, 2005). 
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and elsewhere,558 the United States had championed the creation of ad hoc and mixed 
tribunals, but felt uncomfortable with the creation and existence of the ICC. To stem the 
likelihood of an ICC investigation into U.S. actions, the first George W. Bush 
administration signed bilateral Article 98 agreements with a series of countries.559 The 
U.S. Congress also passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act, which 
prohibited the U.S. government from funding or assisting the ICC.560 As a result, the 
United States supported an international criminal investigation into Darfur, but opposed a 
referral to the ICC. On the other side of the spectrum, France championed a referral to the 
ICC. As a result, the debates between the French and the U.S. sides started on February 1, 
2005, when the Commission of Inquiry issued its report, and lasted until March 2005.  
Meanwhile, on March 4, 2005, the Secretary-General issued to the UNSC 
his monthly report on Sudan of February 2005.  In this report, the Secretary-General 
again determined that the security situation was fragile. The 9,000 humanitarian workers 
could not cope with the magnitude of the crisis, while the African Mission in Sudan 
(‘AMIS’) had a hard time amassing its target of 3,300 troops. Confronted with more 
negative news, the UNSC undertook two actions on Darfur that were not related to an 
atrocities investigation. 
First, on March 29, 2005, the UNSC imposed a system of military and 
financial sanctions against those responsible for the violence in Sudan.561 Acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC decided to establish a Committee that would                                                         
558 Scheffer (1999); Schabas (2004).  
559 E.g. Kelley (2007). 
560 The American Service-Members' Protection Act. 
561 S/RES/1591 (2005). 
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approve the government’s movement of military equipment and supplies into Darfur and 
designate people or entities responsible for the violence in Darfur. Then, the UNSC 
decided that “[a]ll States shall freeze all funds, financial assets and economic resources 
that are on their territories on the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time 
thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons....” In the 
presence of Secretary-General Annan, 12 UNSC members voted in favor of this step, 
with Algeria, Russia, and China abstaining.  
In the background, diplomats continued to work relentlessly on the issue 
of atrocities. The United States overcame its opposition towards the ICC only after 
France accepted jurisdictional restrictions on the ambit of the investigation, which were 
based on the UNSC’s precedent in peacekeeping missions in Liberia (Step 3).  
Hence, on March 31, 2005, two days after it imposed sanctions on the 
government of Sudan, the UNSC also authorized the ICC to investigate the atrocities 
committed in Darfur. As a consequence of this decision, which was taken through the 
three step institutional process and the explanations presented in this dissertation, ICC 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo could investigate and indict the President of Sudan, even 
though Sudan was not a party to the Rome Statute. 
Theoretical Implications 
The conclusions of this dissertation may be disappointing. Not only does 
the dissertation deal with the dark topic of atrocities, but the research behind the 
dissertation points to an entrenched inability of the UNSC to create more investigations 
or to prevent mass atrocities. After all, victims of atrocities and the international 
community cannot reasonably rely on a three step procedure, which has so far worked in 
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eleven, out of ninety-two, instances. However, the dissertation offers four theoretical 
observations that can hopefully improve the general understanding of international 
institutions and of the UNSC system on atrocities investigations, thereby concluding on a 
more positive note. 
As explained in Chapter Three, the three step procedural sequence of the 
UNSC’s decision-making process lends itself to specialized expertise. The role of 
diplomats, the reliance of third-party commissions and the use of precedent all indicate 
how such expertise has an important role in international affairs and within the UNCS, 
which is considered one of the toughest real-politik international institutions. In dealing 
with atrocities, the UNSC members lack a clear definition of atrocities, access to reliable 
information, and the capacity to effectively deal with such events. The UNSC members 
also care about the UNSC’s reputation and try to avoid the negative externalities 
associated with false positives (i.e. create an investigation for facts that are later proven 
not to be atrocities) and false negatives (i.e. fail to create an investigation for true 
atrocities). As illustrated through the previous Chapters, to navigate through these 
perilous decision-making straits, the UNSC members rely on specialized expertise in 
each of the three steps of the process. 
The observation that specialized expertise matters should give us pause. It 
illustrates that the main question posed by this dissertation can be reversed. Instead of 
asking why the UNSC created an investigation into eleven of the ninety-two states that 
have experienced atrocities, one can also ask why the UNSC did not avoid creating an 
investigation into these eleven instances of atrocities. As the case studies in prior 
Chapters indicate, many UNSC member states were lukewarm towards some of these 
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atrocities investigations (e.g. the United States in Darfur). Yet, in these cases the political 
preferences of the UNSC member states caved in when faced with opposing views from 
diplomats, third parties and precedent. In Darfur, the recommendations of the 
commission of inquiry and the precedent in favor of an investigation shifted the 
preferences of the United States, thereby adding Darfur to the list of eleven 
investigations. Per the predictions of this analysis, the UNSC members relied on and 
were influenced by the three forms of professional expertise. It thus appears that the 
UNSC does not avoid an investigation when the professional expertise of diplomats, third 
party commissions and precedent points towards an investigation. 
The reliance on professional expertise further indicates that such expertise 
within international institutions matters. In doing so, it follows the lead of the literature 
on epistemic communities, which argues that uncertainty over complex or technical 
issues often leads to the rise of expert groups with important political power.562 By 
recognizing the role that such individuals and groups have to play, this dissertation 
introduces a new variable into the work of international institutions, namely that of 
professional expertise. This dissertation thus illustrates that knowledgeable individuals 
may carry influence disproportionate to the power of their state within an institution. 
Colin Keating’s example is instructive. While the permanent representative of New 
Zealand, Keating used his legal skills and training to steer the UNSC towards the creation 
of the ICTR, which should not have been the case if it relied on New Zealand’s influence 
within the UNSC in any other terms. It further describes how choices of institutional 
                                                        
562 Haas (1992); Adler and Haas (1992). 
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design, such as the use of procedural rules, the mandate of a third party and the reliance 
on precedent, can also influence the decision-making process. This can be illustrated 
again through the creation of the ICTR. In that case, as explained in Chapter Six, the 
effect of the ICTY’s precedent on the creation of the ICTR exceeded the influence 
exerted by many UNSC member states. By introducing this new variable of professional 
expertise, this dissertation provides one more building block to the literature on 
international organizations. 
Beyond the role of professionalized judgment, this dissertation illustrates 
why all studies on the UNSC can benefit from turning to the micro-dynamics of the 
UNSC’s work. Instead of, for example, focusing on peacekeeping by looking at the target 
state and other variables unrelated to the UNSC, peacekeeping studies may benefit from 
an appreciation of the decision-making patterns at the UNSC. The answer, for example, 
to why a 45,000 force rather than a 90,000 force is authorized for a particular mission 
may have as much to do with intra-UNSC bargaining, as it does with concrete needs on 
the ground. Similar observations can be made for those studies that examine the UNSC’s 
practice on sanctions, diplomatic missions, humanitarian aid or authorizations for the use 
of force. 
This dissertation, furthermore, indicates that commentators evaluating the 
success of an international investigation have to take into consideration the political 
dynamics at the UNSC at the moment the decision to begin an investigation is made. The 
significance of these dynamics on the success of the investigation has, thus far, been 
overlooked. Snyder and Vinjamuri, for example, measure the use of international trials in 
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an empirical study of 32 civil wars.563 They find that international trials (i.e. the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda) had no effect on reducing worldwide atrocities or imposing any 
form of deterrence, but that they have caused a domestic backlash in Serbia and Croatia. 
Contrary to the spirit of these findings, Akhavan presents three case studies (Cote 
d’Ivoire, Uganda, Darfur) in which the presence of an international tribunal has 
improved—rather than impeded—peace and stability.564 In a similarly positive 
examination of international trials, Nettelfield demonstrates that the creation of the 
international court for the former Yugoslavia was strongly related to the growth and 
success of the political order in Bosnia.565 The above evaluations, however, miss the 
influence that the dynamics behind the UNSC political decision to create an investigation 
have on the success of an investigation. One should not, for example, comment on the 
ICC’s investigation into Sudan without appreciating that the political dynamics at the 
moment it was initiated could not have supported a stronger, more powerful 
investigation. The President of Sudan, Omar al Bashir, remains at large not because of 
the ICC’s failure, but because the UNSC members could only agree on a toothless 
investigation.  
The past Chapters have, furthermore, underscored the deep divergence 
between the literature on why investigations ought to be created and on how they are 
actually created. As of now, there have been a large number of writings on why and when 
there should be international atrocities investigations. Three categories of answers have                                                         
563 Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003). 
564 Akhavan (2009). 
565 Nettelfield (2010). 
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been suggested to the first question. Some argue that international criminal courts are 
particularly adept at dealing with perpetrators of atrocities, they deter future conflict and 
they promote the rule of law.566  Others argue that such trials may be successful as a tool 
for peace building.567 Finally, a third group contends that these trials help the healing 
process of those that survived the atrocities and contribute to the reconciliation of the 
affected communities.568  
The answers to the second question can be categorized in two categories. 
For some, trials are fundamental to the promotion of the rule of law. Trials should thus 
take place after any atrocity has been committed, and particularly, when local authorities 
are unwilling or unable to conduct proper domestic investigations in line with 
international legal standards.569 Others, however, tend to be more cautionary. They 
contend that politicians rather than lawyers should conduct these investigations, and that 
the investigations should take place after peace has been secured, when they do not risk 
upsetting the domestic balance of power and when there are no parties likely to disrupt 
the peace (i.e. spoilers). They also expect the international community to have a strategic 
engagement with these courts, trying to use them to its benefit and not for the promotion 
of abstract values such as accountability.570  
The UNSC’s political decisions behind the creation of international 
investigations cannot be squared with these answers. Deterrence, for example, does not                                                         
566 Akhavan (2001); Roth (1998); Orentlicher (1991). 
567 Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003); Elster (1998); Nino (1996). 
568 Minow (1998); van Zyl (2002). 
569 Bassiouni (2002); Minow (2000). 
570 Abbott (1999); Kissinger (2001); Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003). 
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come into play during the decision-making bargains at the UNSC, as the UNSC reacts to 
atrocities already committed. There is little evidence that the UNSC considers these 
investigations as part of the peace building process, since they usually created after at 
least a tenuous peace has been accomplished. While some diplomats and countries at the 
UNSC have a keen interest on the victims of the conflicts, the debates on the creation of 
an atrocities investigation generally focus more on the power of the perpetrators than 
justice for the victims. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the UNSC’s stance 
towards investigations is influenced by the ability or determination of governments to 
conduct their own investigations or local balances of power among the warring factions.  
Of course, there is evidence that all of the above reasons influence the decisions of the 
UNSC. But, they are not dispositive or even central for the UNSC when it comes to 
making its final decision.  
The disconnect between the aspirational goals of international criminal 
justice and the realities at the UNSC remains significant. Perhaps, because there is a lack 
of appreciation for the difficulty of creating an UNSC investigation, international 
atrocities investigations are constantly criticized as falling short of aspirational standards. 
Hopefully, this dissertation contributes to changing this perception by aligning normative 
expectations with the facts on the ground. 
Policy Implications 
Apart from the theoretical implications of this dissertation, the UNSC’s 
reliance on a three step decision-making process allows ample room for human rights 
practitioners and proponents of international criminal justice to improve the prospects of 
international criminal justice in previously untested ways. In the first phase of the UNSC 
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deliberations, the human rights community can rally diplomats to the cause of specific 
atrocities. By providing information on the atrocities and ideas on the role that justice can 
play in a local conflict, human rights practitioners can influence the thoughts of UNSC 
diplomats. This potential is particularly true for the diplomats of the smaller non-
permanent members, who usually have more discretion towards atrocities unrelated to 
their home state and are also less informed about these atrocities.571  
When the UNSC enters its deliberation phase, the human rights 
community can further support the cause of justice by providing the UNSC with evidence 
of atrocities and proposals to use justice in flexible ways that address the reluctance of 
certain UNSC members. Additionally, the human rights community can support the work 
of the commissions of inquiry. For example, invaluable help can be given to the evidence 
collection work of these missions through data management programs and liaisons with 
victims and witnesses on the ground.  
Finally, when the UNSC is debating a resolution for investigations, the 
human rights community can also supply drafting arguments to the states that are 
working on such resolutions. So far, the human rights community has only criticized the 
drafts produced at the UNSC, whereas constructive engagement would likely produce 
better resolutions. 
It is noteworthy that all of the investigations authorized by the UNSC and 
discussed in previous Chapters of this dissertation were undertaken after some prescient 
individuals or groups from the human rights community took initiatives such as those                                                         
571 In dealing, for example, with the 1994 atrocities in Rwanda, Colin Keating, Ambassador from New 
Zealand, and Karel Kovanda, Ambassador from the Czech Republic, had more discretion than their P5 
colleagues. See Interview 7; Kovanda (2010).  
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described above. Cherif Bassiouni, for example, created a data collection system for the 
commission of inquiry into the former Yugoslavia. Humanitarian workers were 
instrumental in collecting testimony for the commission of inquiry into Darfur. Human 
rights NGOs kept the western countries appraised of the atrocities in Sierra Leone, even 
as the Kosovo campaign had captivated the UNSC’s attention. This dissertation indicates 
that, rather than allowing such support to take place on an ad hoc basis, the human rights 
movement would increase the prospects of success for international atrocities 
investigations by systematically helping the UNSC members in its three step decision-
making phases. 
Finally, it is worth considering if and how these three steps of the 
decision-making process can be improved. In the first step, diplomats may become more 
effective in dealing with issues of international criminal justice if they have substantive 
knowledge of international criminal law. Keating and Shaffer, for example, who were 
instrumental in the creation of the ICTY and the SCSL, respectively, were both lawyers 
with a focus on human rights. Such training is likely to be helpful in differentiating the 
instances in which an atrocities investigation is legally feasible. It may also be helpful in 
getting other states and actors within a state to defer to the diplomat’s judgment.  
In the second step, third party commissions may be more useful if they are 
created faster and more frequently. In the current scheme, the UNSC members have to 
deliberate on atrocities and then agree to create a commission of inquiry. This takes time 
and carries the risk that evidence gets destroyed or altered and perpetrators flee. To 
minimize such delays, the UNSC may consider relying on the more frequent 
investigations of the UN Human Rights Committee. Alternatively, and more realistic due 
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to the politicized nature of the latter committee, the UNSC may rely on investigations 
created by the Secretary-General, if he or she were to create such investigations soon 
after an allegation of atrocities. While maintaining their legitimizing role, such 
investigations would cut the delays in the UNSC decision-making process, potentially 
rendering investigations a more effective tool for justice.  
Finally, the third-step of the decision-making process can be improved if 
UNSC members expand the ambit of precedent they consider. So far, the case studies 
indicate that UNSC members look to prior UNCS precedent. But, these same states are 
members to a multitude of other international organizations and conventions, such as 
International Court of Justice, the WTO, the Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. By looking 
at the work of these international bodies, rather than focusing only on the previous work 
of the UNSC, the UNSC members are more likely to find precedent that allows them to 
bargain towards a common outcome. 
Conclusion 
Despite the above potential improvements, this dissertation makes clear 
that, as in all aspects of human life, there is no absolute justice. By design, the UNSC is 
unable to engage with every conflict. As all those who were interviewed for this 
dissertation acknowledged, the UNSC is not going to create investigations into numerous 
atrocities. Double standards will continue to be applied.  However, short of creating a 
replacement, the human rights community and supporters of international justice have to 
work with the UNSC to promote their causes. By clarifying how the UNSC works, this 
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